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International Third Party Dispute
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RICHARD
I.

B. BILDER**

INTRODUCTION

From earliest times, third parties have played an important role in
attempting to resolve interpersonal and intergroup conflicts. Indeed, the
concept of third-party dispute settlement and roles of judge, arbitrator
and mediator pervade all human societies and are closely linked to the
emergence of political order and law.
It is not practical in this brief article to review either the long historical experience of international third party dispute settlement or the extensive descriptive and analytical literature it has produced.' My purpose
* This article was originally written as a background paper for the United States

Institute of Peace Conference on "Toward the Twenty-First Century: An Investigation of
the Roads to Peace," held June 20-21, 1988 at Airlie House, Airlie, Virginia. It will
eventually be published in the proceedings of that conference.
** Burrus-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin -Madison. B.A., Williams
College, 1949; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1956.
1. This initial note is intended to provide an introductory bibliography of international
third-party dispute settlement. Unless otherwise stated, works cited by author in subsequent notes refer to works more fully cited here.
For legally-oriented overviews of international dispute settlement see, e.g., Bilder, An
Overview of International Dispute Settlement, 1 EMORY J. INT'L DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1
(1986); Bilder, InternationalDispute Settlement and the Role of Adjudication, 1 EMORY J.
INT'L DISPUTE RESOLUTION 131 (1987); MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
(1984); INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE LEGAL ASPECTS (H. Waldock ed. 1972); F. NORTHEDGE
& M.DONELAN,INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE POLITICAL ASPECTS (David Davies Memorial

Institute 1971); 0. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUXIL DES
COURS 10 (1981); Sohn, The Future of Dispute Settlement, THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINES AND THEORY 1121 (R. J. Mac-

Donald & D. M. Johnson eds. 1983); D. Bowett, Contemporary Developments in Legal
Techniques in the Settlement of Disputes, 180 RECUEIL DES COURS 177 (1983); Laylin, Out-

lines for Third Partiesin InternationalDisputes, 66 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 22 (1972); 4 C.
DE VISCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Corbett trans. 1968); INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 13 (L. Henkin, R. Pugh, 0. Schachter & H. Smite

eds. 1980) [hereinafter Henkin]; H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933); DISPUTE SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS (K. Raman
ed. 1977) [hereinafter Raman]; RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES sec. 902 (1988) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; Lachs, Some Reflections on the
Settlement of InternationalDisputes, 68 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 323 (1974); RANDOLPH,

(1973); Pechota, Complementary Structures of Third-Party Settlement in InternationalDisputes (UNITAR Study
P.S. No. 3, 1971). On dispute settlement in particular fields, see Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Arising Out of the Law of the Sea Convention, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495 (1975);
Bilder, The Settlement of Disputes in the Field of the InternationalLaw of the EnvironTHIRD PARTY SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
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is rather to suggest some basic questions and tentative answers which
may help to provide a framework for further thinking, discussion and re-

ment, 1 RECUEIL DES COURS 139 (1975). Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures:
The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. R. (1988); R. LILLICH (ed.), THE IRAN-UNITED
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1981-83 (1984).
Among recent legally-oriented empirical or otherwise less-traditional studies, see e.g.,
Bailey, Peaceful Settlement of InternationalDisputes, Raman, supra; T. FRANCK, THE

(1968); J. GAMBLE & D. FISCHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
(1976); G. RAYMOND, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE
STRUCTURE OF THE STATE SYSTEM: AN ANALYSIS OF ARBITRATIVE SETTLEMENTS (1980); A.
STUYT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 1794-1970 (1972); F. NORTHEDGE & GRIEVE,
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: CASE HISTORIES 1945-70 (1973); McGinley, Ordering a Savage Society, 25 HARv. INT'L. L. J. 43 (1984); Coplin & Rochester, The Permanent Court of International Justice, The International Court of Justice, The League of Nations and the
STRUCTURE OF IMPARTIALITY

JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF A FAILURE

United Nations: A Comparative Empirical Survey, 66 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 529 (1972); and L.
PROTT, THE LATENT POWER OF CULTURE AND THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE (1979).
For recent overviews of international dispute settlement primarily from an international relations or social psychological perspective, see e.g., D.G. PRUITT & J.Z. RUBIN, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SETTLEMENT (1986); M. PATCHEN, RESOLVING
DISPUTES BETWEEN NATIONS: COERCION OR CONCILIATION?

(1988); J.

BERCOVITCH, SOCIAL

CONFLICTS AND THIRD PARTIES: STRATEGIES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1984);

W.

ZARTMAN,

THE 50% SOLUTION (1976); W. ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION (1985); NEW ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT (G. Winhan ed. 1988); D.G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR
(1981); J.Z. RUBIN, DYNAMICS OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION: KISSINGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

(1981); J.Z. Rubin, Experimental Research on Third-Party Intervention in Conflict: Towards Some Generalizations,87 PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 379 (1980); J.A. Wall, Third Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup Conflict Resolution, 27 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 301
(1983). Among many other useful political or social science-oriented works, see e.g., J.Z.
RUBIN & B.R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION (1975);
R.L. BUTTERWORTH, MANAGING INTERSTATE CONFLICTS 1945-1974 (1976); MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CRISES (D. Frei ed. 1982); N. CHOUCRI & R. NORTH, NATIONS IN CONFLICT (1976); R.J.
RUMMEL, JR., UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND WAR (1975); G. SNYDER & P. DIESENG, CONFLICT
AMONG NATIONS (1977); J.G. STOESSINGER, WHY NATIONS GO TO WAR (3d ed. 1982); Z. MAOZ,
PATHS TO CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE INITIATION 1816-1976 (1982); S. ROBERTS, ORDER AND DISPUTES (1979); C.R. MITCHELL, THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
(1981); D. YOUNG, THE POLITICS OF FORCE (1968); R.N. LEBOW, BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR:
THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS (1981); D. YOUNG, THE INTERMEDIARIES: THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES (1967); R. SMOKE, WAR: CONTROLLING ESCALATION (1977); THE
MAN IN THE MIDDLE: INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (S. Touval & I.
Zartman eds. 1985); J.W. BURTON, CONFLICT AND COMMUNICATION (1969); J.W. BURTON,
RESOLVING DEEP ROOTED CONFLICT (1987); J.R. MITCHELL, THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (1981); CONFLICT IN WORLD SOCIETY (M. Banks ed. 1984); R. FISHER & W.
URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981); R. JERVIS, PER-

(1976).
There are also many case studies of third party intervention in particular conflicts or
dispute, for example Rubin, supra (1981); M. HASTINGS & S. JENKINS, BATTLE FOR THE FALKCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(1983); R.L. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN
(1969); J. CARTER, KEEPING FAITH (1982).
LANDS

DAYS:

A

MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Among the leading scholarly journals relevant to these problems are the American Jour-

nal of International Law, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and the Negotiation Journal.
For examples of the recent interesting and sophisticated empirical and theoretical research on dispute processing within domestic societies, and particularly the United States,
see e.g., M. Galanter, Adjudication, Litigation, and Related Phenomena, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (L. Lipson & S. Wheeler eds. 1986); materials collected and cited in Special
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search about the potential role of third party intervention.'
Several introductory comments may be in order. First, third party
intervention is not simply a "legal" means of dispute settlement, but is
relevant to many kinds of conflict resolution processes. International lawyers have tended, of course, to look principally at the more formal, institutionalized and "legal" aspects of international third-party dispute settlement-in particular, international adjudication.' The International
Court of Justice's (I.C.J.'s) recent assertion of jurisdiction and ruling
against the U.S. in the Nicaraguacase", and the Reagan Administration's

Issue on Dispute Processing and Civil Litigation, 15 LAW & Soc'v REV. 389-928 (1980-81);
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, (S. Goldberg, E. Green & F. Sander eds. 1985); DISPUTING IN AMERICA:
THE CHANGING ROLE OF LAWYERS (E. Green, J. Marks & F. Sander eds. 1985) See also
Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976); and Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know And Don't Know (And Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983); C. WITTy,
MEDIATION AND SOCIETY (1980); Silbey and Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW &
POL'Y 7 (1987); Kressel & Pruitt, Themes in the Mediation of Social Conflict, 41 J. Soc.
ISSUES 179 (1985); V. Aubert, Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 7 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26 (1963); T. Eckhoff, The Mediator and the
Judge, 10 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 158 (1986); 0. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073
(1984); Mather & Ynvesson, Language, Audience and the Transformation of Disputes, 15
LAW & Soc. REV. 775 (1980-81); C. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754; S. Merry, Disputing Without Culture, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2057 (1987); Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions,
44 So. CALIF. L. REV. 305 (1971); Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 353 (1979); Wagatswma & Rossett, The Implications of Apology, 20 LAW & Soc.
REV. 461 (1980); B. Yngvesson, Reexamining ContinuingRelations and the Law, 1985 Wisc.
L. REV. 623; S. Sibley and A. Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship;
DPRP Working Paper 8:9 (June 1988) (U. Wis.-Madison Inst. for Legal Studies); D. KOLB,
THE MEDIATORS (1985).
On the growing interest among U.S. scholars and practitioners in non-judicial or "alter-

native" dispute resolution, see references above and, L.

KONOWITZ, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE

RESOLUTION: CASES AND MATERIALS (1985).

For interesting discussions of disputes and dispute processing from a broader crosscultural and anthropological perspective, see e.g., Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute
Institutions in Society, 8 LAW & Soc. REV. 217 (1973); S. ROBERTS, ORDER AND DISPUTES
(1979); P. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1979);
THE DISPUTING PROCESS-LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES (L. Nader & H. Todd eds. 1978); F.G. Sny-

der, Anthropology, Dispute Processes and Law: A Cultural Introduction, 8 BRIT. J. L. &
Soc'Y 141 (1981).
2. Certain parts of this paper draw upon my two articles on dispute settlement and
adjudication, An Overview of InternationalDispute Settlement, supra note 1 and International Dispute Settlement and the Role of Adjudication, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., references cited in the first paragraph of supra note 1.
4. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicargua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984 on Jurisdiction and Admissibility),
reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 468 (1984); 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27, 1986 on Merits),
reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986). Among the many articles analyzing and discussing the
decision and various aspects of the case, see, e.g., articles and comments in 79 AM. J. INT'L
L. at 373-405, 423-30, 652-64, and 992-1005 (1985) (dealing with jurisdictional phase), and
81 AM. J. INT'L L. at 77-183 (1987) (dealing with merits); Chayes, Nicaragua, the United
States and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1445 (1985); Moore, The Secret War in
Central America and the Future of World Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 24 (1980); Reisman,
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related decision to withdraw the declaration made by the U.S. in 1946
submitting to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, has certainly heightened current interest in the role of international arbitral tribunals and
courts.' In contrast, however, political scientists and social psychologists
have focused their attention primarily on mediation and other non-binding types of dispute-resolution processes; indeed, their writings have
largely ignored the role of either law or of formal legal techniques such as
adjudication in international conflict resolution.'
Clearly, any approach to thinking about international conflict resolution should take into account all of the types of factors which may affect
the usefulness and success of third party -intervention-normative influences, power-political interests, the parties' perceptions and attitudes.
Our understanding will best be served by pursuing both legal and social
science research and combining a variety of disciplinary perspectives.
Second, third party dispute settlement is only one way of trying to
resolve international conflicts, and can be understood only in the context
of a general study of dispute-settlement problems and processes. While
an exploration of these broad underlying questions is beyond the scope of
this paper, they include: first, what do we mean by "conflicts" and "disputes"?; second, what causes conflicts and disputes?; third, do we need to
settle conflicts and disputes, and, if so, which ones and why?; fourth, do
states have any international obligation to settle their disputes peacefully?; fifth, what kinds of international disputes are there, how frequently do they arise, between or among what states, and involving what
kinds of claims?; sixth, do disputes or conflicts follow typical patterns or
"life cycles"?; seventh, what techniques or procedures are available in
general for settling international disputes?; eighth, when is a dispute
"settled"?; ninth, how can disputes be avoided?; and tenth, what is the
7
relevance of law or normative considerations to dispute settlement?

II. WHAT Do WE MEAN By "THIRD-PARTY DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT"?
A "third-party" can be defined as an individual or collective that is
external to a dispute between two or more others and that either tries to
help the disputants reach a settlement or, in some cases, is authorized on
its own to determine a settlement.' Thus, a third-party may be another
state or group of states (i.e. Algeria in the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis); a governmental international organization (i.e. the U.N. or O.A.S.); an international court (i.e. the I.C.J.) or an arbitrator or arbitration panel (i.e. the

Has the InternationalCourt Exceeded its Jurisdiction? 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1986).

5. See Secretary of State Schultz's letter to U.N. Secretary General, Oct. 7, 1985; Dept.
of State statement of Oct. 7, 1985; and Legal Adviser Sofaer's statement of Dec. 4, 1985, all
reprinted in 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2106 at 67 (Jan. 1986) and 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985).
6. See, e.g., the references cited in the third paragraph of supra note 1.
7. For a discussion of some of these broader issues, see, e.g., Bilder, An Overview of
InternationalDispute Settlement, supra note 1.
8. This definition draws on, Puirr AND RUBIN, supra note 1, at 165-66.
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U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal); a non-governmental organization (i.e. the International Committee of the Red Cross); or an individual or group of
individuals functioning either in a representative capacity (i.e. a U.N.appointed mediator) or conceivably in a private capacity. In the interest
of impartiality, mediators, arbitrators or judges (or at least most of the
judges on an international court) will usually be of a nationality other
than that of the disputing parties. However, this need not be the case so
long as the third-party is perceived by the disputants as "external" to the
dispute and capable of performing impartially and effectively the role of a
third-party. For example, the U.S. and Canada have frequently utilized
binational panels in dispute settlement roles (i.e. the arbitral panels established under the Jay Treaty, the U.S.-Canada International Joint
Commission, and the binational panels which will be set up to review antidumping and countervailing duty determinations under Chapter 19 of
the proposed Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement)."
"Third-party intervention" has, in turn, been defined as
"[I] ntervention into a dispute of a person or agency whose purpose it is to
act as an instrument for bringing about a peaceful settlement of that dispute, while creating structures whereby the foundations of a lasting settlement may be laid,"' 0 or, more broadly, as "[Any action taken by an
actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or
remove one or more problems in the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the conflict itself."" International
lawyers and others appear to sometimes use the term "third-party dispute-settlement" to refer, not to the broad political processes of thirdparty intervention but only to the more formalized and regularized structure of norms, institutions, arrangements and procedures which are recognized parts of the international legal order - in particular, techniques
and procedures for binding adjudication utilizing arbitral tribunals or the
I.C.J. However, I will here use "third party intervention" and "third
party dispute settlement" interchangeably. It is important to note that
third parties can play an important part in managing, deescalating or
damping disputes, even if such efforts do not result in a final resolution of
the disputes. That is any enquiry into the role of third parties should
appropriately address and encompass their function in "dispute-management and processing," as well as in "dispute resolution and settlement."

9. See Bilder, When Neighbors Quarrel: Canada-U.S. Dispute Settlement Experience
(the 1986-87 Claude T. Bissell Lectures, University of Toronto), Inst. for Legal Studies,
Univ. of Wisconsin Law School, Disputes Processing Research Program Working Paper 8:4
(May 1987); J.-G. Castel, The Settlement of Disputes Under the 1988 Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement, 83 AM. J. INT'L. L. 118 (1989); McDorman, The Dispute
Settlement Regime of the Free Trade Agreement, 2 REv. INT'L. Bus. L. 303 (1988).
10. BERCOVITCH, supra note 1, at 13, citing Harbottle, The Strategy of Third Party
Intervention in Conflict Resolution, 35 INT'L J. 118, 120 (1979-80).
11. Young, infra note 17, at 34.
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III. Do STATES HAVE AN OBLIGATION To SUBMIT THEIR DISPUTES To
THIRD PARTIES EITHER FOR HELP OR FOR BINDING SETTLEMENT?

It is well established that, absent special agreement, states have no
obligation to submit their disputes to third parties either for help in
achieving settlement or, a fortiori, for binding settlement by such third
parties.1" Consequently, the use of most third-party dispute settlement
techniques, and in particular resort to arbitration or judicial settlement,
depends upon the acquiescence of the disputing parties and cannot occur
without their consent.
However, those states that are members of the U.N. (which means, in

effect, almost all of the world's nations) have assumed under the Charter
treaty obligations to accept at least some limited types of third party intervention, particularly as regards disputes whose continuation "[ils likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."1 3 And,
under Art. 33(2) of the Charter, the Security Council shall, when it deems
necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by the means
(which include third-party means) listed in Art. 33(1) of the Charter.
It is, of course, also open to nations to enter into international agreements with each other which include so-called "compromissory clauses"
or other obligations and arrangements to settle their disputes peacefully,
and a great number (probably thousands) of such agreements are in effect.14 Frequently, such agreements will not only include general obliga12. See, e.g., An Overview of InternationalDispute Settlement, supra note 1, at 7-13.
See also Henkin, supra note 1, at 910, "As long as a State does not resort to force, there has
been no disposition to find a violation of law in failure to settle disputes peacefully, as by
leaving them unsettled."
See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, sec. 902, comment (e):
It is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other states either to mediation
or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific settlement. Eastern Carelia
(Finland v. Russia), 1923 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 5 at 27 (Advisory Opinion of July
23). Consequently, international claims cannot, in the present state of the law
as to international jurisdiction, be submitted to a tribunal, except with the
consent of the States concerned.
Reparation for Injuries, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 177-78 (Advisory Opinion of April 11).
As to arbitration, see also the Ambatielos case (Greece v. U.K.) 1953 I.C.J. 10, 19 (Judgment of May 19) ("a State may not be compelled to submit its disputes to arbitration without its consent.").
13. See, inter alia, U.N. Charter arts.1(1), 2(3), 33, Ch. VI (arts. 33-38) and Ch. VII
(arts. 39-51).
14. For example, there are some 250 agreements, bilateral and multilateral, conferring
on the I.C.J. jurisdiction over disputes as to the interpretation or application of the agreements. See 1983-84 I.C.J.Y.B. 51-56, 92-108 (1984). See generally, Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Interpretationand Application of Treaties, 150 RECUEIL DES COURS
(1976) and Morrison, Treaties as a Source of Jurisdictionfor the InternationalCourt of
Justice, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (L.F. Damrosch ed.
1987) [hereinafterDamrosch]. There are many additional agreements containing provisions
for dispute settlement by means other than reference to the World Court. See, e.g., Sohn,
supra note 1, and UNITED NATIONS, A SURVEY OF TREATY PROVISIONS FOR THE PACIFIC SET-
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tions of peaceful settlement, but will require, recommend, or provide procedures for the use of specific dispute settlement techniques, such as
conciliation, arbitration, adjudication or other third party techniques.
It is an interesting question whether the international community interest in peaceful settlement of disputes suggests the need for expanding
the duty of states to resort to at least certain non-binding methods of
third-party dispute-settlement, even in the absence of their consent.
IV.

WHY

Do

DISPUTING STATES TURN

To

THIRD PARTIES?

Third party dispute settlement is primarily a supplementary means
of conflict resolution. Typically, it will be used only when either: (1) the
disputing states are unwilling to reach a settlement themselves and wish
the help of third parties to do so; or (2) a third party is otherwise authorized or in a position to intervene to affect the settlement or outcome of
the dispute. Professor Louis Sohn points out that, "[I]t is an axiom of
international diplomacy that the most efficient method of settling international disputes is through negotiations between the two governments
concerned, without any meddling of third parties, other states or international organizations," and that "in most instances negotiations lead to a
solution."15 Negotiations are the preferred means of resolving disputes for
many reasons. Perhaps the most important is that it is the least risky way
the parties can try to resolve their dispute. Thus, negotiation permits
each state maximum control over both the dispute settlement process and
outcome, since each state always has the option of simply walking away
from the negotiation and not agreeing. In contrast, any kind of thirdparty involvement carries a risk of reducing a disputing state's flexibility
and freedom to do what it wants, and of somehow trapping it into an
undesirable outcome. Some other advantages of negotiation are that negotiation places responsibility for resolving the dispute on the parties
themselves, who are in the best position to develop a sensible, workable
and acceptable solution. Negotiation works toward a freely agreed rather
than imposed solution, which is likely to have maximum acceptability
and stability, negotiation favors compromise and accommodation, which
is most likely to preserve good long-term cooperative relations between
the parties, and negotiation is generally simpler and less costly than alternative dispute settlement methods. So long as disputing states are making some progress towards solving their dispute themselves, they will normally have little reason to turn to third parties, and, conversely, third
parties will have little reason to intervene.
Consequently, one would expect disputing states to seek or acquiesce
in third-party intervention only when their own efforts to reach a negotiated settlement have been unavailing and are at an impasse, and where
neither prefers such a failure to reach agreement to the alternative possi-

TLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DIsPUTEs, at 1949-62 (1966).

15. Sohn, supra note 1, at 1122.
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bility of continuing to seek settlement through assistance by, or delegation to, third parties. In this case, both parties may choose to ask third
parties for help in their attempts to reach an agreement or, at the extreme, they may simply ask or allow a third party to determine the settlement or outcome.
Presumably, in deciding whether to seek or acquiesce in third-party
dispute settlement procedures, each party will weigh what it thinks it
may gain from such intervention against the risks and constraints on its
control of the situation and outcomes that the particular third party techniques may involve. We would expect that, typically, the party in the
more powerful negotiating position might be particularly reluctant to accept third party intervention, since such intervention may have the effect
of counterbalancing or neutralizing its bargaining power. But sometimes,
even for the stronger party, the risks of conflict, continued dispute, or
unfavorable internal or external public opinion may outweigh even substantial risks from third party intervention.
Of course, a state's apparent consent to third party intervention may
not in fact be serious or sincere; a state may pretend to agree simply to
appeal to internal or external public opinion or seem like a "good citizen," but without any real intention of compromise or cooperation in a
good faith effort to settle the dispute. Indeed, both disputing parties may
find it useful to appear to be doing something by accepting third party
intervention, even though neither really expects such intervention to be
successful, or at least to do any more than ratify the outcome that would
have occurred anyway. In some cases, for example, agreements may contain nominal obligations, included solely to pacify an internal political
constituency of one of the parties, which neither expects to be observed.
If and when such "noncompliance" occurs, the party will complain and
dispute the matter although it cannot in good faith insist on its position.
By resorting to third party dispute settlement techniques, including adjudication, the parties can delay and look as though they are trying to adjust the question while ultimately reaching the outcome they always
intended."6
In practice, the context of each dispute and conflict is likely to be
unique, and many factors may bear upon the willingness of disputing
states to seek or accept third party intervention. In the first place, such
attitudes obviously will vary depending on the particular circumstances
and stakes involved, the type of intervention contemplated, and who the
third parties are likely to be. For example, a state may be willing to accept non-binding U.N. mediation but not a binding I.C.J. decision, or accepting fact-finding by neutral State 'A' but not hostile State 'B'. Second,
as a threshold condition, disputing states must believe that there are

16. For an interesting discussion of such "latent" functions of adjudication, see Hudec,
Transcending the Ostensible: Some Reflections on the Nature of Litigation Between Governments, 72 MINN. L. REV. 211 (1987).
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things third parties can do that are more likely to be helpful than harmful and they must be willing, at a minimum, to let third parties try. This
means that third-party intervention will often have at least two stages or
phases: an initial "jurisdictional" phase in which the parties are persuaded to seek or acquiesce in a third party having some role (or the third
party otherwise establishes its right to do so); and a substantive or "merits" phase where the third party actually attempts to help settle the dispute. Third, it may not always be easy to say when the disputants are in
fact at an "impasse"; for example, a state in a weaker bargaining position
may seek third party intervention in hopes of thus obtaining an outcome
better than it can obtain itself, even though it is prepared, if its efforts to
involve third parties prove unsuccessful, to agree to a less favorable settlement. Fourth, even where states are reluctant to accept third party intervention, they may, as previously noted, have previously undertaken legal obligations to do so under the U.N. Charter, the I.C.J. statute or other
international agreements. Indeed, serious problems may arise where a
third party, at the request of one party to a dispute, intervenes based on
what it construes as the other party's prior consent, but the other party is
no longer willing to accept such intervention or claims that it had never
given consent. Recent experience, in the Nicaragua and other cases,
raises questions as to the usefulness or effectiveness of third party intervention in the absence of real and continuing consent on the part of all of
the disputing parties.
Finally, third party intervention may occur even in the absence of
impasse between disputing states or indeed of real consent by one or both
parties. Thus, the third state may have its own interest in promoting or
preventing a particular outcome (i.e., helping an ally or hurting an enemy). Indeed, in some situations, the "selfish interest" of the intervening
state may be so great that its role is better analyzed as that of a third
party to the dispute, rather than as an external third party concerned
only with helping the parties resolving the dispute. Or, as often the case,
the international community as a whole may have its own interest in
resolving conflicts or preventing unjust or unstable settlements which
might escalate or spill over to threaten other states. Much of the U.N.'s
interventionary authority, under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, are
based on this premise. Indeed, it is worth noting that the international
community might wish to intervene even if the disputing states were able
themselves to agree easily on a settlement with which they were quite
content. For example, the U.N. or third states might wish to intervene in
a bilateral settlement of a transfrontier pollution dispute in which the
two states agreed to solve the problem by dumping large amounts of the
pollutant into the ocean in a way which threatened serious injury to the
ocean environment.
V.

WHY ARE THIRD PARTIES WILLING

To

INTERVENE?

Performing a third-party role in dispute settlement is not an easy
task; it can be arduous and costly (i.e., the U.S. role in the various mid-
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east crises), dangerous (i.e., the assassination of Count Bernadotte) or
unrewarding (i.e., the U.S. role in the Falkland-Malvinas war). Indeed,
third parties may run serious risks of becoming caught up in, or
blackmailed into, a continuing role in a long-drawn-out dispute or conflict, or of being blamed by one or both of the parties for unfavorable
outcomes.
There appear to be various reasons why third parties are willing to
intervene, including the following:
First, the third-party may have a legal or institutional responsibility
to do so; it may simply be the third party's job or raison d'etre. For example, serving as third parties in dispute settlement for which international judges, arbitrators and U.N. Secretary-Generals are paid.
Second, the third party may have a sense of public responsibility, as
well as perhaps a desire for the prestige and honor that may accompany a
successful third party role. Algeria's role in the Iran Hostages dispute, the
Pope's role in the Argentina-Chile Beagle Channel dispute, or the Soviet
mediation of the Kashmir dispute may be examples.
Finally, as previously noted, the third party may have its own interests or the interests of an ally at stake, which it believes will be protected
or advanced by its intervention and third-party role.
Of course, several of these motives may combine - as may be the
case, for example, with U.S. intervention in the Middle East or the "Contadora" states' intervention in the Nicaraguan conflict.
VI.

WHAT KINDS OF THIRD-PARTY TECHNIQUES ARE AVAILABLE?

The most usual and accepted list of methods of peaceful settlement
of international disputes - and the one most familiar to international
lawyers - is that set forth in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter - negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, and resort to the U.N. or other
international organization dispute settlement procedures. In essence, this
list of methods reflects a spectrum or continuum of techniques ranging
from so-called "diplomatic means," which give control of the outcome primarily to the parties themselves, to so-called "legal means" which give
control of the outcome primarily to a third party or parties. That is, the
principal difference among these techniques is in the extent to which
third parties can legitimately participate in helping to bring about or determining the settlement and, conversely, the extent to which the parties
can reject a settlement proposed by the third party. In practice, distinctions between these techniques may be more theoretical than real, and a
particular process of dispute settlement may combine elements of various
techniques. For example, international arbitration or adjudication may
often embody compromises reflecting strong elements of negotiation or
mediation among the arbitrators or judges, at least some of whom may
see their role as safeguarding the interests or representing the point of
view of one or the other party. Negotiators will often have to make their
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bargaining decisions with the possibility of third party intervention, or
perhaps even resort to adjudication, in mind.
The more traditional third-party methods of peaceful settlement,
each of which has its own distinctive characteristics, are the following:
Good offices and mediation" are techniques in which the parties, unable to resolve a dispute by negotiation, request or agree to limited intervention by a third party to help them break the impasse. In the case of
good offices, the role of the third party is usually limited to simply bringing the parties into communication and facilitating their negotiations. In
the case of mediation, the mediator usually plays a more active part in
facilitating communications and negotiations between the parties, and is
sometimes permitted or expected to advance informal and nonbinding
proposals of his or her own. President Carter's mediation leading to the
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is a recent example of successful mediation.
Fact-finding, inquiry and conciliation' are methods of settlement in
which the parties request or agree to the intervention of a third party,
usually on a more formal basis, for the purpose of determining particular
facts or otherwise conducting an impartial examination of the dispute
and, if the parties so agree, attempting to suggest or define the terms of a
mutually acceptable settlement. Like mediation, the report of a fact-finding body or conciliation commission is normally non-binding, although
the third party finding or recommendation may exercise an important influence on the settlement. A recent example of a successful use of a formal inquiry procedure is the 1961 "Red Crusader" inquiry into the facts
concerning the stopping by a Danish fishery protection vessel of a British
trawler off the Faroe Islands. A recent example of successful conciliation
is the special commission established by Norway and Iceland to make recommendations concerning their dispute over the apportionment of the
continental shelf off Jan Mayen Island; the Commission's Report, recommending joint development of hydrocarbon production, was implemented
by the conclusion of a 1981 Norway-Iceland Treaty on the matter.
Arbitration 9 involves the reference of a dispute or series of disputes,
by the agreement of the parties to an ad hoc tribunal for binding deci-

17. See, e.g., MERRILLS, supra note 1, at ch. 1; Darwin, Mediation and Good Offices, in
Waldock, supra note 1, at 83; Raman, supra note 1, at ch. 3. See generally, 0. YOUNG, THE
INTERMEDIARIES: THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES (1967).
18. See, e.g., MERRILLS, supra note 1, at chs. 3 and 4; Fox, Conciliation, in Waldock,
supra note 1, at 159; BAR-YAACOV, THE HANDLING OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY MEANS OF
INQUIRY (1974); COT, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION (1972); Firmage, Fact-Finding in the
Resolution of International Disputes: From the Hague Peace Conference to the United
Nations, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 421 (1971).
19. See, e.g., MERRILLS, supra note 1, at ch. 5; Fox, Arbitration, in Waldock, supra note
1, at 101; WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (1979); S.
SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS (1987); SIMPSON AND Fox,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1959); Sohn, The Function of International Arbitration Today, 1 RECUEIL DES COURS 108 (1963); CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1946).
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sion, usually on the basis of international law. The parties by agreement
establish the issue to be arbitrated and the machinery and procedure of
the tribunal, including the method of selection of the arbitrator or arbitrators. While arbitration is normally binding, it is open to the parties to
provide that the tribunal's opinion will be only advisory. The 1978 U.S.French Air arbitration over a dispute concerning the interpretation of the
U.S.-French Air Agreement is a recent example of a successful
arbitration.
Judicial Settlement 0 involves the reference of the dispute, by the
agreement or consent of the parties, to the International Court of Justice
or some other standing and permanent judicial body for binding decision,
usually on the basis of international law. Again, if the rules establishing
the court so allow, the parties may agree to an advisory or nonbinding
opinion rather than a binding decision, or to a declaratory judgment specifying the principles which the parties should apply in the settlement of
their dispute. The Gulf of Maine case between the U.S. and Canada is a
recent example of successful judicial settlement under the procedures of
the I.C.J.
Another method is settlement through the United Nations or other
global or regional international organizations or agencies. 1 In some circumstances, the parties may request the assistance of the U.N., a regional
organization, or another international organization in settling their dispute, or the U.N. or another organization (for example, a regional organization) may on its own motion legitimately intervene in the dispute, at
least for the purposes of trying to bring about a peaceful settlement.
Sometimes a third party may ask for the organization's intervention. This
assistance may, inter alia, take the form of good offices, mediation, factfinding or conciliation. The rights and obligations of the parties and authority of each organization in these respects are in each case set out in
their respective Charters and other constitutive instruments, as well as
developed through their practice. The U.N.'s various attempts to deal

20. See, e.g., MERRLLS, supra note 1, at ch. 6; Bilder, InternationalDispute Settlement and the Role of InternationalAdjudication, supra note 1, Damrosch, supra note 14;
T. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT (1986); R. FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT (1986);
Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication as an International Dispute Settlement Technique, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1982); Allott, The InternationalCourt of Justice, in Waldock,
supra note 1, at 128; S. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT (3d ed. 1973); S. ROSENNE, THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1965); JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1964); the excellent collections of articles in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (L. Gross ed. 1976); and JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES (H. Mosler & R. Bernhardt eds. 1979); Schachter, supra note 1; Sohn,
supra note 1, and references cited infra note 33; and the many additional articles cited in
these works. For a listing and brief description of the various present international courts,
see Sohn, supra note 1, at 1127-30.
21. See MERRILLS, supra note 1, at chs. 8 and 9; Bowett, The United Nations and
Peaceful Settlement; Waldock, supra note 1, at 179; and Raman, supra note 1. Some international agreements empower the organizations established by them to render a binding
decision. See RESTATEMENT sec. 902, reporter's note 6, at 176. See also Sohn, supra note 1.
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with Middle Eastern, Iran-Iraq, and many other problems are familiar
examples of the attempted use of this technique.
The international system has developed a wide variety of institutions, arrangements, procedures and norms through which These kinds of
techniques can be invoked and implemented. These include over a hundred international organizations; international courts such as the I.C.J.,
the Court of the European Communities and the European and American
Courts of Human Rights; arbitral tribunals such as the U.S.-Iran Claims
Tribunal currently sitting in the Hague; GATT dispute-settlement.
panels; many binational commissions such as the Canada-U.S. International Joint Commission and so forth.
There are, of course, other sorts of distinctions that can usefully be
drawn. For example, two social psychologists, Dean Pruitt and Jeffrey
Rubin, suggest the following several broad contrasting types of thirdparty roles:22
- Formal vs. Informal Role. Is the third party intervening pursuant
to a formal understanding or legal precedents (i.e. under U.N. authorization or the "compromissory clause" of an agreement), or is the
intervention informal and without express legitimation?
- Individual vs. Representative Role. Is the intervenor acting in a
personal capacity, or in a representative capacity (i.e. as a government or international organization official)?
- Invited vs. Non-Invited Role. Is the intervenor acting pursuant to
an express or implied invitation or with the parties' consent, or on its
own or some other third party initiative (or conceivably against the
expressed wishes of one or both of the parties)?
- Impartialvs. PartialRole. Is the intervenor impartial or neutral, or
is it biased in favor of one party or a particular result?
- Advisory vs. Directive Role. Is the intervenor's role wholly or primarily advisory, with the aim of helping the parties achieve their own
solution, or can the intervenor determine all or part of the settlement
or outcome?
- Content-Orientedvs. Process-OrientedRoles. Does the intervenor's
role focus primarily on the actual content of the dispute (the issues
of substance under consideration), or primarily on the process of decision-making (the way in which the discussions are taking place)?
VII.

How

CAN THIRD PARTIES HELP

As indicated, in the case of advisory and non-binding techniques
such as good offices, mediation, fact-finding and conciliation, the third
party's role is usually limited to helping the parties to negotiate their own
settlement of their dispute. In contrast, in the case of directive and binding techniques such as arbitration and judicial settlement, responsibility
for settlement of all or part of the issues in dispute is removed from the

22. PRUITT AND RUBIN, supra note 1, at 166-69.
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parties' direct control and the third party is authorized to decide the matter for them. In each case, of course, the actual - or even potential - presence and activities of a third party may have various effects upon the
dynamics of the disputing process and the disputing parties'relationships,
some helpful, but some, perhaps not.
How can third parties help the disputants achieve a settlement themselves? A good deal of research has been done to identify the general
functions that mediators and other non-directive third parties can perform and the specific kinds of things they can do that are likely to be
most useful.
Pruitt and Rubin, for example, describe the type of negotiating impasse which may call for third-party assistance:
Positions tend towards rigidity because the protagonists are reluctant
to budge lest any conciliatory gesture be misconstrued as a sign of
weakness. Moreover, the parties may lack the imagination, creativity,
and/or experience necessary to work their way out of the pit they have
jointly engineered - not because they don't want to but because they
don't know how. Thus, for a variety of reasons, disputants are sometimes either unable or unwilling to move toward agreement of their
own accord. Under the circumstances, third parties often become involved at the behest of one or more of the disputants, or on their own
initiative.13
They suggest and discuss a variety of ways in which a third party can
help the parties break out of such an impasse.24 One way is by modifying
the physical and social structure of the dispute. For example, the third
party can structure communication between the principals; open and neutralize the site in which problem-solving takes place, impose time limits,
and infuse resources. Another way is by modifying the issue structure.
For example, the third party can assist the disputants to identify existing
issues and alternatives; help them to package and sequence issues in ways
that lead towards agreement; and introduce new issues and alternatives
that did not occur to the disputants themselves. Finally, the third party
can increase the disputant's motivation to reach agreement. For example,
it can facilitate their making concessions without loss of face, engender
mutual trust, encourage their venting and coming to grips with irrational
feelings, and respect their desire for autonomy.
Another commentator, Jacob Bercovich, divides third party aims into
process objectives and outcome objectives, each of which he in turn subdivides into two categories: (1) information search (i.e., establishing communication, searching for common principles) and, (2) social influence
(i.e., persuading the parties to converge on an acceptable outcome).
Bercovich sees third party behavior as implemented through certain tactics which he calls (1) reflective behavior (i.e., receiving, transmitting and

23. Id. at 165.
24. Id. at 169-79.
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interpreting messages and signals reflecting and influencing how the parties perceive their situation); (2) non-directive behavior (i.e., influencing
the context and structure of the conflict by controlling publicity, controlling the environment, controlling resources, reducing pressure and recasting issues); and (3) directive behavior (i.e., influencing the parties perceptions and motivation through making proposals, a judicious exercise of
power and promises of resources).2 5
Other commentators suggest other types of potential third-party contributions, or classify third-party objectives or functions in a somewhat.
different way. For example, Oran Young classifies third party objectives
as: (1) informational (i.e., offering information or increasing communication); (2) tactical (i.e., offering services); (3) supervisory (i.e., monitoring
an agreement); and (4) conceptual (i.e., offering new ideas for a settlement).2 6 Indeed, there is now a rich literature suggesting imaginative
techniques through which third parties may help parties in an impasse
"get unstuck" - for example, by creating a "hurting stalemate," providing "decommitting formulas" or "bypass solutions," "changing or refraining the game," using "single text procedures," and so forth. I have suggested elsewhere that a principal reason why disputing parties may not be
able to reach a settlement agreement is that they distrust each other or
are otherwise concerned with what they see as very serious risks potentially involved in such an agreement. In this case, third parties can play a
crucial role in dispute settlement by helping the parties in a variety of
ways to manage these risks - for example, by monitoring or verifying performance, serving as escrow agents, or providing guarantees.17 Third
party risk management devices of this kind may be particularly useful,
for example, in facilitating dispute-settlement arrangements in which distrust is a particularly serious obstacle, such as armistice or peace agreements or agreements seeking to resolve complex and emotional racial,
ethnic or religious conflicts.
What about more directive techniques of third party intervention
such as adjudication, in which third parties have authority themselves to
determine how the dispute is to be settled? While we will look at adjudication shortly, two of the most important ways in which this kind of third
party technique can help disputing parties can be briefly mentioned here.
First, adjudication can dispose of the matter. It is often more important to the parties that a dispute be settled than that it be settled in a
particular way. Where negotiations are unsuccessful, adjudication or
other third party disposition of the matter provides an alternative way in
which the parties can put the dispute behind them and move on to other
things.

25. BERCOVITCH, supra note 1, at ch. 5, esp. 96-108.
26. Young, supra note 1, and Young, Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts on Third
Parties,16 J. CONFLICT REsOLUTION 51 (1972).
27. See R. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (1981).
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Second, adjudication can permit concessions without "loss of face" or
bureaucratic risk. Since adjudication involves an impersonal decision by a
third party, neither of the governments of the parties (or the officials involved) can be held directly responsible for the outcome. There are probably a number of disputes where governments are relatively indifferent as
to the outcome and would normally be willing to negotiate a compromise
settlement, but where, for internal political or other reasons, they are unable to concede or even compromise the issue in negotiations. Third-party
settlement is a politically useful way by which foreign offices can dispose
of such problems without taking direct responsibility for concessions. In
effect, they can "pass the buck" for not "winning" the dispute to the
third-party tribunal - "Don't blame us, blame the judge!"
VIII.

WHICH TECHNIQUES WORK BEST?

A great deal of experience and writing exists concerning the relative
advantages and disadvantages of various techniques and when and how
each can best be employed.28 For example, J.G. Merrills, assessing the
value of conciliation as a dispute settlement technique, concludes:
Conciliation has proved most useful for disputes where the main issues are legal, but the parties desire an equitable compromise .... In
cases of this type, conciliation would appear to offer two advantages
over arbitration ex aequo et bono, the obvious alternative.
First, because of the way conciliation is conducted - through a dialogue with and between the parties-there is no danger of it producing a result that takes the parties completely by surprise, as sometimes happens in legal proceedings. Secondly a commissions'
proposals . . . are not binding and, if unacceptable can be rejected.29
Merrills and others have attempted similar types of assessments of other

techniques. Moreover, there is now a considerable body of theoretical and
empirical research, historical and political analysis, and biographical and
anecdotal reporting concerning such "how to do it" questions as the most
appropriate timing of intervention, characteristics of a third party, site
selection, the pros and cons of publicity in mediation, and so forth. In
this brief overview, however, only a few very broad generalizations can be
suggested.

First, different kinds of disputes will obviousely call for different
methods of settlement. The craft of effective dispute settlement involves
judging what method or combination of methods may be most useful in
helping to resolve the particular dispute and how and when such techniques can best be employed. Among the factors affecting such a choice

will be:
- the subject-matter and characteristics of the dispute (e.g., whether
28. See references in supra note 1. For excellent brief evaluations of various techniques
from an international lawyer's perspective, see MERRILLS, supra note 1.
29. Id. at 66.
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itinvolves a dispute about the facts, the law, at the law should be,
the terms of a particular allocation, or procedural issues);
- the nature of the relations between the parties, e.g., whether they
are "repeat players" having continuing relations with each other or
only infrequently have occasion to interact or deal with each other,
and whether there is generally friendship and trust or enmity and
distrust between them;
- the parties' perceptions and emotional attitudes as to the importance of the dispute (i.e., whether it is considered a matter of "vital
interest" or national prestige, or either party feels it "cannot afford'
to lose");
- the past history of this and other disputes between the parties (i.e.,
the "stage" of the dispute and extent to which positions have
changed or hardened, and precedents as to how the parties have handled such problems in the past);
- the potential effect of the dispute on other states or the international community (e.g., whether it is a matter potentially affecting
international peace and security) and the availability or willingness
to serve of appropriate third parties and the resources they are able
or willing to deploy.
Second, the various techniques are not mutually exclusive, nor are
the boundaries between them rigidly drawn. A number of them are usually employed either seriatim (although in no mixed order), or in combination to supplement or complement each other. For example, the recent
1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1988 Convention on
the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, both of which
deploy a variety of techniques to deal with diverse types of disputes that
may arise, show how these possibilities can be exploited in an innovative
and imaginative way. As Professor Oscar Schachter has pointed out,
"Flexibility and adaptability to the particular circumstances are the essential characteristics of these various procedures. There is little to be
gained by seeking to give them precise legal limits or procedural rules as a
general matter."
Similarly, Judge Manfred Lachs, in his individual opinion in the 1978
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (Greece v. Turkey) commented:
There are obviously some disputes which can be resolved only by negotiations, because there is no alternative in view of the character of
the subject-matter involved and the measures envisaged. But there
are many other disputes in which a combination of methods would
facilitate their resolution. The frequently unorthodox nature of the
problems facing States today requires as many tools to be used and as
many avenues to be opened as possible, in order to resolve the intricate and frequently multi-dimensional issues involved. It is sometimes
desirable to apply several methods at the same time or successively.
Thus, no incompatibility should be seen between the various instru-

30.

SCHACHTER,

supra note 1, at 205.
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ments and fora to which States may resort, for all are mutually
complementary.31
Third, it is often useful to develop structured institutions and arrangements, such as international courts or fact-finding agencies, and to
have them in place, ready for use, and easily available if need should
arise. However, in other cases, it may be better to deal with problems as
they arise, on a pragmatic, flexible and ad hoc basis, rather than to try to
force dispute-management efforts onto the Procustean bed of some possibly unsuitable and inflexible already established dispute settlement
institution.
Fourth, the choice of techniques and the way they are employed
should, where relevant, take into account the particular dispute-settlement experience of the states involved. Every bilateral or other international relationship has its own unique character and environment which
shapes both the kinds of disputes that arise and how these particular
states tend to deal with them. Some states (i.e. Canada and the U.S.)
have developed special dispute management systems - a unique set of
practices, procedures, techniques and institutions - to deal with their particular quarrels.
Finally, a specific list of techniques will not exhaust the possibilities.
It will always be open to the disputing parties, or to third parties, to modify or adapt most of these techniques (except in the case of judicial settlement by an existing court with established rules), or to creatively develop
such additional methods as their needs and ingenuity suggest. Moreover,
since every dispute or conflict will be unique, generalizations such as
these, or particular "rules" or "formulas," should be applied with caution.

IX. THE ROLE OF ADJUDICATION
In view of current interest regarding the proper role of adjudication
as a method of international dispute settlement, particularly in the wake
of the World Court's decision in the Nicaragua case, some remarks on
this technique in particular may be appropriate. Again, it is not practical
to review here the very extensive literature analyzing the experience, procedures role and significance of international arbitral tribunals and
courts, and more particularly, the I.C.J 2 However, I would suggest the
following general points.
As is the case with respect to any method of dispute settlement, in
deciding whether to use adjudication, the parties to a dispute will weigh
its potential advantages against its disadvantages. 3 Among the potential

31. 1978 I.C.J. 52 (Dec. 19, 1978).
32. See, e.g., Bilder, InternationalDispute Settlement and the Role of Adjudication,
supra note 1, and other references supra notes 1 and 20.
33. For discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of adjudication and reasons
why states may be reluctant to accept adjudication and, in particular, the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J, see, e.g., Bilder, International Dispute Settlement and the Role of
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advantages of adjudication, are: (i) it is dispositive, ideally, at least putting an end to the dispute; (ii) it is impersonal, permitting the parties to
pass responsibility for unfavorable outcomes to the tribunal; (iii) it is
principled and impartial, ostensibly deciding the matter by neutral principles rather than power, bias or whim; (iv) it is serious and demonstrates
that the state instituting suit really believes in its claim; (v) it is orderly
and can be useful in resolving complex factual and technical disputes; (vi)
it can sometimes "depoliticize" a dispute, reducing tensions or buying
time; (vii) it can provide rules socially useful for guiding conduct and
resolving disputes more broadly; (viii) it can reflect, and educate the com-'

Adjudication, supra note 1, at 144-65; T. FRANCK, supra note 20; SCHACHTER, supra note 1,
at 207-11; Vallat, Foreword in Waldock, supra note 1; MERRILLS, supra note 1, at 107-13; M.
NORTHEDGE & DONELON, supra note 1, at 321-29; Gross, Role of InternationalAdjudication,
and Rovine, The National Interest and the World Court; Hudec, Transcending the Ostensible: Some Reflections on the Nature of Litigation Between Governments, 72 MINN. L.
REV. (1987); Higgins, The Desirabilityof Third Party Adjudication: Conventional Wisdom
or Continuing Truth?, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: LAW IN MOVEMENT 37 (J. Fawcett &
R. Higgins eds. 1974); Lachs, A Few Thoughts on the Independence of Judges of the International Court of Justice, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 593 (1987); Owen, Compulsory Jurisdiction of the InternationalCourt of Justice:A Study of Its Acceptance by Nations, 3 GA.
L. REV. 704 (1969); Shihata, The Attitude of New States Toward the InternationalCourt of
Justice 19 INT'L. ORG. 203 (1965); J. GAMBLE & D. FISHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE (1975); Dalfen, The World Court in Idle Splendour: The Basis of State Attitudes,
23 INT'L J. 124 (1967); Brauer, International Conflict Resolution: The ICJ Chambers and
the Gulf of Maine Dispute, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 463, 468-73 (1983); De Visacher, Reflections
on the Present Prospects of InternationalAdjudication, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 467 (1956); E.
MCWHINNEY, THE WORLD COURT AND THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING PRO-

CESS (1979); Falk, The Role of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 37 J. INT'L AFF. 253
(1984); R. FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT (1986); W. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1964); and generally other sources cited supra notes 1 and 20. As
indicated, explanations of why states are generally reluctant to agree to adjudicative or "legal" techniques of dispute settlement often emphasize states' lack of confidence in the predictability of such procedures and their concern over their loss of control over outcomes.
See, e.g., D. Bowett, supra note 1, at 180-81:
[While] specific reasons change from State to State, the basic reason for avoiding legal settlement is simply that States prefer to retain control over the settlement process, so as to ensure that any settlement is acceptable to them, or,
if that cannot be achieved, that no settlement is reached. With the political
techniques they retain such control - though this is less true when the pressures of United Nations organs are brought to bear - whereas with legal techniques States evidently feel that they lose control.
Some commentators suggest a distinction between so-called "legal" or "justiciable" disputes,
on the one hand, and "political," "non-legal" or "non-justiciable" disputes, on the other; the
implication is that some disputes have inherent characteristics that make them either particularly appropriate or inappropriate for the use of adjudication as a dispute settlement
technique. Others, with whom I agree, are of the view that, while state attitudes towards
accepting the risks of adjudication and the usefulness of adjudication will obviously differ in
different circumstances, in principle all international disputes are "justiciable." See, An
Overview of InternationalDispute Settlement, supra note 1, at 15-17. For discussion, see,
e.g., SCHACHTER, supra note 1, at 211-15 and Schachter, Compulsory Jurisdiction in Cases
Involving the Use of Force, in Damrosch, supra note 14; Henkin, supra note 1, at 829-31;
Darwin, General Introduction in Waldock, supra note 1, at 6-13; RESTATEMENT, supra note
1, sec. 903, reporter's note 7;J. GAMBLE & R. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 20.
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munity as to social values and interests of the international community
more broadly, apart from those of the parties alone, and; (ix) it can be
system-re-enforcing, supporting respect for and the development of international law.
But, there are also a number of potential disadvantages of adjudication: (i) it involves the possibility of losing; (ii) adjudicative settlement
may be illusory or superficial, deciding the "legal" but not the "real" issues in dispute; (iii) it can be inflexible, resulting in a "win-lose" rather
than a compromise decision; (iv) it can be judgmental, labeling one party
as a "lawbreaker," rather than providing for a shared acceptance of responsibility as a facesaving way out of a conflictual situation; (v) it looks
primarily to the past rather than to the future, possibly jeopardizing the
maintenance of a useful ongoing relationship; (vi) it is conservative; (vii)
its results are unpredictable; (viii) it may not be impartial; (ix) an adjudicative settlement is imposed on the parties; (x) it is adversarial and may
escalate the dispute or conflict; (xi) it may freeze the parties' options and
discourage settlement; (xii) it can be complex and costly, and; (xiii) there
is no assurance that an adjudicative decision will be enforceable.
As previously noted, adjudication has generally played only a rather
limited role in the settlement of international disputes. While nations
often pay lip-service to the ideal of judicial settlement, in practice they
have entrusted relatively few significant disputes to international tribunals. During the period of 1946 through 1985, the International Court of
Justice had only 72 cases submitted to it; it rendered 45 judgements in
contentions cases and 17 advisory opinions. Moreover, countries have
been particularly reluctant to obligate themselves in advance to compulsory binding adjudication of their potential disputes with other countries-particularly disputes concerning issues that may involve what they
consider "vital" national interests. In general, they have been willing to
do so, at most, only when their commitment to such compulsory jurisdiction is restricted in terms of subject matter or otherwise carefully
circumscribed.
In my opinion, this reluctance of states to submit disputes to arbitral
or judicial settlement will continue for some time to come. Thus, for the
near future at least, the prospects for widespread acceptance of the general compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. under the Optional Clause of
Article 36(2) of the Court's Statute do not seem to me bright." In partic-

34. By 1988, only 46 of the 159 members of the U.N. had declarations in effect accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause. For comprehensive
reviews and analysis of experience respecting the I.C.J.'s compulsory jurisdiction (the socalled "optional clause" of Article 36(2) of the I.C.J. Statute), see, e.g., Damrosch, supra
note 14; Gross, Compulsory JurisdictionUnder the Optional Clause: History and Practice,
in DAMROSCH, supra note 14, at 19; Merrills, The Optional Clause Today, 1979 BRIT.
Y.B.I.L. 87 (1979); Giustini, Compulsory Adjudication in InternationalLaw: The Past, the
Present and Prospects for the Future, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 213 (1985-86); Scott and Carr,
The InternationalCourt of Justice and Compulsory Jurisdiction:The Case for Closing the
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ular, I believe that, in the aftermath of the Nicaraguacase, it is unlikely
that the U.S. will soon resume its acceptance of the optional clause, except possibly with very broad reservations-although it is my personal
belief that it is in our national interest to do so."
While adjudication may not be the best way of resolving every dispute, there are clearly a number of situations in which adjudication, or at
least the availability of adjudication, can perform a very useful dispute
settlement function. In practice, most disputes do not involve issues of
significant or "vital" national concerns. In these cases, while each party
may prefer to win the dispute, the stakes involved are limited and each
can afford to lose. Adjudication is one good way in which the parties can
achieve their most important objective in these situations - disposing of
the dispute. Indeed, to the extent that states can be assured that a commitment to adjudication will be restricted to less vital issues, they will be
more willing to agree, even in advance, to adjudication. Thus, nations
have frequently been willing to agree to compromissory clauses providing
in advance for compulsory jurisdiction over disputes arising out of treaties concerned with specialized matters of clearly defined scope and limited import, such as commercial treaties. The U.S. for example, is party

Clause, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1987). On the Court's jurisdiction under "compromissory
clauses," see, e.g., Charney, Compromissory Clauses and the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 855 (1987). Morrison, Treaties as a Source of
Jurisdiction,Especially in U.S. Practice, in DAMROSCH, supra note 14, at 58.
35. For recent discussions of U.S. attitudes regarding international adjudication and
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, see in particular Panel Discussion, Current Developments Concerning the Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration and the World Court, 83rd
Annual Mtg. of Am. Soc. of Int'l L. (Chicago) (April 5-8, 1989) to be printed in 1989 PROC.
AM. Soc. INT'L. L. _; DAMROSCH, supra note 14; T. FRANCK, supra note 20; Symposium, 81
AM. J. INTL. L. 1 (1987). Suggestions have been made for various types of reservations to
meet the Administration's concerns and permit resumed U.S. acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the I.C.J. They include reservations excluding from the jurisdiction of the
Court matters involving national security or the use of force or matters referred to other
dispute-resolution procedures or matters under consideration by the U.N. Security Council;
excluding jurisdiction when the applicant party's declaration of acceptance of the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction was made for the purpose of filing the individual suit; and providing
for the possibility of denunciation of the U.S. acceptance with immediate effect. Suggestions
have also been made for modification or elimination of certain U.S. reservations in its 1946
declaration of acceptance, particularly the multilateral treaty (Vandenberg) reservation and
the "self-judging" domestic jurisdiction (Connally) reservation. See, e.g., Damrosch, supra
note 14; Sohn, Suggestions for the Limited Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdictionof the
International Court of Justice by the United States, 18 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 1 (1988);
D'Amato, Modifying U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdictionof the World Court,
79 AM. J. INT'L L. 385 (1985); D'Amato, The United States Should Accept, by a New Declaration, the General Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 331
(1986); Gardner, U.S. Termination of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421 (1986); Morrison, Reconsidering United
States Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the InternationalCourt of Justice,
148 WORLD AFF. 63 (1985); Ende, Comment, Reaccepting the Compulsory Jurisdictionof
the International Court of Justice: A Proposalfor a New United States Declaration, 61
WASH. L. REV. 1145 (1986).
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to more than 60 bilateral and multilateral agreements containing such
"compromissory clauses."
Among the types of diisputes in which adjudication is likely to be particularly useful are: (a) disputes in which governments are indifferent to
outcome, but for internal political or other reasons are unable to concede
or even compromise the issue in negotiations (i.e., minor boundary disputes or substantively unimportant but emotionally volatile issues of title
to small or insignificant areas of territory); (b) disputes involving difficult
factual or technical questions in which the parties may be prepared for a
compromise solution but where, either because of the complexity of the
situation or internal political pressures, they cannot evolve a basis for developing a viable compromise (i.e., again certain complex boundary or
maritime, continental shelf, or fishery resource zone delimitation issues);
and (c) some particularly awkward or dangerous disputes, in which resort
to judicial settlement may be a politically acceptable way of buying time
and containing a volatile situation while solutions are sought over time.
Moreover, international tribunals, simply by being available, may
help avoid, or induce the settlement of, disputes. Even if states choose
only infrequently to invoke the International Court's jurisdiction under
the Optional Clause or "compromissory clauses" in relevant agreements,
that does not mean such commitments are useless. On the contrary, since
each party to a dispute covered by such provisions knows that the other
can resort to the Court, a party that wishes to avoid adjudication will
have more incentive to reach a negotiated settlement. That is, where the
parties have conferred potential jurisdiction on an international tribunal,
their decisions and bargaining, like those of parties to domestic disputes,
will be more likely to occur "in the shadow of the law." J.G. Merrills
comments:
[T]he value of arrangements for dispute settlement is not to be judged
solely by the cases. For a provision for compulsory arbitration by its
very existence can discourage unreasonable behaviour and so may be
3
useful even if it is never invoked. 1
It is also important to note that, for many people throughout the
36. MERRILLS, supra note 1, at 88. In this context, it is amusing to compare an ancient
Chinese suggestion that a good way to encourage dispute-settlement by the parties themselves is to provide only very bad courts. The 7th century Emperor K'ang Hsi is reported to
have said:
Law suits would tend to increase to a frightful amount, if people were not
afraid of the tribunals, and if they felt confident of always finding in them
ready and perfect justice. As man is apt to delude himself concerning his own
interests, contests would then be interminable, and the half of the Empire
would not suffice to settle the lawsuits of the other half. I desire, therefore,
that those who have recourse to the tribunals should be treated without any
pity, and in such a manner that they shall be disgusted with law, and tremble
to appear before a magistrate.
R. DAVID & J.E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 520 (1978), citing
S.

VAN DE SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANCHU CHINA

77 (1962).
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world, international adjudication symbolizes civilized and ordered behavior and the rule of law in international affairs. Whatever the truth may be
as to how the international legal system actually works, public judgments
as to the relevance and effectiveness of international law are at least in
part based on whether the public sees international courts, and particularly the International Court of Justice, as playing a significant role in
international dispute settlement. If many states (particularly the important ones) are willing to submit their disputes to impartial settlement and
show respect for the International Court, this will be taken by the public
as meaning that international law is in itself relevant and worthy of respect, and the public will believe in and support international law. If, on
the other hand, important states show indifference or contempt for international adjudication and the Court, the public is likely to conclude that
international law is meaningless and withdraw their belief and support.
Indeed, these public attitudes may in turn over time reflect back on official and bureaucratic attitudes towards and respect for international law.
Consequently, if a state believes that its national interest will be furthered by wider global respect for international law, it will arguably also
have an interest in doing what it can to strengthen and support the role
of international adjudication.
Finally, even if the role of international adjudication is limited and
there is no international court with general compulsory jurisdiction, there
can still be effective dispute settlement and a workable international legal
order. The international legal order is different in many respects from
national legal orders, and need not operate in exactly the same way."7
Moreover, we are coming to realize that, even in the domestic legal system, adjudication plays a largely supplementary or "back up" role, and
that much of the work national courts do is in effect mediation or
conciliation. 8
In sum, since adjudication can be a particularly useful tool in our
tool-box of dispute settlement techniques, it is important that it be kept
ready at hand, easily available and employed to the fullest whenever its
use is warranted. Even if adjudication is not a panacea for problems of
world order, it makes sense to do all that we can to strengthen and encourage the greater use of judicial institutions, and to improve their ability to respond in flexible ways to nations' dispute settlement needs.
It is relevant in this respect to note that the Soviet Union's recent
apparent change of attitude and new receptiveness towards the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court, and towards multilateral conflict
resolution techniques more generally, at least as stated in Premier

37. See discussion in Bilder, InternationalDispute Settlement and the Role of Adjudication, supra note 1; Allott, in Waldock, supra note 1, at 128-32; Schachter, supra note 1,
at ch. III and 207-11.
38. See, e.g., references on dispute processing in the U.S. cited in supra note 1, and,
particularly, Galanter, supra note 1.
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Gorbachev's September, 1987 Pravda articles,"9 may represent a unique
"window of opportunity" for strengthening international dispute-management institutions, which the U.S. and other western nations ought seriously to explore.
X.

SOME LIMITATIONS OF THIRD PARTY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

While third-party intervention is usually helpful and undertaken for
benevolent motives, this may not always be the case. There are some potential drawbacks of third party dispute settlement. 0
Even well-meaning intervention may get in the way of or discourage
the parties' own settlement efforts, making things worse rather than better. This may be true in particular where the intervention is premature or
inept, or where the third party is an "officious intermeddler," butting into
a situation without invitation and against the parties wishes. But even if
intervention is invited, it may be the case that "too many cooks may spoil
the soup" or that things somehow go wrong.
Third party intervention will not necessarily produce a fair or stable
settlement or outcome. Even where third party intervention is ostensibly
"neutral," it may often have the effect of supporting the position and interests of one or another of the parties. Moreover, to the extent intervention by third parties typically produces outcomes differing from those
which would have resulted from negotiations based on the effective power
of the disputing states acting solely by themselves,the outcomes and "settlements" resulting from intervention may distort rather than reflect real
underlying power relationships and be unstable. Indeed, where third parties artificially constrain real pressures, the result may be that over time
"the boiler will explode" or "the toothpaste squeeze out of the tube somewhere else," producing even greater problems in the future.
As a corollary to the previous point, the possibility of third party
intervention may sometimes lead to or prolong disputes and conflicts by
encouraging parties (particularly weaker parties) to be more aggressive or
intransigent than they would otherwise normally dare to be. For example,
it has been suggested that the Arab states have little reason to refrain
from hostile actions against Israel, or to reach a definitive settlement with

39. Mikhail Gorbachev, The Realities and Guarantees of a Secure World, Pravda,
Sept. 17, 1987; USSR Mission to the UN, Press Release No. 119 (Sept. 17, 1987), suggesting,
inter alia, that the International Court's "mandatory jurisdiction should be recognized by
all on mutually agreed conditions," that "the permanent members of the Security Council,
taking into account their special responsibility, are to make the first step in that direction,"
and that "the international community should encourage the United Nations Secretary
General in his missions of good offices, mediation and reconciliation" (at 11-12). See also,
e.g., the Soviet Union's announcement on March 8, 1989, that it would accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with respect to disputes concerning
five international human rights treaties, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1989, at 1, col. 4; see also
Lewis, Moscow Says World Court can Decide Soviet Disputes, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1988, at
4, col. 7.
40. See also PRUITT AND RUBIN, supra note 1, at 179-82.
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it, so long as they believe from experience that any severe Israeli sanctions or retaliation will always be nullified by U.N. or other third party
intervention.
Third party intervention - or even its possibility in the future - can
hinder or chill negotiations by encouraging an exaggeration or freezing of
the parties' positions. Each will be aware of the tendency of mediators
(and even arbitrators and judges) to "split the difference" and seek a
compromise; consequently, rather than focusing on settling the matter
themselves, they may seek to put themselves in the best position to "win"
any third party intervention.
In trying to help resolve a dispute or conflict, third parties can become enmeshed in it, thus widening, complicating and prolonging the dispute. For example, one or another of the disputants may come to perceive
the third party as really an ally or an enemy; persuade, coerce or trick it
into "taking sides;" or "blackmail" it into a continuing role in the dispute. In this event, the third party may become part of the problem
rather than its solution.
Finally, third parties will often have their own interests at stake in
intervening in a conflict or dispute, which may distort their settlement
efforts or cause them to seek outcomes not in accord with the parties
desires or interests. Indeed, sometimes a third party may have a mischievous or malevolent purpose, seeking to prevent the conflict or dispute
from being resolved or to "keep the pot boiling" to suit the third party's
own purposes.
XI.

How

IMPORTANT

Is

THIRD PARTY

DisPuTE

SETTLEMENT AND DOES

IT REALLY WORK?

It is difficult to measure precisely and objectively either the practical
significance or success of third party dispute settlement. Clearly, any such
judgments will vary with the situation under examination and the perspective of the observer. Moreover, in assessing importance or success, we
may have to answer the question "as compared to what?" However, we
can probably say at least a few things.
As indicated, most disputes are - and should be - settled through
direct negotiations. Thus, third party intervention will usually be less important, effective or efficient than settlement directly by the parties
themselves.
However, while precise data is lacking, recent studies suggest that
third party intervention in international conflicts often can play a significant role - a result in accord with long human experience and intuition.
In particular, there is evidence that, while third party intervention does
not always provide a final settlement to a conflict or dispute, it often
seems to keep things from getting worse. For example, Bercovitch, analyzing data involving 310 conflicts from 1945-74, found that in 235 of
these conflicts, or 82 percent of the total, there was some form of official
third-party intervention, primarily by the U.N. and in the form of media-
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tion, and that it was useful in at lest abating conflict in a substantial
number of these situations.' He concludes that third party intervention
seems to be an important method for managing international conflict, and
that:
[S]tudies show that institutional third parties can be particularly useful in abating, insulating and restraining international conflict, though
not in settling it. We do not know, however, whether conflicts in
which the parties accept the intervention of an outsider are more, or
less, likely to terminate in a settlement. Nor do we know whether a
better, or even a similar outcome could not have been attained and
without the participation of a third party. Until we have some answers
to these questions, third parties' contributions to successful outcomes
should be kept in their proper, and critical, perspective."'
Similarly, Pruitt and Rubin conclude that: "In the last analysis, however,
it is our view that third parties are enormously
helpful and important in
3
the reduction and resolution of differences.'

Certainly, there is much to be said for techniques which stop the parties from fighting and keep them talking, even if a definitive solution
proves for the moment elusive. Sometimes, if matters can just be put "on
hold," time and changing attitudes, interests and circumstances may provide opportunities for settlement not presently apparent.
It is usually assumed, probably correctly, that third party intervention is much more widely used in relatively "unimportant" than "important" types of disputes. But it is also evident that third parties do, at
least occasionally, help parties resolve "important" disputes. If third
party intervention is in fact useful in resolving a number of less important and even a few important disputes, it would certainly seem to be
performing a significant function, even if it cannot help in all disputes.
Finally, regarding adjudication, it seems fair to conclude that despite
the relatively small number of these cases - perhaps in all only several
hundred intergovernmental arbitrations and less than 85 contentious
cases in the World Court (33 in the P.C.I.J. and some 50 in the I.C.J.),
many of these cases have involved disputes of considerable significance.
Among these important cases are the Alabama Claims, Bering Sea,
North Atlantic Fisheries,Lake Lanoux, Island of Palmas, Trail Smelter,
Rann of Kutch, Channel Islands and Beagle Channel arbitrations, and
the Gulf of Maine, North Sea Continental Shelf and Iranian Hostage
cases. Moreover, these decisions have helped to establish principles and
rules which have helped resolve or avoid other international disputes.

41. BERCOVITCH, supra note 1, at 92-93 and 113-15 (using data from Butterworth).
42. Id. at 113-15.
43. Pruitt and Rubin, supra note 1, at 179. For a discussion of the role of third-party
dispute settlement techniques in helping nations to manage the risks of their international
cooperation and reach international agreements, see Bilder, supra note 27, at 56-61.
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XII.

SOME CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

What is the proper role of third party techniques in managing international disputes and what can we do to improve their usefulness? In
summary, the following are some of my suggestions.
First, we should recognize that the best way of dealing with international disputes is by negotiations between the parties themselves, and the
most important and useful thing third parties usually can do will be to
supplement and assist this process. Consequently, our efforts should be
directed particularly to improving facilitative techniques such as mediation, fact-finding and conciliation. Certainly, we should also encourage
the use of more directive techniques such as adjudication, but with
awareness that arbitration and judicial settlement are likely to play only
a limited role in international dispute settlement for some time to come.
Second, while third party techniques will often be useful, we should
not expect more than they can deliver. For example, even the most skilled
use of third party techniques usually will not succeed in bringing unwilling parties, who have fundamental differences, to agreement. However,
we should also remember that third party intervention can be useful and
"successful" simply by restraining or isolating conflict, buying time, or
keeping a situation from getting worse, even if it does not bring about a
final settlement.
Third, while we should certainly continue to learn more about various methods of third-party intervention, such as mediation, and improve
our ability to use them effectively, we should be careful not to overemphasize the importance of mere technique or "gimmicks." There are few
secrets and little magic in successful dispute settlement. The most important factor will continue to be whether the parties want - or can be persuaded to want - the dispute settled. The most important qualities of a
third party will continue to be traditional "old-fashioned" virtues - common sense, honesty, trustworthiness, patience, integrity, stamina, courage,
intelligence, competence, sensitivity to the concerns of others, conscientiousness, impartiality and good will. And luck will always help.
Fourth, we should try to better understand and develop disputemanagement systems between or among particular states or groups of
states." Dispute settlement is a complex process, in which a variety of
techniques may appropriately play a part. Each international relationship
exists in a unique environment, and may require its own special approach
or "mix." Thus, the U.S. and Canada historically have developed and
may be able most appropriately to use one type of dispute-management
system, while U.S.-Soviet relationships may most appropriately call for a
completely different kind of system.
Fifth, in thinking about dispute settlement, we should not forget the
great importance of doing more to avoid disputes. Thus, we should de44. See Bilder, supra note 9.
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velop and improve arrangements and mechanisms designed both to keep
disputes from occurring and to permit them to be dealt with at an early
stage, before political interests become vested, emotions become involved,
or positions harden." Such dispute avoidance measures might include
prior agreement on clear rules and workable arrangements; prior notification and consultation, and the establishment of ad hoc or permanent
binational commissions or joint agencies.
Sixth, we should be sensitive to the possible relevance to any dispute
of the particular cultural attitudes and responses towards conflict and
dispute-settlement of the parties involved, and take such perspectives
into account in deciding on the appropriateness of different approaches or
techniques. For example, Chinese, Japanese and certain other non-Western societies appear traditionally to have given particular emphasis to
nonadversarial techniques of mediation and mutual accommodation as a
way of dealing with disputes, and to have been particularly reluctant to
use adjudication or other adversarial or "legally-oriented" methods.
Again, different societies may have different perspectives regarding the
types of individuals most worthy of respect and trust and most suitable to
perform third-party roles; thus, in some cultures, eminent lawyers may be
appropriate mediators or dispute resolvers, while in others, political or
religious leaders may be more suitable.
Seventh, we should study possibilities for improving old third party
institutions and procedures and developing new ones. Clearly, there is
much to be said for having institutions or procedures in place, more easily
available to parties if they wish to use them - although it is open to
question whether new institutions in themselves will make much difference without some change in underlying state attitudes. Certainly, one of
the most important things we can do is to foster an international atmosphere in which third-party intervention and efforts to promote peaceful
settlement of disputes are considered routine,appropriate, legitimate and
acceptable. There are several ideas worth exploring regarding improvements to be made and possible new developments in our dispute management institutions.
One idea is to expand the availability and use of non-binding conciliation processes and of the advisory jurisdiction of international tribunals.
As indicated, governments have been reluctant to accept binding judicial
settlement since they see legally binding judgments as posing special risks
- even though their fears may be unrealistic and unlikely to come to
pass. Conciliation and advisory or non-binding adjudication, on the other
hand, can offer many advantages of impartial third-party factual and legal determination while reducing some of its most significant risks. In
many cases, a recommendation or advisory decision may in fact provide a

45. See, e.g., Bilder, An Overview of InternationalDispute Settlement, supra note 1,

at 29-31; R.
TICE (1983).
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mutually acceptable basis for resolution of the dispute; however, each
party will have the assurance that, should its worst fears be realized and
the decision prove unacceptable, it can legally refuse to comply with it,
incurring only limited public relations costs. While binding adjudication
may in principle be preferable, non-binding conciliation or adjudication
may in some situations be the most that one or both parties will agree to,
and in that event, better than nothing. The thus far successful experience
of the newly formed Inter-American Court of Human Rights with advisory jurisdiction is suggestive in this respect."
Another idea is to develop a wider, more easily available, and more
credible array of international fact-finding, monitoring and verification
facilities. For example, proposals have been made in 'the U.N. for the development of permanent fact-finding institutions, and even for the establishment of International Satellite Monitoring Agency to help verify arms
control or similar agreements. I have elsewhere suggested the possibility
of establishing an essentially independent and neutral entity (e.g., a "Facility for International Risk Management") outside the U.N. framework
and free of direct government control, which would be available to states,
at their request and with their sharing of costs, to perform verification,
monitoring, escrow or other risk-management functions; such a facility
might take, for example, the form of an international corporation, along
the lines of EUROCHEMIC, or a nongovernmental organization, such as
the International Committee of the Red Cross.4 7
Still another possibility is to explore ways of making international
adjudication, and in particular the I.C.J., more acceptable, accessible and
flexible." As indicated, any substantial change in the willingness of
state's to use international adjudication or the I.C.J. is likely to require a
fundamental change in state attitudes and in their willingness to face the

46. See, e.g., Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1985). See generally, for arguments for more pragmatic, flexible and non-binding types of risk-management and dispute-resolution arrange-

ments, R. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (1981).
47. See Bilder, An Institution to Monitor Treaties, 18 INT'L PRAC. NOTEBOOK 13 (Apr.
1982) (Amer. Branch, Int'l Law Assoc.) and Milwaukee Journal Mar. 14, 1982, at part 9. On
verification, see generally, Bilder, supra note 46, at 119-39; Trimble, Beyond Verification:
The Next Step in Arms Control, 102 HARv. L. REV. 885 (1989); M. KREPON, ARMS CONTROL
- VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE (1987); W. POLLER (ed.), VERIFICATION AND ARMS CONTROL
(1985).
48. For recent discussions of the I.C.J. and suggestions for broadening its role, see the
references cited in supra notes 1, 20, and 33, and also Allott, supra note 1, at 134-58; Gross,

supra note 1; Gross, The InternationalCourt of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for
Enhancing its Role in the InternationalLegal Order, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 253 (1971); Sohn,
supra note 1; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, STUDY ON WIDENING ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1976), reprinted in DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 650 (Mcdowell ed. 1976); Murphy, The World Court and the Peaceful Settlement of
InternationalDisputes, 7 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 551 (1977); Dillard, The World Court:
Reflections of a Professor Turned Judge, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 205 (1978); Petren, Some
Thoughts on the Future of the International Court of Justice, 6 NETH. Y.B.INT'L.L. 59
(1975).
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risks inherent in binding third-party dispute settlement techniques. But
some procedural innovations may be of help. For example, the recent expansion of the availability and use of the I.C.J.'s chamber procedure is
one useful step in this direction.49 Professor Louis Sohn's proposal for
step-by-step acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction - the
idea of slicing or fractionating types or degrees of commitment to adjudication into less-risky and more-acceptable packages - is another suggestive and innovative type of approach."0 Another idea is that the U.S. consider entering into special dispute settlement agreements with the Soviet
Union and perhaps other major powers outside the Article 36(2) "optional clause" framework - providing for the compulsory submission of
carefully specified types of treaty or other disputes to special chambers of
the International Court of Justice. Among the various other suggestions
which have been made and debated are: permitting wider access to the
I.C.J. or other international courts by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, or even individuals; restricting the types of
reservations which can be made to acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. under the "optional clause"; completely discarding the
concept of compulsory jurisdiction; expanding the "law" the I.C.J. can
draw on under Article 38 of its statute to include U.N. General Assembly
declarations; and so forth. We might consider whether at least some of
the so-called "alternative dispute resolution" (ADR) techniques, such as
"minitrials," currently being discussed and experimented with within the
U.S. and some other national legal systems, have possible application to
international problems and are worth exploring.
We should also try to strengthen the ability of third parties in appropriate situations to intervene on a temporary basis in disputes and conflicts simply to keep matters "on hold" and from getting worse, while providing time or a "waiting period" in which the disputing states or third
parties can seek solutions. Precedents include the power of the I.C.J.,
under Article 41 of its statute, to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to
preserve the respective rights of either party, as well as the activities of

49. See, e.g., Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 81 AM.
J. INT'L L. 831 (1987). Most of the cases submitted to the Court since 1982 have been under
the chamber procedure. There are indications that the State Department strongly favors use
of the chamber procedure and, indeed, may contemplate that future submissions to the
Court be only to such a panel. See 1989 PRoc. AM. Soc. INT'L. L., supra note 35. Certainly
the panel concept has proven popular, and it is arguable that any device which encourages a
willingness by states to resort to the Court is for the good. On the other hand, there may be
some question whether, if all states choose to use only such specially selected panels, the
International Court of Justice will remain in fact a "World Court", rather than simply being
a series of ad hoc arbitral tribunals sitting at a common seat. That is, to the extent that the
extensive use of the chambers procedure tends to erode the concept and integrity of the
Court as a global institution, or encourages the attitude that its international judges are
inherently biased or untrustworthy, there may be serious reason for concern.
50. Sohn, Step-by-Step Acceptance of the Jurisdictionof the International Court of
Justice, 58 A.S.I.L. PRoc. 131 (1964).
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various U.N. peacekeeping forces. We should explore whether there might
be additional ways of temporarily restraining and preventing escalation of
disputes to permit time and opportunity for settlement.
Also, we should attempt to develop ways of better utilizing national
legal systems to implement international dispute-management objectives
should be developed. Proposals to allow the I.C.J. to give advisory opinions to national courts on questions of international law would be one
interesting step in this direction.5 1 Other possibilities might include
agreements facilitating access to national courts or agencies by alien individuals, corporations or even foreign governments seeking domestic remedies for particular kinds of transnational problems, such as transfrontier
pollution disputes; or an agreement, similar to the N.Y. Arbitration Convention, expressly providing for implementation by a respondent state
and third states of the obligation of states under the U.N. Charter to
comply with a judgment of the I.C.J.
Eighth, we should give more emphasis and support to innovative research about the international dispute process and techniques of international dispute management and settlement, particularly empirical and interdisciplinary studies. 2 This research should include investigations of
the broad underlying questions concerning the causes, characteristics, and
"life cycle" of disputes noted at the beginning of this paper. Particular
questions relevant to third party dispute-settlement which might merit
more attention and additional research including the following:
- What factors influence disputing states' perceptions of the acceptability, authority, and persuasiveness of third parties? What qualities
really are most important? In particular, what do we mean by "neutrality," "impartiality" or "lack of bias," how important are perceptions as to the neutrality of third parties to the success of their efforts, and how can we best ensure that third parties are in fact
neutral and unbiased? Even though every human being, inevitably,
may have biases, can't people still be counted on to conscientiously
perform roles which require them to act "neutrally," and how can we
strengthen such traditions? What are the pros and cons of utilizing
51. See, e.g., Schwebel, PreliminaryRulings by the InternationalCourt of Justice at
the Instance of National Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 495 (1988); Gross, supra note 48 ; Sohn,
Broadening the Advisory Jurisdictionof the InternationalCourt of Justice, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 124 (1983); Goldklang, House Approves Proposal Permitting ICJ to Advise Domestic
Courts, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 338 (1983); McLaughlin, Allowing Federal Courts Access to International Court of Justice Advisory Opinions: Critique and Proposal, 6 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 745 (1983).
52. For listings of academic and other study programs and institutes and organizations
involved in research relating to conflict resolution and dispute settlement, see INSTITUTE FOR
WORLD ORDER, PEACE AND WORLD ORDER STUDIES: A CURRICULUM GUIDE 373-86 (3d ed.
1981). A number of these, such as the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School and
its Harvard Negotiation Project, expressly adopt an interdisciplinary approach. There is a
need, in particular, to integrate the insights of legal and social science research in this respect, and to provide more occasions for lawyers and social scientists interested in these
problems to talk and work together.
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an international institution, such as the U.N., in a third party role, as
contrasted with a state or individual?
- What do we mean by "settlement of a dispute" or an "acceptable
outcome" and, in particular, what affects the parties' perceptions as
to the "equity" or "fairness" of a particular outcome? Is "fairness"
primarily substantive or procedural, against what base lines or by
what criteria are the parties likely to judge it, and how can we best
achieve it? More generally, how can we best define or measure the
"quality" of dispute resolution processes and outcomes?
- Can we say anything about when is the "right time" for various
types of intervention? How important are personal interrelations between individual participants in settlement processes? Can nongovernmental organizations play a more useful role in dispute
settlement?
- How can disputing parties best protect themselves against improper
overreaching or counterproductive interference by a third party?
How can a third party best protect itself from becoming enmeshed or
blackmailed in the dispute?
- What affects third party perceptions of the legitimacy and persuasiveness of the disputing parties' positions? Is there a difference between the type of argumentation the parties use in negotiation to try
to persuade each other, and the type of argumentation they use in
third party contexts to try to persuade the third party?
- What role do international law, generalized norms, or general "public opinion" and the attitude of third states play in dispute resolution? What does "social pressure" mean and how does, or can, it affect dispute-resolution processes? Are perceptions of legitimacy
relevant only to adjudication or other "legal" techniques of settlement, or do they affect non-adjudicative methods of third-party settlement as well?
- In what kind of cases is it important to successful intervention that
the third party be able to provide specific resources, particularly the
resources to help the parties manage the risks of potential settlement
arrangements,and how can such resources be made more available?
- What do we mean by "face" - the quality of respect or reputation
that states (and officials) seem so concerned with "losing" by giving
in to settlements, and how can we reduce the obstructive influence of
such considerations on settlement efforts?
- What is the effect of "trust" and "distrust" on dispute settlement
efforts, and how can third parties help disputing states to overcome
or counterbalance distrust?
- Is it desirable or undesirable for a third party to be "powerful" or
have some independent basis of influence over the disputing parties?
More generally, what is the role of power or force in third party settlement? Can there be anappropriate role for "creative coercion."
- In what respects do mediators or conciliators behave differently
from adjudicators or judges, and what makes them act and see their
roles as different? What do the parties, or the "general public", ex-
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pect of third parties entrusted with these different roles?
- How can third parties better contribute to the settlement of the
complex and pervasive internal racial, ethnic and religious strife
which increasingly threatens international order (e.g., in South Africa, the Middle East, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere)? Clearly, it is becoming increasingly difficult to draw any
sharp lines between international (or external) and domestic (or internal) disputes. Do we need to develop new approaches or ways of
thinking to help us to deal effectively with these "mixed" or "transnational" kinds of disputes?
Ninth, the international community should be more assertive in insisting that parties accept third party intervention in disputes which
threaten international peace and security or, indeed, the international
community's general welfare. It is now widely recognized that, for better
or worse, the world has become an interdependent community and that
serious disputes and conflict are now everyone's business. The idea that
states are free to conduct their quarrels however they wish and without
regard to the cost to others is outdated and has no place in a nuclear age.
Finally, once again, we should not forget that international third
party dispute settlement has a symbolic significance as well as practical
importance. The concept that disputes and conflicts within a group are
not simply the business of those directly involved but are of concern of
every member is at the root of civilized and ordered society. Consequently, third party dispute settlement, and institutions such as the International Court of Justice which implement its use, can encourage
growing perceptions of international community and play a crucial role in
the development of a more peaceful, just and decent world.

The Law of International Watercourses:
Some Recent Developments and
Unanswered Questions
STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY*

The International Law Commission of the United Nations (ILC), a
body composed of 34 individuals who serve in their personal capacities,
and not as government representatives,' is currently engaged in the preparation of drafts on two subjects that relate to transfrontier environmental harm. This work is particularly significant because of the unique nature of the Commission, whose task is "the promotion of the progressive
development of international law and its codification." 2 The ILC fulfills

* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. B.A., University
of Colorado; J.D., University of California (Berkeley); Dr. Jur., University of Cologne, FRG.
Member, United Nations International Law Commission.
1. UNITED NATIONS, THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 6 (4th ed.
1988). Article 2, para. 1 of the Commission's Statute provides that members are to be "persons of recognized competence in international law." Statute of the International Law
Commission 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/4/Rev.2 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ILC Statute]. Members are elected by the General Assembly unless a vacancy occurs during a five-year term, in
which case it is filled by the Commission itself; Article 8 of the Statute provides that "the
electors shall bear in mind that the persons to be elected to the Commission should individually possess the qualifications required and that in the Commission as a whole representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should
be assured." I.L.C. Statute, at 2.
It is therefore surprising that a recent article should have characterized the Commission
as "government-dominated." Allott, State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law, 29 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 and 16 (1988). That governments have no power over
members of the Commission was demonstrated beyond any doubt when, on several occasions, they have been unsuccessful in efforts to unseat ILC members. See e.g., H. BRIGGS,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 78-80 (1965) (attempts to remove Shuhsi Hsu (China)
in the 1950s); and Schwebel, The Thirty-Second Session of the InternationalLaw Commission, 74 A.J.I.L. 961, 961-62 (1980) (attempt to unseat Abdul Hakim Tabibi (Afghanistan).
A similar attempt to replace a member of Nigerian nationality after a change of government
in 1984 was also unsuccessful. Aide-Memoire of 11 May 1984 from the ILC to the Government of Nigeria. "[O]n each occasion, the Commission has politely, but firmly, adhered to
the view that its members sit in their personal capacities and cannot be unseated during
their term of office by means other than voluntary resignation." I. SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 20-21 (1987).
While there may be some justification for the view that the election of Commission
members has become increasingly politicized. See e.g., H. BRIGGS at 42; Saunders, The 1971
Elections of the InternationalLaw Commission, 66 A.J.I.L. 356 (1972)], it has been suggested that this actually enhances the possibility that Commission drafts will be acceptable
to governments. See e.g., B. RAMCHARAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 34 (1977);
and EL BARADEI, FRANCK AND TRACHTENBERG, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION: THE

NEED FOR A NEW DIRECTION 29 (1981). See generally I. SINCLAIR at 16-19.
2. ILC Statute, supra note 1, at 1. The Commission, in practice, has not drawn a dis-
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this mandate by preparing what amount to draft conventions for submission to the United Nations General Assembly. These drafts have often
formed the basis of multilateral treaties adopted at conferences convened
by the General Assembly.3 But the Commission's work is of interest even
without regard to the final form it may take, since it is the result of efforts to state what the law is (codification) or what it should be (progressive development)."
The two subjects on which the ILC is currently working that address
problems of transfrontier environmental harm are The Law of the Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses (International Watercourses) and International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (International Liability).' This article will be confined to reviewing recent developments of

tinction between "codification" and "progressive development," although they are treated as
separate exercises in the ILC Statute (supra note 1, arts. 15, 16-17 (progressive development) and 18-23 (codification)). I. SINCLAIR, supra note 1, at 7; McCaffrey, Codification and
Progressive Development: Law and the World Environment, 7 HARV. INT'L REV. 8 (1984).
3. See, e.g., the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea which, in turn formed
the basis of much of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Convention on the
High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention
on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 472, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311;
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living
Resources of the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S.
285. See also, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done April 18, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261; and The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 169 (1969).
4. Supra note 2.
5. For discussions of the Commission's work on International Liability see, e.g.,
Magraw, Transboundary Harm: The International Law Commission's Study of International Liability, 80 A.J.I.L. 305 (1986); McCaffrey, The Work of the International Law
Commission Relating to the Environment, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 189, 206-211 (1983); id. An
Update on the Contributionsof the InternationalLaw Commission to InternationalEnvironmental Law, 15 ENV. L. 667 (1985); and id. The Fortieth Session of the International
Law Commission, 83 A.J.I.L. 153, 169-70 (1989).
The Commission has provisionally adopted an article in the context of its work on a
third topic, State Responsibility, which also concerns environmental protection. Article 19
of Part One of the Responsibility draft is entitled "International Crimes and International
Delicts." It creates a new category of especially serious internationally wrongful state acts
called "international crimes". The article provides that an international crime "may result,
inter alia, from" an act of aggression, the establishment or maintenance by force of colonial
domination, a serious and widespread breach of an obligation for the safeguarding of the
human being, such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid,and finally, (d) a
serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding
and preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of
the atmosphere or of the seas. 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 95, 96 (1976). The Commission's
commentary to article 19 is contained in id. at 96-122. For a brief discussion of subparagraph (d), quoted above, see McCaffrey, The Work of the InternationalLaw Commission
Relating to the Environment, 11 EcOL. L. Q. 189, 211-214 (1983). For an in-depth examination of article 19, see generally International Crimes of State, A Critical Analysis of the
ILC's Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (J. Weiler, A. Cassese & M. Spinedi eds.
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significance in relation to the Commission's work on International Watercourses and examining some of the questions that work raises.
I.

OVERVIEW

The General Assembly first recommended that the International Law
Commission study the law of the non-navigational uses of international
watercourses in 1970.6 The Commission held general discussions of the
topic in 1976 and adopted the first six articles of the draft in 1980. While
these articles were later withdrawn at the instance of a new special rapporteur, 7 the Commission in 1987 adopted a fresh set of introductory provisions, as well as the first two articles of Part II, entitled "General Principles."' The Commission made further significant progress at its 1988
session, adopting the remaining general provisions as well as Part III of
the draft, which concerns procedural obligations in the case of planned
measures.' At the same session, the Commission discussed a set of articles

1989).
6. G.A.O.R. Res. 2669 (XXV) (Dec. 8, 1970). For a historical overview of the ILC's work
on international watercourses, see UNITED NATIONS, THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION 100-105 (4th ed. 1988).
7. Stephen M. Schwebel resigned from the Commission in 1981 upon his election to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). He was succeeded by Jens Evensen, who was appointed
in 1982. In 1985 the Commission appointed the present author special rapporteur after
Evensen had himself been elected to the ICJ. Schwebel was in fact the second rapporteur
for the topic, having succeeded the original rapporteur, Richard Kearney, in 1977. Since the
Commission accords special rapporteurs wide latitude in deciding how work on a topic
should proceed, and because it discusses topics only on the basis of reports submitted by the
rapporteurs, changes in rapporteurships can result in significant delays in the ILC's work.
8. See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Ninth
Session, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/42/10 at 53-88 (1987) [hereinafter 1987
ILC Report], which also contains the Commission's commentaries to these articles. The titles of the articles forming Part I, Introduction, are as follows: Article 1, "[Use of terms]"
(action on this article was deferred until a later stage of the Commission's work; infra note
10); Article 2, "Scope of the present articles;" Article 3, "Watercourse States;" Article 4,
"[Watercourse] [System] agreements;" and Article 5, "Parties to [watercourse] [system]
agreements." The articles of Part II, General Principles, adopted in 1977 are Article 6, "Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation," and Article 7, "Factors relevant to
equitable and reasonable utilization."
9. The remaining articles of Part II, General Principles, adopted in 1988 are: Article 8,
"Obligation not to cause appreciable harm;" Article 9, "General obligation to co-operate;"
and Article 10, "Regular exchange of data and information." Part III, Planned Measures,
also adopted in 1988, contains the following provisions: Article 11, "Information concerning
planned measures;" Article 12, "Notification concerning planned measures with possible adverse effects;" Article 13, "Period for reply to notification;" Article 14, "Obligations of the
notifying State during the period for reply;" Article 15, "Reply to notification;" Article 16,
"Absence of reply to notification;" Article 17, "Consultations and negotiations concerning
planned measures;" Article 18, "Procedures in the absence of notification;" Article 19, "Urgent implementation of planned measures;" Article 20, "Data and information vital to national defence or security;" and Article 21, "Indirect procedures." These articles, together
with the Commission's commentaries thereto, are contained in the Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its FortiethSession, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10),
U.N. Doc. A/43/10 at 83-139 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 ILC Report].
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proposed by the special rapporteur on environmental protection and pollution. Some of the more controversial issues raised by these articles will
be examined after a brief discussion of the general obligations that form
their basis.

II.

EQUITABLE UTILIZATION AND THE OBLIGATION NOT TO CAUSE
APPRECIABLE TRANSFRONTIER HARM

The twin cornerstones of the entire watercourses draft are Articles 6
and 8. They provide as follows:
Article 6: Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation 1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an
international watercourse [system] 10 in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse [system] shall be used
and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimum
utilization thereof and benefits therefrom consistent with adequate protection of the international watercourse [system].
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and
protection of an international watercourse [system] in an equitable and
reasonable manner. Such participation includes both the right to utilize
the international watercourse [system] as provided in paragraph 1 of this
article and the duty to co-operate in the protection and development
thereof, as provided in article [9]."'
Article 8: Obligation not to cause appreciableharm Watercourse States shall utilize an international watercourse [system] in such a way as not to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse
States. 2
The obligations embodied in Articles 6 and 8 are firmly rooted in the
practice of states."3 Article 6 obligates states to use international water-

10. The term "system" appears in brackets as a result of a Commission decision to
postpone until a later date the precise definition of the scope of the draft. The basic question is whether the draft should apply to the concept of an "international watercourse system," which would include not only tributaries but also such watercourse components as
groundwater and glaciers, or to the potentially much narrower concept of an "international
watercourse" which, in the view of some ILC members, would include only the main stem of
a river. See 1987 ILC Report, supra note 8, at 54.
11. 1987 ILC Report, supra note 8, at 69-70. The Commission's commentary to article 6
is contained in id. at 70-82.
12. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 83. The Commission's commentary to article 8 is
contained in id. at 83-101.
13. See the Commission's commentaries to article 6, 1987 ILC Report, supra note 8, at
70-82; and article 8, 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 83-101. See also the authorities
surveyed in S. McCaffrey, Second Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/399 44-81, and id. at Add.1, 1-52 (1986) [hereinafter McCaffrey, Second Report]; and S. Schwebel, Third Report on the Law of the Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses, [1982] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 65, 75-87
(1982) [hereinafter Schwebel, Third Report].
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courses in a manner that is "equitable" viv-a-vis other states using the
same watercourse. "The scope of a State's rights of equitable utilization
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case, and
specifically upon a weighing of all relevant factors, as provided in article
7."I' Article 8 "is a specific application of the principle of the harmless
use of territory, expressed in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which is itself a reflection of the sovereign equality of States."1
In the view of many specialists, the most fundamental principle of
international water law is that of equitable utilization. Thus, for example,
a downstream state that was first to develop its water resources could not
foreclose later development by an upstream state by demonstrating that
the later development would cause it harm; under the doctrine of equitable utilization, the fact that the downstream state was "first to develop"
(and thus had made prior uses that would be adversely affected by new
upstream uses) would be merely one of a number of factors to be taken
into consideration in arriving at an equitable allocation of the uses and
benefits of the watercourse.1 6 These observers believe that if the "no
harm" principle took precedence over that of equitable utilization the effect would be to freeze the development of many riparian states to international watercourses ("watercourse states").
The approach of the International Law Commission to this problem
is illustrated in the following excerpt from the commentary to Article 8:
[PJrima facie, at least[,] utilization of an international watercourse
[system] is not equitable if it causes other watercourse States appreciable harm ....
The Commission recognizes, however, that in some
instances the achievement of equitable and reasonable utilization will
depend upon the toleration by one or more watercourse States of a
measure of harm. In these cases, the necessary accommodations would
be arrived at through specific agreements. 7
This solution will probably not be completely satisfying to adherents of

14. 1987 ILC Report, supra note 8, at 73.
15. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 83. Compare Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, adopted by the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment on June 16, 1972 which provides as follows:
States have, in accordance with the charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, at 325 U.N. Sales
No. E.73.II.A.14.
16. See text supra note 14. See the indicative list of factors contained in Article 7,
adopted by the ILC in 1987. 1987 ILC Report, supra note 8, at 82. See also Article V of the
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers, adopted by the International
Law Association (ILA) it its fifty-second Conference held in Helsinki in 1966, ILA, Report
of the fifty-second Conference, Helsinki, 1966, 484 (1967) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules].
17. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 84.
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the school of thought referred to above. Several points must be recognized in its defense, however. First, the ILC's approach affords a measure
of protection to the weaker state that has suffered harm. It is not open to
the stronger state to justify a use giving rise to the harm on the ground
that it is "equitable." A second, and related, point is that it is far simpler
to determine whether the "no harm" rule has been breached than is the
case with the obligation of equitable utilization. Thus, primacy of the "no
harm" principle means that the fundamental rights and obligations of
states with regard to their uses of an international watercourse are more
definite and certain than they would be if governed in the first instance
by the more flexible (and consequently less clear) rule of equitable utilization. And finally, the "no harm" rule is preferable in cases involving
pollution and other threats to the environment. While a state could conceivably seek to justify an activity resulting in such harm as being an
"equitable use," the "no harm" principle would - at least prima facie s
- require abatement of the injurious activity.
Irrespective of whether primacy is accorded to the "no harm" principle, however, the question remains whether it is enough for an injured
state to show that it has been harmed by another state's use of a shared
watercourse. That is, is the standard of responsibility for breach of Article 8 a strict one, or is responsibility based on the "fault" of the source
state? The Commission side-stepped this important issue. It decided to
determine the extent to which a state could be held strictly liable (i.e.,
liable for the injurious consequences of an act not prohibited by international law) in the context of its work on the International Liability topic.
Within the context of the ILC's overall program of work,1" this decision
can be defended as a means of avoiding duplication of effort. But those
who look to the Commission's work-product for guidance in dealing with
problems relating to international watercourses would doubtless have welcomed some treatment of the standard of responsibility in the context of
the watercourses draft itself. The Commission's discussion of this issue
will be reviewed in part IV, below.

18. The extent to which other states would tolerate harm so long as the source state
was taking reasonable measures to abate it is discussed in S. McCaffrey, Fourth Report on
the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
412/Add.2, 12-13 (1988) [hereinafter McCaffrey, Fourth Report]; and J. LAMMERS, POLLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, 349 (1984) [hereinafter LAMMERS]. See infra note 67.
19. There are seven substantive items on the Commission's active agenda. They are:
state responsibility, Jurisdictional immunities of states and their property, status of the diplomatic courier and the diplomatic bag not accompanied by diplomatic courier, the Draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the law of the non-navigational
uses of international watercourses, international liability for injurious consequences arising
out of acts not prohibited by international law, and relations between states and international organizations (second part of the topic). 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 3-4.
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III.

THE OBLIGATIONS OF NOTIFICATION, CONSULTATION AND
NEGOTIATION CONCERNING PLANNED MEASURES

A survey of the ILC's work on International Watercourses relating to
the environment would not be complete without at least a brief mention
of the articles adopted at the Commission's 1988 session on procedural
obligations in the case of planned measures relating to an international
watercourse.20 Such provisions are indispensable to any scheme of prevention. Their aim is to provide an "early warning" of potentially adverse
changes in the regime of an interantional watercourse so that the states
concerned will have an opportunity to effect any necessary adjustments in
advance, before human and financial resources are irrevocably committed
and positions become entrenched.
The provisions on prior notification and consultation concerning
planned measures are contained in Part III of the watercourses draft.2 "
That chapter begins with Article 11, a general article requiring states riparian to an international watercourse to "exchange information and consult each other on the possible effects of planned measures on the condition of the watercourse .. *"22 Unlike the other articles in Part III,
Article 11 requires the exchange of information concerning all potential
effects of planned measures, whether they be positive or negative. This
will facilitate planning by affected watercourse states and may help to
avoid problems associated with unilateral interpretations of whether a
new project will have negative or beneficial impacts.
Articles 12 and following establish a system of prior notification concerning planned measures that may adversely affect other watercourse
states and procedures for resolving any disputes that may arise concerning those measures. The Commission's commentary explains that the expression "planned measures" includes "new projects or programmes of a
major or minor nature, as well as changes in existing uses of an international watercourse.
...
2s The obligation to notify is triggered by the criterion that the contemplated measures may have "an appreciable adverse
effect" upon other watercourse states. 24 It is therefore incumbent upon

20. The titles of these articles are set forth in supra note 9. The articles themselves,
together with the Commission's commentary thereto, are contained in 1988 ILC Report,
supra note 9, at 114-139.
21. Id.
22. Article 11, Information concerning planned measures, 1988 ILC Report, supra
note 9, at 114.
23. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 115 (para. (4) of commentary to Article 11).
24. Article 12. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 115. The meaning of the expression
"appreciable adverse effect" is discussed in para. (2) of the commentary to article 12. Id. at
115-116. As there explained, "[t]he threshold established by this standard is intended to be
lower than that of 'appreciable harm' under article 8." Id. The purpose of using a different
standard is to encourage notification in order to allow bilateral determinations of whether a
project (or change in an existing use) will have harmful consequences in other watercourse
states, without forcing the notifying state to admit that it is planning measures that may
give rise to a violation of article 8.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 17:3

the state planning the measures to undertake its own assessment of the
impact of the project upon other states using the watercourse. This evaluation would include possible effects upon the environment of other states;
it would thus function as a "transfrontier" environmental impact
assessment.
The system established by Part III functions in the following manner: After a state has received a notification of the kind described above
it has six months (unless another period is agreed upon) within which to
evaluate the potential effect of the project upon it and to communicate its
findings to the notifying state (Articles 12 and 13). The notifying state
may not proceed with the implementation of its plans during this period
without the consent of the notified state (Article 14). If the latter state
determines that implementation of the plans would put the notifying
state in violation of Articles 6 (equitable utilization) or 8 (no appreciable
harm), and so informs the notifying state within the 6-month period, Article 17 requires that the states enter into consultations and negotiations
with a view to arriving at an equitable resolution of the matter. Implementation of the project must be suspended for an additional 6 months if
the notified state so requests, in order to permit meaningful discussions
(Article 17). If, on the other hand, the notifying state does not receive a
"negative" reply within the initial 6-month period, it may go forward with
the implementation of its plans (Article 16).
Of course, it may happen that the state in whose territory the measures would be implemented (for convenience, the "planning state") provides no notification at all. This would presumably be due to a finding by
that state that the planned measures would have no appreciable adverse
effect upon other watercourse states. If another state nonetheless learns
of the plans and wishes information concerning them, it may set in motion the procedures outlined above by requesting the planning state to
apply the provisions of Article 12 (Article 18, para. 1) - i.e., to determine
whether the plans could have an appreciable adverse effect upon other
watercourse states. If the planning state answers this question in the negative, but that determination is not accepted by the other state, the states
are required to enter into consultations and negotiations (Article 18, para.
2). Once again, implementation of the plans is to be suspended for 6
months, at the request of the potentially affected state, to allow meaningful talks (Article 18, para. 3). It goes without saying that even if no information is provided to other states before the plans are actually implemented, the state permitting the implementation remains bound to
comply with its obligations under Articles 6 and 8.
These articles represent acceptance by the Commission of the principles of prior notification, consultation and negotiation in relation to new
watercourse uses or modifications of existing ones. While the procedures
they establish are quite general, they provide a framework within which
states sharing international watercourses can develop specific regimes tailored to their particular needs and to the characteristics of the watercourse and the uses being made of it. The articles cover all potentially
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adverse effects of planned measures, including environmental impacts.
The particular obligations of watercourse states in relation to pollution
and environmental protection were the subject of articles proposed by the
special rapporteur in 1988. These articles, and some of the issues they
raise, are the subject of the following section.
IV.
A.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND POLLUTION

The Articles Proposed by the Special Rapporteur

In 1988, the special rapporteur for international watercourses proposed a set of three draft articles (initially submitted as Articles 16-182"
on the subtopic of "Environmental protection, pollution and related matters." At the rapporteur's suggestion the Commission focused its discussion upon draft Articles 16 and 17; action on draft Article 18 was postponed until the ILC's next session. The latter article, entitled "Pollution
or environmental emergencies," will not be discussed further in this paper.2 6 The Commission ultimately decided to refer draft Articles 16 and
17 to the Drafting Committee. That body attempts to produce formulations of draft articles, on the basis of proposals submitted by the rapporteurs, that take into account points of view expressed in the Commission's debates. The Committee was unable to take up the two articles at
the 1988 session for lack of time. It will presumably examine them during
the course of the ILC's 1989 session.
Draft Articles 16 and 17, which would be contained in a separate
chapter, provide as follows:
Article 16 - Pollution of internationalwatercourse[s][systems] 1. As used in these draft articles, 'pollution' means any physical,
chemical or biological alteration in the composition or quality of the waters of an international watercourse [system] which results directly or indirectly from human conduct and which produces effects detrimental to
human health or safety, to the use of the waters for any beneficial purpose or to the conservation or protection of the environment.
2. Watercourse States shall not cause or permit the pollution of an
international watercourse [system] in such a manner or to such an extent
as to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States or to the ecology

25. These articles will eventually be renumbered to conform to the numerical sequence
of the articles already adopted.
26. The special rapporteur suggested deferring detailed discussion of the article so he
would have an opportunity to incorporate it into a more general article on water-related
hazards and dangers. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 54. After defining the term "pollution or environmental emergency," the draft article requires the state in whose territory
such an incident has occurred to notify immediately all potentially affected watercourse
states and to provide them with all available data and information relevant to the emergency. It further obligates that state to take immediate steps to prevent, neutralize or mitigate the danger or damage to other watercourse states resulting from the incident. McCaffrey, Fourth Report, supra note 18, at 23.
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of the international watercourse [system].
3. At the request of any watercourse State, the watercourse States
concerned shall consult with a view to preparing and approving lists of
substances or species, the introduction of which into the waters of the
international watercourse [system] is to be prohibited, limited, investigated or monitored, as appropriate."
Article 17 - Protection of the environment of international
watercourse[s][systems] 1. Watercourse States shall, individually and in co-operation, take all
reasonable measures to protect the environment of an international watercourse [system], including the ecology of the watercourse and of surrounding areas, from impairment, degradation or destruction, or serious
danger thereof, due to activities within their territories.
2. Watercourse States shall, individually or jointly and on an equitable basis, take all measures necessary, including preventive, corrective
and control measures, to protect the marine environment, including estuarine areas and marine life, from any impairment, degradation or destruction, or serious danger thereof, occasioned through an international watercourse [system]28
The three paragraphs forming Article 16 contain a definition of pollution, a core obligation not to cause appreciable pollution harm to other
watercourse states, and a requirement that watercourse states consult, on
request, with a view to agreeing upon lists of substances or species which,
due to their especially dangerous qualities, should be subjected to special
regulation. A summary of the Commission's discussion of this article is
contained in its report to the General Assembly.2 9 Only its most controversial aspects will be considered here. Draft Article 17 begins by requiring watercourse states to protect the environment of the watercourse.
This affirmative obligation of protection goes further than the "no appreciable harm" rule of draft Article 16, since it requires the taking of positive steps; such steps may be necessary even if no pollution harm would
be caused to other states. The obligation is mitigated, however, by the
qualification that a state need only take "all reasonable measures" to protect the watercourse environment. While such qualifications weaken the
rule to which they pertain and are thus generally undesirable, in this case
the term "reasonable" is intended to reflect the nascent character of the
obligation itself.30 Equivalent language is employed, perhaps for the same
reason, in the environmental provisions of the Law of the Sea Conven-

27. McCaffrey, Fourth Report, supra note 18, at 2; 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at
57; supra note 49.
28. McCaffrey, Fourth Report, supra note 18, at 20; 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at
69; supra note 61.
29. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 57-69.
30. See the authorities surveyed in McCaffrey, Fourth Report, supra note 18, at 8-57
(A/CN.4/412/Add.2).
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3
tion.1
Paragraph 2 of draft Article 17 addresses the increasingly serious
problem of harm to the marine environment resulting from watercourse
pollution. Like paragraph 1, it lays down an affirmative obligation of protection. In the case of paragraph 2, the duty is based on the Law of the
Sea Convention 2 and other, regional agreements that proscribe pollution
damage to the marine environment from land-based sources.3 3 In some
respects this provision seems to go further than paragraph 1, in that it
requires that "all measures necessary" (rather than "all reasonable measures") be taken, and specifies that these are to include "preventive, corrective and control measures." In employing the expression "on an equi-'
table basis," however, paragraph 2 may seem to be softening the
obligations of watercourse states in the case of actual or threatened harm
to the marine environment. But the expression is used here for a different
purpose, namely, to indicate that while a watercourse state is not internationally responsible for harm to the marine environment caused by pollution originating in another state, all states riparian to the watercourse
share an obligation to cooperate with each other in developing and establishing arrangements designed to avoid such harm. The intent of the provision is that the costs and other burdens of such arrangements be shared
equitably among the riparian states.

It may be said immediately that paragraph 2 of article 16 provoked a
more lively debate within the Commission than any other paragraph of
either article. This may be because it contains the "hardest" obligation of
any of the five paragraphs. It may also be due in part to questions raised
as to the standard of responsibility the paragraph entails. But it is at
least somewhat ironic that an obligation which is found in numerous treaties, dating from the middle of the last century," proved more controver-

31. 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Protection of Marine Environment, Art. 194, 11 (1982) (states shall use "the best practicable means at their disposal and
in accordance with their capabilities") [hereinafter 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea]. Id. at 70.
32. Id. Art. 194(1) & (3)(a) & Art. 207.
33. See, e.g., Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Development of the
Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region, March 23, 1981,
Natural Resources/Water Series No. 13, supra note 13, p. 2; 1974 Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Land-Based Sources, 13 I.L.M. 352 (1974); 1974 Convention on
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, 13 I.L.M. 546 (1974); 1976
Convention on the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, 15 I.L.M. 290
(1976); 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation in the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution, 17 I.L.M. 511 (1978).
34. One study identifies 88 different international agreements "containing substantive
provisions concerning pollution of international watercourses." LAMMERS, supra note 18, at
124. Early agreements containing provisions on water pollution include the 1868 Final Act
of the Delimitation of the International Frontier of the Pyrenees between France and Spain,
sec. I, clause 6, reprinted in Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions concerning the Utilization of InternationalRivers for other Purposes than Navigation, 674, 676, U.N. Sales No.
63.V.4 (1963)(Treaty No. 186)[hereinafter Legislative Texts]; see also the following conventions in Legislative Texts: 1887 convention between Switzerland and the Grand Duchy of
Baden and Alsace-Lorraine, art. 10, at 397 (Treaty No. 113); the 1904 Convention between
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sial than one which has been recognized only recently. 5
B.

Salient Issues

The Commission's discussion of Article 16 revealed differences of
views on several important issues," three of which will be the focus of
this section: (1) The question whether the draft should contain a strict
obligation concerning transfrontier water pollution harm; (2) the criterion
of "appreciable (pollution) harm;" and (3) the standard of responsibility
for breach of the article. These points, all of which relate to paragraph 2
of Article 16, will be taken up in turn.
1.

The Strictness of the Obligation

Most members of the Commission who addressed the issue agreed
that the draft should contain a strict obligation not to cause transfrontier
water pollution harm, along the lines of Article 16, paragraph 2. Some of
these members believed the principle to be so important that it deserved
to be placed in a separate article; in the view of others, the obligation was
sufficiently central to warrant its inclusion in Part II of the draft among
the other general principles. 7 Not all members believed that such emphasis should be given to prohibiting pollution, however. Thus it was suggested that the obligation not to cause transfrontier water pollution harm
was actually only an aspect of the more fundamental duty to cooperate in
the equitable utilization of international watercourses. According to this
view, international cooperation was the best means of controlling pollution. It was therefore proposed that paragraph 2 of Article 16 could provide as follows: "Watercourse States shall co-operate to prevent, reduce

France and Switzerland for the Regulation of Fishing in their Frontier Waters, art. 17, at
701, 706 (Treaty No. 196); the 1906 Agreement between Switzerland and Italy Establishing
Provisions in Respect of Fishing in Frontier Waters, art. 12, at 839, para. 5, (Treaty No.
230); and the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between Canada and the United States, art. IV,
at para. 2, 260, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. 548, 12 Bevans 319, (Treaty No. 79).
35. A number of relatively recent international agreements contain provisions on the
protection of the environment of international watercourses. See, e.g. the 1975 Statute of
the Uruguay River, especially arts. 36, 37 and 41 reprinted in URUGUAY, MINISTERIO DE RELACIONEs EXTERIORES, ACTOS INTERNACIONALES URUGUAY-ARGENTINA,
1830-1980, 600-602
(Montevideo, ed. 1981); the Accord de 1977 portant creation de l'organisation pour
l'amenagement et le developpement du bassin de la Riviere Kagera (Burundi, Rwanda,
Tanzania and Uganda), art. 2, para. 1, Natural Resources/Water Series, No. 13, U.N. Doc.
ST/TCD/4, 32 (1987); and the 1978 convention relating to the Status of the River Gambia
(Gambia, Guinea and Senegal), art. 4, Natural Resources/Water Series No. 13, at 39. For a
more general view, see the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, supra note 31 at 70-73 (arts. 192, 194 and 207). U.N. Sales No. 83.V.5, 70-73
(1983)(Article 207 specifically addresses pollution from land-based sources, "including rivers, estuaries, pipelines and outfall structures").
36. For a summary of the Commission's discussion of Article 16, see 1988 ILC Report,
supra note 9, at pp. 57-69.
37. Id. at 61.
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and control pollution of international watercourse[s] [systems]." '
There is nothing objectionable about such a formulation, as far as it
goes. Indeed, cooperation among all states sharing an international watercourse system is essential not only to the maintenance of acceptable
water quality but also to the smooth functioning of procedural rules and
the very development of the resource.8 9 The problem is that the proposed
language, by itself, does not go far enough. It is a general principle that
must be implemented through specific obligations. It could therefore
complement, but should not replace, a concrete prohibition of trans-.
frontier pollution harm. "Soft law"40 may be useful for certain purposes,
such as paving the way for the development of new norms. 41 But a "soft"
obligation such as the one proposed, standing alone, lacks the "determinacy,""' or "ability... to convey a clear message,' 4 necessary for states
to take it seriously, if indeed they are able to ascertain from its text exactly what it requires them to do or refrain from doing. It is a classic
example of a norm "whose substance is so vague, so uncompelling, that
A's obligation and B's right all but elude the mind." 4 Thus its value as a
deterrant of state caused or permitted transfrontier pollution harm would
be slight. And since it would be difficult to determine whether such a
general obligation had been violated, the proposed provision would provide only a very slender reed of support for a state claiming to have suffered harm as a result of another state's breach of an obligation to prevent pollution of an international watercourse. Finally, substituting an
obligation to cooperate in controlling harmful pollution of international
watercourses for a prohibition of such pollution seems out of line with
treaty practice. This is important for the following reasons: Even though
the Commission's draft on watercourses is foreseen as a "framework
agreement,"' one of its chief purposes is to clarify the fundamental obli-

38. Id.
39. See the discussion of the importance of cooperation in the use and development of
international watercourse systems in S. McCaffrey, Third report on the law of the nonnavigational uses of international watercourses 7-34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/406 and Corr.1
(1987) [hereinafter McCaffrey, Third Report].
40. See generally Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77
A.J.I.L. 413, 414 (1983) ("alongside 'hard law,' made up of the norms creating precise legal
rights and obligations, the normative system of international law comprises ... more and
more norms whose substance is so vague, so uncompelling, that A's obligation and B's right
all but elude the mind. One does not have to look far for examples of this 'fragile,' 'weak,' or
'soft law,' as it is dubbed at times: ... a recent Advisory Opinion of the International Court
of Justice includ[ed] obligations 'to co-operate in good faith' and 'to consult together' among
the 'legal principles and rules' governing the relations between an international organization
and a host country.").
41. See 1988 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (April 2023, 1988) to be published in Proceedings of the Society (1988) (remarks of Professor Dupuy
during panel discussion).
42. See Franck, Legitimacy in the InternationalSystem, 82 A.J.I.L. 705, 713 (1988).
43. Id. at 713.
44. Weil, supra note 40, at 414.
45. See, e.g., [1986] 2(2) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 63,

242; [1980] 2(1) Y.B. INT'L L.
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gations of states with regard to the non-navigational uses of international
watercourses." These obligations may be distilled, in part, from similar
provisions in a wide range of international agreements. 47 Many such
agreements, some of which are quite venerable, " contain prohibitions of
harmful transfrontier water pollution.49 It seems unwise to ignore the lessons of this treaty practice, especially in this era of increasing pollution
and environmental problems. Moreover, retreating from a specific obligation that states have demonstrated a willingness to accept, to a more general and vague obligation whose contours are blurred at best, would do
little to promote clarification of the rights and obligations of watercourse
states - one of the chief purposes of the draft. For these reasons, it is
submitted that the first question identified above should be answered in
the affirmative, i.e., the draft should contain a strict obligation concerning
transfrontier water pollution harm, such as that contained in paragraph 2
of draft article 16.
2.

The "Appreciable Harm" Criterion

The second issue concerns the criterion of "appreciable (pollution)
harm." The standard of "appreciable harm" was first considered in relation to article 8, set out above. 0 The Commission accepted the special
rapporteur's proposals that (a) the purely factual standard of "harm" was
preferable to the legal concept of "injury" because of its greater clarity;
and (b) some qualifier was necessary so that the article would not be interpreted to proscribe all harm, no matter how minor. 1 These factors are

COMM'N 161,

11 (The idea of a "framework agreement" is that "the Commission should
produce a set of articles which would provide a legal framework for the negotiation of treaties to govern the use of water of individual watercourses by the watercourse States.").
46. [1986] 2(1) Y.B. INTr'L L. COMM'N 94-95 T 32, ("[S]ince political relationships and
disposition to co-opeate among riparian States varied greatly, the general rules included in a
framework agreement should be precise and detailed enough to safeguard the rights of interested parties in the absence of specific agreements." Summarizing comments made in the
Sixth [Legal] Committee of the General Assembly).
47. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMrr, INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (2d ed. 1987)
(This is especially true when, as in the case of the non-navigational uses of international
watercourses, the agreements "deal with matters generally regulated by international law,"
as opposed to "treaties which deal with matters which are clearly recognized as within the

discretion of the states

. . . .").

See also 1

HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

17

(1940); and 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-11 (2d ed. 1945).
48. See, e.g., agreements cited in supra note 35.
49. See the agreements surveyed in McCaffrey, FourthReport, supra note 18, at 8-18.
50. See text supra note 12. The adjective "appreciable" is also employed in articles 4
and 5 of the watercourses draft.
51. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 85. McCaffrey, Second Report, supra note 13,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/399/Add.2 at 1-3. Another approach to the problem of formulating a general criterion is found in the newly adopted Antarctic Minerals Convention, which employs
the standard of "significant adverse effect." ("significant adverse effects on air and water
quality"). Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, 27 I.L.M.
868, 871 (1988)(Art. 4, para. 2 (a)). The Convention also incorporates the expression "damage to the Antarctic environment or dependent or associated ecosystems." See, e.g., id. at
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recognized in a number of agreements, which employ the expression "appreciable harm" or its linguistic counterpart."
Some members of the Commission nevertheless expressed doubts as
to the "appreciable harm" criterion, either because it was too subjective
or on the ground that it was a potential obstacle to industrial development. The adjective "substantial" was proposed as being preferable to
"appreciable." In the end the Commission seemed to agree with the special rapporteur that an expression should be employed that provided as
factual and objective a standard as could be formulated in the context of
a framework agreement. Since the criterion of "appreciable harm" has
already been employed in Article 8, it seems likely that the same standard will be used to measure the permissible limits of transfrontier water
pollution.
3.

Standard of Responsibility

The final issue to be discussed here is that of the standard of responsibility for breach of the obligation not to cause appreciable pollution
harm to another watercourse state. The Commission also confronted this
issue with regard to the more general obligation of Article 8. In that case
it was ultimately decided not to address the point in the commentary,"
presumably on the ground that the problem should be dealt with in the
context of the Commission's work on other topics on its agenda more directly concerned with issues of responsibility, viz., State Responsibility
and International Liability." It is likely that the Commission will follow
the same approach with regard to draft Article 16.5 But because the
ILC's work on these two topics may never provide a clear answer to the
question of the standard of responsibility in the specific case of transfrontier water pollution, brief consideration of the issue here seems
appropriate.
During the Commission's consideration of draft Article 16, a number
of members addressed the issue of standard of responsibility. As one
might expect, opinion in the Commission was divided between those that
favored a strict standard and those that would apply a more flexible

art. 1 (15), at 869-70.
52. See the agreements cited in 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 86-87.
53. The Commission deleted a paragraph of the draft commentary to Article 8 which
developed the proposition that a breach of that article would engage the international responsibility of the watercourse state in question, thus in effect deciding not to address the
issue. ProvisionalSummary Record of the 2092nd Meeting of the InternationalLaw Commission, 28 July 1988, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2092 at 11 (Oct. 3, 1988).
54. In its discussion of the issue of standard of responsibility in the context of draft
Article 16, para. 2 (prohibition of appreciable pollution harm), the Commission seemed to
agree that the matter was best left to be resolved in the context of its work on the two other
topics. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 69, para. 168. It is reasonable to infer that this was
also the motivation for not dealing with the issue in the commentary to Article 8, since the
latter was considered after the Commission's discussion of draft Article 16.
55. See id., and accompanying text.
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test."6 In his report, the special rapporteur had stated that "the obligation
set forth in paragraph 2 [of Article 16] is proposed as one of due diligence
to see that appreciable harm is not caused to other watercourse States or
to the ecology of the international watercourse [system]. 57 A number of
members agreed with this approach, noting that since the concept of due
diligence was well rooted both in domestic tort law and in the law of state
responsibility it would be easy for states to apply. Moreover, these members believed that it was the appropriate standard in the specific case of
responsibility for transfrontier water pollution harm.
Other members, however, opposed the use of a due diligence test. For
some, it was simply too vague and subjective to serve as a standard of
responsibility. Others maintained that such a criterion could place,
[t]oo heavy a burden on the victim State since only the source State
would have access to the means of proving whether or not it had exercised due diligence to prevent appreciable harm from being caused to
another watercourse State. It was suggested in this connection that
the burden of proving due diligence should be placed on the source
State."8
Some members went so far as to label the due diligence standard "dangerous" on the ground that "it made responsibility rest on wrongfulness
rather than on risk and that States would be tempted to evade responsibility simply by trying to prove that they had complied with their obligation of due diligence."" According to this view, responsibility for breach
of paragraph 2 should be strict. These members went on to urge that, in
any event, the question of responsibility should be tackled within the
framework of the International Liability topic rather than that of International Watercourses.
This tendency to treat the standard-of-responsibility question as
such a hot potato is unfortunate, even if it is understandable. It is unfortunate because it leaves an important question in this field unanswered,
robbing the "no harm" rule of much of its "determinacy" and thus undermining its "legitimacy." 60 For in an actual case, whether the injured state
will be legally entitled to relief will often come down to how the responsibility of the source state must be established. If the standard is a strict
one, responsibility is established by showing appreciable harm that resulted from, e.g., pollution emanating from the source state. If a lower
standard is applied, there may be no final determination of responsibility
as a practical matter, in the absence of agreed dispute settlement machinery, especially if the burden of proof rests entirely upon the victim state.

56. See 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 64-66.
57. McCaffrey, Fourth Report, supra note 18.
58. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 66.
59. Id.
60. As explained by Professor Franck, the "legitimacy" of a rule of international law is
largely dependent upon its "determinacy," or the clarity of the obligation it creates. Franck,
supra note 42, at 713. See text at supra note 39.
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Instead, the question will be left to be resolved, as so many are, through
negotiations between the governments concerned. And since it will be
very difficult for the victim state to prove, e.g., that the source state failed
to comply with its obligation of due diligence, the outcome for it will
probably be less than satisfactory. This situation would be ameliorated,
but not eliminated, if the burden of proving due diligence shifted to the
source state upon a prima facie showing by the victim state of harm
caused by water pollution emanating from the former state."e
Side-stepping the standard-of-responsibility question is, however, un-.
derstandable in the context of the ILC's program of work as a whole. The
very fact that it is a pivotal issue means that much time and energy
would have to be expended before it was resolved; even then, the likelihood is that the "resolution," like most compromises, would not be definitive. The question is, then, whether the resources that would have to be
dedicated to the effort would be worth an end result that would likely be
inconclusive. Two considerations suggest a negative answer to this question: first, taking on this issue could prevent the Commission from attaining its objective of completing the provisional adoption of the entire watercourses draft by 1991;6" and second, examining this issue in the context
of watercourses, at the same time it is being studied in the context of two
other topics, would entail an undesirable duplication of effort. All things
considered, therefore, it may be advisable for this issue to be left to river
basin states to be resolved in specific agreements. As a practical matter,
however, the states concerned may be unable to reach agreement on the
question or simply may not address it. The remainder of this section
therefore considers the standard that would apply under rules of general
international law.
In the absence of any agreement on the standard of responsibility,
the question would be governed by general rules of state responsibility or
possibly, where "ultrahazardous activities" are involved, the regime being
developed by the Commission in its work on International Liability."' In
the ordinary case of transfrontier water pollution, a breach of paragraph 2
of draft Article 16 (or, more generally, Article 8) would engage the international responsibility of the source state. In requiring watercourse states
not to cause appreciable pollution harm to other watercourse states, paragraph 2 lays down an "obligation of result" in the sense of Article 21"

61. This technique was suggested by some members of the Commission. See text at
supra note 54.
62. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 281.
63. See generally Magraw, supra note 5.
64. Article 21 provides as follows:
Article 21. Breach of an international obligation requiring the achievement of a
specified result:
1. There is a breach by a State of an international obligation requiring it to
achieve, by means of its own choice, a specified result if, by the conduct
adopted, the State does not achieve the result required of it by that obligation.
2. When the conduct of the State has created a situation not in conformity
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and, in particular, Article 2365 of the ILC's articles on State Responsibility. Article 23 provides as follows:
Article 23 - Breach of an international obligation to prevent a given
event When the result required of a State by an international obligation is
the prevention, by means of its own choice, of the occurrence of a given
event, there is a breach of that obligation only if, by the conduct adopted,
66
the State does not achieve that result.
Both Article 8 and paragraph 2 of draft Article 16 require watercourse states to prevent a given event, namely, appreciable harm in another watercourse state. Whether there had been a breach of those provisions would therefore be determined by applying Article 23. If, by
whatever means it chooses, the state fails to prevent the occurrence of
appreciable (pollution) harm to another watercourse state, it will have
breached the two articles. The Commission's commentary to Article 23
states that it even applies to "cases where the result aimed at by the
obligation is the prevention by the State of an event caused by factors in
which it plays no part [such as] ensur[ing] the result of preventing individuals or third parties from committing certain acts, or of preventing
disasters, whether naturally or artificially caused (such as flooding or pol6' 7
lution), from taking place.
This sounds very much like strict responsibility. Indeed, although
opinion is not uniform, the prevailing view today would seem to be that
there is no general requirement of international law that a state be at
"fault" - in the sense of culpable negligence (culpa) or malicious intent
(dolus) - in order to be internationally responsible.6 Under this "objec-

with the result required of it by an international obligation, but the obligation
allows that this or an equivalent result may nevertheless be achieved by subsequent conduct of the State, there is a breach of the obligation only if the State
also fails by its subsequent conduct to achieve the result required of it by that
obligation.
11977] 2(2) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N at 18-19.
65. [1978] 2(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n at 81.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 82. Article 21, on the other hand, covers obligations "requiring a result in
whose achievement or non-achievement only action by the State is involved."
68. See, e.g., I. Brownlie, Principlesof Public InternationalLaw 436-441 (3d ed. 1979),
canvassing the authorities: "It is believed that the practice of states and the jurisprudence
of arbitral tribunals and the International Court have followed the theory of objective responsibility as a general principle (which may be modified or excluded in certain
cases). . . . A considerable number of writers support this point of view, either explicitly, or
implicitly .. " Similarly, according to Starke, international law does not contain "a general floating requirement of malice or culpable negligence as a condition of responsibility."
Starke, Imputability in InternationalDelinquencies, 19 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 114, 115 (1938).
See also Sohn and Baxter, Convention on the InternationalResponsibility of States for
Injuries to Aliens (Final Draft with Explanatory Notes), reprinted in RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY TO ALIENS

135, 169 (Garcia-Amador,

Sohn & Baxter eds. 1974). See generally the survey of "doctrine" concerning the "fault
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tive theory" of responsibility, it is the content of the obligation itself (in
the ILC's parlance, the "primary rule")6 9 that is crucial. Where the obligation requires the state to prevent the occurrence of a given event (such
as pollution harm), no amount of diligence will eliminate responsibility if
the event occurs.70 On the other hand, if the obligation merely requires
the state to exercise due diligence to prevent the occurrence of the event,
the occurrence of the event will not give rise to responsibility if due diligence has been exercised.
As presently worded, Article 8 and paragraph 2 of draft Article 16
contain no due diligence requirement. Without any contrary indication in
the commentary to those provisions, they would presumably be interpreted as falling under Article 23 of the State Responsibility draft, with
the consequences described above. This would leave no room for a source
state to claim that it had made its best efforts, or had used the best available technology, to prevent extraterritorial pollution harm. While this result might seem rather harsh (and possibly out of line with the reality of
state practice),7 1 Article 23's strictness could be mitigated, in appropriate
cases, in two ways. The first has to do with what the ILC has termed
"circumstances precluding wrongfulness." In all cases governed by the
law of State Responsibility under the Commission's draft, certain circumstances may operate to preclude what the ILC terms the "wrongfulness,"
or unlawfulness, of the conduct in question. "The circumstances usually
considered to have this effect are consent, countermeasures in respect of
an internationally wrongful act, force majeure and fortuitous event, distress, state of emergency [necessity] and self-defence. 7 2 If one of these

theory" and the "objective theory" of international responsibility in "Force majeure" and
"fortuitous event" as circumstances precluding wrongfulness: Survey of State practice, international judicial decisions and doctrine, study prepared by the U.N. Secretariat, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/315, reprinted in [1978] 2(2) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 61, 188 (1978).
69. The Commission decided in 1970 that, in order to enable it to make progress on the
State Responsibility draft, it would not undertake to define
[tihe rules of international law which . . . impose particular obligations on
States, and which may, in a certain sense, be termed 'primary,' as opposed to
the other rules - precisely those covering the field of responsibility - which
may be termed 'secondary,' inasmuch as they are concerned with determining
the consequences of failure to fulfil obligations established by the primary
rules.
[1970] 2(2) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 179. Using this terminology, the "secondary rules" of international responsibility contain no "fault" requirement; fault may, however, be required
by a specific "primary" rule. To this effect see, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 47, at 528-529;
and B. SMITH, STATE RESPONsmILrrY AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 16-17 (1988).
70. See the passage of the commentary to article 23, quoted in text at supra note 67.
71. See LAMMERS, supra note 18, at 349, noting that if source states take the best practicable measures to abate pollution, "victim States do not appear to be much inclined to
hold those States internationally responsible, demanding either the immediate effective termination of the causing of substantial harm or compensation for the harm caused or both."
(emphasis in original).
72. [1979] 2(2) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 106 (commentary to Chapter V of the articles on
State Responsibility).
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circumstances were present, the conduct of the State of origin could not
be characterized as "wrongful;" the State would thus not be in breach of
the relevant obligation (e.g., draft Article 16(2)). For example, under Article 33, "State of Necesstry," a state would not be in breach of draft Article 16 if it could show that its "sole means of safeguarding an essential
interest threatened by a grave and imminent peril is to adopt conduct not
in conformity with what is required of it by [Article 16]."" While this
kind of situation is certainly not a common one, the availability of exculpating circumstances such as a state of necessity provide potential escape
routes for polluting states; if the "primary rule" requires strict prevention, source states can be expected to look closely to see whether one of
74
these circumstances might be present.
The second way in which Article 23's strictness might be mitigated
has to do with the consequences that would ensue from the international
responsibility of the source state. In the words of Jimenez de Arechaga,
"a State discharges the responsibility incumbent upon it for breach of an
international obligation by making reparation for the injury caused....
The forms of reparation may consist in restitution, indemnity or satisfaction,"' 7" indemnity being "the most usual form. '76 It has long been recognized that the amount of indemnity, or compensation, may in appropriate
cases be determined by taking into account the degree of "blameworthiness" of the state's conduct.7 That is, even if the standard of responsibility is strict under the applicable primary rule, its effect may be softened
by a reduction in the monetary extent of responsibility where the source
state's conduct was not particularly "blameworthy." Thus, a source state
might be found to have breached draft Article 16 but, because the harm
occurred notwithstanding its proper use of the best available technology,
the amount of compensation owing to the injured state might be mitigated. Such a reduction in the extent of responsibility may well be viewed
as being inconsistent not only with the "Polluter Pays Principle,"' "7 but

73. [1980] 2(2) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 34.
74. It must be noted, however, that even if there is an applicable circumstance precluding wrongfulness, the Commission does not exclude the possibility that compensation might
be payable. Article 35 of the State Responsibility draft provides that "Preclusion of the
wrongfulness of an act of a State . . . does not prejudge any question that may arise in
regard to compensation for damage caused by that act." [1980] 2(2) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
61.
75. de Arechaga, InternationalLaw in the Past Third of a Century, 159 Recueil des
Cours 285 (1978-I). See also The Chorzow Factory Case (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser. A,
No. 9, at 21 (the leading judicial decision on the point).
76. The Chorzow Factory Case, 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 17, at 27.
77. In the 1872 Alabama arbitration, Great Britain took the position, which the United
States did not dispute, that the amount of compensation should be in proportion "not only
to the loss incurred as a consequence of a wrong (act or omission), but also to the gravity of
the wrong itself." The Alabama Claims Arbitration (U.S. v. U.K.), Moore, 1 Arbitrations
495, at 623 (1898). See also SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 661 (3d ed. 1957). See
generally the authorities surveyed in B. SMrrH, supra note 69, at 58.
78. This Principle is contained in the Annex to Recommendation C(72)128, adopted by
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more fundamentally with the concept that one conducting an activity
should be responsible for any harm it causes.7" Yet the fact remains that
relative culpability has been considered by international tribunals in assessing damages"0 and, in the specific context of water pollution, injured
states have shown a willingness to allow source states some flexibility
where the latter are taking all reasonable steps to terminate the harmful
water pollution."'
While these considerations could introduce a small measure of flexibility into what would otherwise appear to be a rather strict regime, they
are not likely to provide much comfort to source states inasmuch as they
go only to the extent, not the existence of responsibility. Thus, there is all
the more reason for states sharing international watercourses to enter
into specific agreements that take into account the characteristics of the
watercourse, the types and extent of its uses by the respective states, and
any special circumstances such as the levels of development of the states
concerned.
V.

CONCLUSION

The recent strides made by the International Law Commission in its
work on International Watercourses pave the way for completion of the
draft in the near future. Important issues remain to be addressed, however. The Commission will resolve some of these when it adopts articles
on environmental protection and pollution. It is uncertain at this stage of
the work on Watercourses whether that draft will deal with the issue of
standard of responsibility. The Commission may wish to revisit this issue
prior to completing the provisional adoption of the draft as a whole or
when giving the articles a "second reading."8 2 A model that the Commission might consider is provided by the 1982 United Nations Convention

the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on 26
May 1972, reprinted in OECD, OECD and the Environment at 23, 24 (1986).
79. This idea is implicit in the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which was
in turn stated by the Commission to be the basis of the rule expressed in Article 8 of the
Watercourses draft. 1988 ILC Report, supra note 9, at 83. It is also expressed in Principle
21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, which provides in pertinent
part that "States have ... the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction." Report of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, U.N. Pub., Sales No. E.73.1I.A.14, at 325. See supra note 15.
80. See the decisions collected in B. SMITH, supra note 69, at 58.
81. See, e.g., the finding of Professor Lammers quoted in supra note 18.
82. When the Commission completes work on a draft, it is provisionally adopted and
sent to the General Assembly and to governments for their comments. The Commission
then gives the articles a "second reading" on the basis of governmental observations and the
special rapporteur's recommendations in response thereto. When the Commission has
adopted a final draft, it is submitted to the General Assembly with a recommendation concerning further action (e.g., that a conference be convoked to conclude a convention on the
basis of the Commission's draft). See ILC Statute, supra note 1, Art. 16, paras. (g)-(j); and
THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION,

supra note 1, at 14.
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on the Law of the Sea. Article 94 of the Convention measures the performance of a flag state by whether it conforms to "generally accepted
international regulations procedures and practices." 83 The recently revised Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law generalizes this standard and applies it to a source state's obligation to take measures to prevent extraterritorial environmental harm. Thus, under section 601 of the
Restatement:
(1) A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to
the extent practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control
(a) conform to generally accepted international rules and standards
for the prevention, reduction, and control of injury to the environment of another state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction . . ..
In the parlance of the Commission's articles on State Responsibility, this
section expresses the obligation of the source state as one of conduct,"
rather than one of result. This may be the course that would prove most
broadly acceptable to states since "[iln general, the applicable international rules and standards do not hold a state responsible when it has
taken the necessary and practicable measures.""
Even if the Commission does not ultimately address the standard of
responsibility for water pollution harm to other states, the draft will still
have made a significant contribution to the development of international
environmental law. As is true of any general codification effort, however,
the real test of its effectiveness will be whether states apply it in concrete
cases.

83. 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 31, at 32 (art. 94, para. 5).

84. 2 RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 601, at

103 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
85. Obligations of conduct are governed by Article 20 of the State Responsibility draft.
That article provides: "There is a breach by a State of an international obligation requiring

it to adopt a particular course of conduct when the conduct of that State is not in conformity with that required of it by that obligation." [1980] 2(2) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 32.
86. RESTATEMENT, supra note 84, at 105. While the Restatement provides an interesting
model, it is to be hoped that the Commission's final product will avoid language such as "to
the extent practicable under the circumstances," in the interest of establishing an obligation
whose content is clear to both the obligor and the obligee state. Such language could be

considered necessary in relation to an obligation of result, but it does not seem justified
when a mere obligation of conduct is involved.
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Very little has been written in the West about the Chinese system of
taxation as a whole, even though the appearance of numerous publications dealing with taxation of foreigners in China reflects the obvious interest of Western writers in this area. Taxation, however, is central to the
current reform of China's entire economic system and, as such, merits
greater attention. This article attempts to provide a concise overview and
evaluation of the tax system, explaining its evolution, in the hope that
this might stimulate comment and discussion among Western observers.
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I.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CHINESE TAX SYSTEM'

The tax system in China has developed with the evolution of the political and economic structure of the country. As the latter predetermines
the fiscal structure, the fiscal systems of the various historical periods reflect the economic situation and the interests of the governing body. In
the course of several thousands of years of feudal society, the feudal dynasties derived most of their revenue from compulsory levies, land taxes
and various excise taxes on items like salt, tea, liquor and iron. Taxation
of commercial activities was only commenced in the Song Dynasty (9601279) when a class of merchants started to appear and commercial transactions became popular." Direct taxes in the modern sense were first introduced by the Guomindang Government in 1936. By the end of the
Guomindang Era (1912-1949), there existed about eighteen taxes, including land tax, contracts tax, income tax, profits tax, inheritance tax, business tax, stamp tax and excise taxes'.
The tax system of the Guomindang Government was abolished by
the Communist Government with the promulgation of the "Principal
Rules for Implementation of the National Tax Administration" in January 1950". The Principal Rules instituted a new unified tax system and
designated the different categories of taxation. Apart from the existing
agriculture tax, fourteen taxes were introduced: the commodity tax, industrial and commercial tax, salt tax, custom duties, stamp tax, transaction tax, slaughter tax, house property tax, land tax5, special consumption
tax, vehicle and vessel license plate tax, interest income tax, salary or
remuneration tax and inheritance tax. The two last mentioned taxes,
however, were never implemented.
From the beginning, the most important tax was the industrial and
commercial tax which comprised a business income tax and a business
turnover tax imposed on business entities temporary commercial enter1. For a more detailed discussion, see A.J. Easson and Li Jinyan, The Evolution of the
Tax System in the People's Republic of China, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 399 (1987); WANG KUN,
GUOJIA SHUIFA GAILUN (A GENERAL INTRODUCTION OF THE NATION'S TAX LAW) 57-82 (1985)

(Chinese version); LIuLoNOHENG, ZHONGGUO SHUIFA GAILUN (A GENERAL INTRODUCTION OF
CHINA'S TAX LAW) 1-52 (1986) (Chinese version); and ZHAO WEIJIN & YIN ZHONGXIN, ZHONGGUO SHUIWU XUE (CHINESE TAXATION) 81-96 (1987) (Chinese version).

2. See generally Zhongguo Caizheng Jinrong Xueyuan Caizheng Jiaoyan Shi (The
Teaching and Research Group of the Finance Department of China's Fiscal and Financing
Institute), ZHONGGUO CAIZHENG JIANSHI (A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHINA'S FINANCE) 107 (1980)
[hereinafter CAIZHENG SHI]; ZHOU BODI, ZHONGGU CAIZHENG SHI (CHINA'S FINANCE HISTORY)
(1981) (Chinese versions); and R. HUANG, TAXATION AND GOVERNMENTAL FINANCE IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY MING CHINA (1974).
3. CAIZHENG SHI, supra note 2, at 264.
4. Principal Rules for the Implementation of the National Tax Administration,
adopted by the Government Administration Council on January 27, 1950 [hereinafter
"Principal Rules"].
5. The house property tax and land tax were combined into an Urban Real Estate Tax,

the regulations of which were promulgated in 1951.
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prises and street-traders. A contract tax and a cotton-yarn monopoly
sales tax were introduced soon afterwards. Despite the Korean War, economic recovery from the years of the anti-Japanese war and the civil war
was quite rapid and tax f'evenue doubled in two years. The state sector of
the economy had also commenced to grow and this facilitated the simplification of the tax system which occurred in 1953. The number of taxes
was reduced to thirteen,' with a number of the specific taxes either disappearing or being merged into a single commodity circulation tax. This
reform was carried much further in 1958, when the number of taxes was
reduced to eleven. The simplification, however, may have been more apparent than real, except from an administrative point of view, since the
new Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax," which replaced four
existing taxes, preserved many of the previous categories and grew in
complexity and multiplicity of rates and schedules.
The chief effect of the consolidation was to bring together a variety
of commodity, excise, sales and turnover taxes, leaving the tax on business income as a separate item - the Industrial and Commercial Income
Tax.8 Another achievement of the 1958 reform was that a new national
Agriculture Tax was introduced." A further reform took place in 1973
when the Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax was merged with
a few other taxes levied on state enterprises, such as the urban real estate
tax, the vehicle and vessel license plate tax and the slaughter tax, and the
name "Consolidated" was dropped. As a result of the simplification, state
enterprises became liable only to the Industrial and Commercial Tax,
whereas collective enterprises were liable to the Industrial and Commercial Income Tax as well as the Industrial and Commercial Tax.'0

6. The taxes that were reduced were the commodity circulation tax, commodity tax,
industrial and commercial taxes, stamp tax, salt tax, customs duties, livestock transaction
tax, slaughter tax, urban real estate tax, entertainment tax, vehicle and vessel license plate
tax, interest income tax and contracts tax; see Liu, supra note 1, at 11. For a further discussion of the tax system between 1950 and 1956 in China, see GE ZHIDA, GUODU SHIQI DE
ZHONGGUO YUSUAN (CHINA'S BUDGET IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD) (1957).
7. Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax (Draft), adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Sept. 11, 1958, promulgated for trial implementation by the State Council on Sept. 13, 1958.
8. Until 1980, this was the only tax on business profits. Introduced in 1950 as one of
four components of the industrial and commercial taxes, it was imposed upon the income of
all industrial and commercial enterprises operated for profit. Since 1980, new legislation has
been adopted to tax enterprises with foreign investment and various types of domestic
enterprises.
9. Agriculture Tax Regulations of the People's Republic of China, promulgated by the
96th Session of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on June 3, 1958
[hereinafter Agriculture Tax Law].
10. In 1950, regulations were adopted which exempted most publicly-owned enterprises
from income tax. See Ministry of Finance Notice on Payment of Industrial and Commercial
Tax by Public Enterprises, issued Mar. 17,1950; and article 5 of the Provisional Regulations
on Industrial and Commercial Tax, adopted Jan. 27, 1950. See also H. Chao and Yang
Xiaoping, Private Enterprises in China: the Developing Law of Collective Enterprises, 19
INT'L L. 1215, at 1236 (1985); and GE, supra note 6, at 67.
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That, essentially, was how the Chinese tax system stood at the beginning of 1980. With the launching of the "Four Modernizations" programme in 1978, two years after the death of Chairman Mao Zedong and
the end of the "Cultural Revolution", a new set of economic policies was
adopted by the Chinese Government. The new policy was composed of
two parts: the opening to the outside world and the reforming of the domestic economic system.
The "open to the world" policy called for more international cooperation, and foreign enterprises were invited to invest in China bringing with.
them capital, skills and technology. Fiscally, this had two major implications. First, if foreigners were to be encouraged to do business in or with
China, they might also be expected to contribute to the Chinese economy
by paying taxes on their profits. Second, if a tax regime for foreign investment was to be introduced, it was necessary that the system be differentiated from the domestic tax system. These differentiations were necessary
as these investments would not form part of the central economic plan.
The government promised the autonomous management of these foreign
investment enterprises. As a consequence, the first major amendments to
the Chinese tax laws since 1950 were those which concerned foreign business and investment in China. 1
On the domestic scene, the reform was initiated in rural areas in 1979
and expanded to urban areas soon afterwards. The introduction of the
"household responsibility system" in the countryside, leading to the virtual dismantling of the People's Communes which had been set up in the
1950s, had enormous economic consequences but little impact on the agricultural tax system. As a deliberate policy, agricultural taxes have not
increased in line with production and the main consequence of the rural
economic reform has been an increase in the payment of taxes in cash
rather than in kind.
Reform of domestic industry has been a different matter. The ownership structure of the industrial sector has been changed from the previous
state-owned to a multiple structure of ownership whereby collectivelyowned and privately-owned enterprises coexist with the state enterprises.
State enterprises themselves have been given much more autonomy to
operate as independent economic entities through experimentation with
various responsibility systems. The orthodox central planning of the
economy is being replaced with a state-guided market economy. The fiscal reforms have been equally significant. Whereas state enterprises were
formally required to turn in all their profits to the state, experiments
were began as early as 1979 to allow those enterprises to keep part of
their profits to expand production and to issue bonuses and awards to
workers. This experiment proved generally successful, with the growth

11. The Individual Income Tax Law and the Joint Venture Income Tax Law, both of
Dec. 14, 1980 and the Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law of Dec. 13, 1981. These tax laws
will be discussed further below.
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rates of those enterprises chosen for the experiments averaging three to
four times that of the average state enterprises. Based on the experience
drawn from the experiments, a further reform took place in 1983 to make
state enterprises subject to income taxes - a reform which is commonly
referred to in Chinese as 1i gai shui.
The first stage of 1i gai shui commenced in 1983 in accordance with
the Provisional Regulations on Levying Income Tax on State Enterprises."2 By the end of 1983, over 90 percent of profitable state enterprises
were paying income tax.' 3 At this stage of 1i gai shui, state enterprises
were still required to deliver their "extra" after-tax profits to the state.
The purpose of the reform was to give enterprise managers greater independence and control over the allocation of funds and with regard to investment decisions and, by permitting a substantial part of the profit to
be retained, to provide an incentive for greater efficiency and promote
competition between enterprises. There was, however, a major obstacle to
this. Due to the distortions caused by price controls and the unbalanced
allocation of natural resources and capital investment, the level of aftertax profits among state enterprises does not necessarily reflect the level of
management and productivity. Therefore the second stage of 1i gai shui
was instituted in October 1984,1" requiring all taxable state enterprises
only to pay income taxes and removing the obligation to deliver profits to
the state. Enterprises were thus permitted to retain all their after-tax
profits. The second stage of 1i gai shui also implemented a new turnover
tax system which replaced the former Industrial and Commercial Tax
with four new taxes - a product tax, a value-added tax, a business tax
and a salt tax. Regulatory taxes on resources and state enterprise profits
and other taxes were introduced to complete the substitution of tax payment for profit delivery for state enterprises so that, in the end, taxation
became the primary means by which the state shares in the profits made
by enterprises."
The re-birth of collective and private enterprises also necessitated
the introduction of new taxes on business profits generated in these
enterprises. 6

12. Provisional Regulations on Levying Income Tax on State Enterprises, adopted by
the Ministry of Finance on April 29, 1983.
13. Yan Zhensheng, Stage Two of the Substituting Taxation for Profit Delivery for
State Enterprises, Zhengfa Luntan (Political and Legal Forum), 1985, No. 3, 53 (Chinese
version).
14. Pursuant to the Trial Measures concerning Stage Two of the Substitution of Taxation for Profit Delivery of State Enterprises, adopted by the State Council on Sep. 18, 1984.
15. Subsequently, however, there has been a move to adopt the "contract management
responsibility system," under which a contract is made by the state with the management to
require the latter to turn over a prescribed amount each year out of profits, thus reintroducing a form of profit delivery.
16. The Collective Enterprise Income Tax of Oct. 26, 1985, the Urban and Rural Individually-Owned Industrial and Commercial Households Income Tax of Jan. 7, 1986, and the
Private Enterprise Income Tax Law of June 25, 1988.
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Consequently, the current tax scene in China bears very little resemblance to that which existed at the beginning of 1980. There have been
changes in the Agriculture Tax, especially in the method of payment. An
entirely new system of taxation has been installed to deal with foreign
enterprises and investment. An individual income tax has been introduced for the first time. Commodity and product taxes have been radically revised. State enterprises now pay tax on their profits instead of
accounting for them to the state. Private and collective enterprises have
been revived and are subject to wholly new taxes. Some new local taxes
have been introduced. Not only has a complete new tax system been created but taxation has assumed a new importance: whereas in the period
1958-1978, tax revenue accounted for only 40 percent of state revenue, by
17
1985 this proportion had risen to approximately 95 percent.

II.

THE CHINESE TAX STRUCTURE

Currently in China, there are taxes levied on commodities and services, taxes imposed upon personal and business income, as well as taxes.
charged by local governments. Several "penalty" taxes are also levied by
the government in order to implement certain state policies, such as the
bonus taxes and construction tax. Each of the main taxes will be briefly
described and commented on in the following section of this paper.
A.

Turnover Taxes

Turnover taxes are those taxes levied on the basis of business revenue derived from the sales of products and the provision of services. Ever
since the eighth century B.C., this type of tax has been an important and
reliable source of government revenue in China." Before 1984, these taxes
were levied under the Industrial and Commercial Tax Law, the greater
part of which was collected from state enterprises which would eventually
account to the state for their profits in any event. Thus the collection of
the tax really represented little more than a bank transfer from the enterprise to the tax office at the time that sales receipts were realized. 9 Nevertheless, turnover taxes were simple to administer and ensured a prompt
and regular cash flow for the exchequer. 2 This liquidity advantage has
become far more important with the change from profit delivery to profit
taxation.
Additionally, turnover taxes operate as a form of "buffer" between
the cost of production and the eventual price paid by the consumer. In

17. Cong Shuhai, An Analysis of the Establishment of China's Tax System, Caijing
Yanjiu (Finance Study), 1986, No. 5, at 26 (Chinese version).
18. DING WEN, SHUISHOU YU CAIWU SHOUCE (TAXATION AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS HAND-

BOOK) 30-1 (1987); and Wei Zuhou, A Brief Introductionof Commodity Tax During the
National Period, Zhongguo Shuiwu, 198-8, No. 5, 60 (Chinese versions).
19. G. ECKLUND, FINANCING THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT BUDGET 69 (1966).
20. Zhan Wu, Gong Qifang and Chen Deyan, Several Questions on the Reform of the
Taxation System, Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), March 14, 1984, at 5 (Chinese versions).
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most tax systems it is assumed that the burden of indirect tax will be
shifted forward to the consumer in the form of higher prices. But in
China the majority of prices, especially of goods produced and services
supplied by state enterprises, are regulated by the state. Consequently,
turnover taxes have a greater effect upon the level of profit of the enterprise; since, in most cases, the tax cannot be passed forward. It is shifted
back to the supplier.2 1 Before 1i gai shui, when enterprise profits accrued
to the state, the precise level of tax was relatively unimportant since the
more tax the state collected on transactions, the less it received in the
form of profit delivery. All this, of course, was changed once enterprises
became responsible for their own profits or losses and private businesses
were allowed to operate.
As will be discussed below, the relationship between taxation and
pricing ensures that turnover taxes have a special role to play in regulating the economic activities of enterprises in China. Due to irrational pricing, enterprises producing high-priced goods or services will enjoy a
greater after-tax income than those producing low-priced goods and services. This unbalanced "sweet and sour" situation became more obvious
when enterprises were required to pay income taxes and were allowed,
subject to certain restrictions, to dispose of their retained earnings. Although pricing policy is being reformed, this will inevitably be a lengthy
process so that, in the meantime, the reform of the turnover tax system is
necessary to regulate the effect upon profits of "irrational" pricing. 22 The
new rates of tax have been established by reference to the fixed price and
to the average cost of production, leaving a reasonable margin of profit
for the producing enterprise. Further, by regulating the profitability of
particular types of goods and services, the new taxes may operate as economic levers to stimulate the production of those articles which are at
present in short supply. Regulating profitability may also operate to reduce production of those articles where the supply is excessive due to
high profit levels.2 3
Under the current system, the following turnover taxes are imposed:
1. Product Tax (Chanpin Shui)
The product Tax is imposed on enterprises and individuals engaged
21. For a discussion of the shifting of tax burden in China, see Cao Erdong, A Brief
Discussion of Shifting of Tax Burden, Caijing Yanjiu (Finance Study), 1985, No. 6, 24; and
Xu Jianguo, Whether Shifting of Tax Burden Exists in Socialist Tax System, Zhongguo
Shuiwu (Chinese Taxation), 1987, No. 6, 26 (Chinese versions).
22. The State Council made it clear that changes in turnover taxes were not to involve
any price change, but must be absorbed by the paying enterprise. See State Council Circular
on the Approval and Circulation of Finance Ministry Report on the Second Phase of Substitution of Tax Payment for Profit Delivery in State Enterprises: State Council Bulletin No.
23 of Oct. 10, 1984, at 796.
23. See Dai Yuanchen, Substituting Tax Payments for Profit Delivery is a Decisive
Step in the Economic System Reform, Jingji Yanjiu (Economic Study), Sept. 20, 1984, at
17, (Chinese version).
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in manufacturing taxable industrial products and purchasing taxable agricultural products, as well as on importers of foreign goods.2 4 Under the
Product Tax Law, there are 270 taxable items, of which 260 are industrial
products and 10 agricultural, taxable at 26 different tax rates ranging
from 3 percent to 66 percent. Necessities and industrial raw materials are
taxed at lower rates, whereas luxury goods (such as top-grade cigarettes
and electric appliances) are subject to high tax rates. The broad tax base
and multiple rate structure make this tax a useful means for the state to
control the price level of a product and the profit level of a producer by
manipulating the tax rates.
The tax is payable by manufacturers on gross sales revenue when
they sell taxable products to wholesalers or retailers. Products manufactured by an enterprise and used in its continuous production are not
taxed, with the exception of products subject to high tax rates such as
liquor, sugar, leather and silk. 5 Purchasers of agricultural products are
liable for the Product Tax on the purchase price when the purchasers are
state or collective enterprises. If such a purchaser is an individual or
other type of entity, it is the seller who is liable to pay the tax.2 6 A taxpayer importing taxable goods is subject to the tax, but the tax is normally paid to Customs upon importation together with import duties.2 7
The Product Tax is levied only once on a taxable product, either on
the manufacturer, purchaser or importer. However, the Business Tax may
be levied again on the turnover of these products in the hands of wholesalers or retailers.
To encourage exports, goods are exempted from the tax if they are
exported directly by manufacturers, or a rebate is given if they are exported through a foreign trading corporation. Gold and contraceptive
products are also exempted whether they are exported or not. New products listed in the State Plan for trial production, and products which use
waste residue, waste liquid 6r waste gas, may be granted a reduction of, or
exemption from, the tax for a period of time. Certain products manufactured in minority nationality regions to meet the special needs of the minority people may also be exempted or receive a reduction of tax where
there is difficulty paying the tax. Reduction or exemption can be granted
in other special circumstances."
Since 1984, when the Product Tax was introduced, it has become one
of the most important taxes in China. It provides about 40 percent of the
total tax revenue of the country and 50 percent of the tax payment by

24. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Product Tax (Draft), promulgated Sept. 18, 1984 by the State Council (hereafter Product Tax Law). The Implementing
Rules for the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Product Tax (Draft) were
promulgated Sept. 28, 1984.
25. Id. at art. 3.
26. Id. at art. 4.
27. Id. at art. 5.
28. Id. at art. 7.
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state enterprises to the state.29 More importantly, because of its comprehensive tax base and numerous tax rates, this tax is considered to be an
efficient economic regulator used in conjunction with pricing policy to adjust the supply and demand of the market.
2.

Value Added Tax (Zengzhi Shui)

The Value Added Tax (VAT), a new tax in China,"° was introduced
on a trial basis in 1979 in some industrial cities including Shanghai,
Liuzhou and Xian. From July 1, 1982, VAT was experimented with across
the country." During this period, VAT applied only to five chosen items
which had been cumulatively taxed under the existing Industrial and
Commercial Tax. Regulations concerning VAT were formally adopted in
198432 in the second phase of li gai shui, together with the Product Tax
and Business Tax.
Pursuant to the 1984 VAT Law, the scope of VAT was restricted to
two categories comprising twelve items of industrial products including
machines, machinery and spare parts (covering mechanical equipment for
general and specified use, motor vehicles, motorized ships, bearings and
farm implements), steel products, billet, bicycles, sewing machines, electric fans, printed and dyed silks and western medicines. These products
were taxed at six different rates ranging from 6 percent (on farm implements) to 16 percent (on electric fans). Two methods of calculating VAT
liability were adopted: the tax credit method applying to "simply structured" goods, such as steel products, bicycles, electric fans, printed silk
and western medicines; and the sales subtractive method applying to machines and machinery products. 3 Deductible items were limited to the
cost of purchase and taxes paid on materials, fuels, power and packaging
materials purchased from outside and used to manufacture the taxable
products."'

29. WANG, supra note 1, at 98 and DING, supra note 18, at 184.
30. For a discussion of VAT in China, see Li Jinyan, People's Republic of China: Value
Added Tax, 42 BULL. INT'L FiscAL DOCUMENTATION 17 (1988).
31. This was conducted in accordance with the Provisional Measures on Value Added
Tax, issued by the Ministry of Finance, Cai Shui Zi, No. 343. For further information, see
Guo HONGDE, WANG WENDING AND HAN SHAOCHU, ZENGZHI SHUI GAISHUO (A GENERAL TALK
ON VALUE ADDED TAX)

(1984) (Chinese version).

32. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Value Added Tax (Draft),
promulgated on Sept. 18, 1984 by the State Council [hereainafter VAT Law]. The Implementing Rules to the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Value Added Tax
(Draft) issued on Sept. 28, 1984 by the State Council.
33. For further, see Li, supra note 30, at 19-20; Yan Zengzu, A Talk on VAT Administration, Zhongguo Shuiwu, 1986, No. 3, 33 (Chinese version).
34. Arts. 5 and 6 of VAT Law, supra note 32. Capital goods are not deductible because
most capital investment is planned by the state and the government encourages labourintensive investment. Moreover, the unbalanced existing capital structure of enterprises
makes it difficult to set a uniform level of depreciation. The purpose of introducing VAT in
China is to eliminate the unfair tax burden caused by cumulative taxation. Capital inputs
are not considered a contributing factor.
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As is well known, a VAT works ideally only if there is a single tax
rate, or at most two rates, a comprehensive tax base, and the tax credit
method is adopted. In China, VAT has been proved to be a superior tax
to the Product Tax for the elimination of cumulative taxation of a product, and for the encouragment of enterprises to compete on a fair basis,
whether they are comprehensive or specialized manufacturers. At present,
VAT co-exists with Product Tax due to the particular political and economic situation in China. The role of government in direct regulation of
the market through pricing policy and taxation, the traditional use of the
product tax, and the unbalanced development level between regions, industrial sectors and enterprises make it impossible, for the moment, to
completely substitute VAT for the Product Tax. Moreover, the government has used the Product Tax quite efficiently to control and regulate
the supply and demand of the market by increasing or decreasing the tax
rates applicable to specific products. Therefore, in maintaining the regulatory function of the Product Tax, efforts have been made to reduce the
unfair tax burden on enterprises by increasing the scope of VAT while at
the same time reducing that of the Product Tax."5 By the end of 1987,
there were 24 categories and some 120 items of industrial products subject to VAT and taxable at eleven tax rates and the tax credit method
was adopted as the proper way of calculating VAT liabilities.3 6 Consequently, although the categories of taxable products were increased by
about ten times, the number of tax rates was merely doubled indicating
the intention of the government to adopt a VAT system which not only
accommodates the existing multi-rate structure of the turnover tax system but which is also easily administered and enforced. However, compared to the VAT system adopted in other countries, the Chinese VAT
has too many tax rates and too restricted a scope of taxable products. To
fully take advantage of the tax system, China's VAT needs to be further
37
expanded in scope and simplified in rate structure.
3.

Business Tax (Yingye Shui)

The Business Tax was one of the four components of the Industrial
and Commercial Tax of 1950, and was incorporated into the Consolidated

35. The Ministry of Finance made it very clear that products which have been brought
within the scope of VAT shall no longer be taxed under the Product Tax Law. Cai Shui
Zeng Zi, No. 037 (July 13, 1987). See also Cai Shui Zi, No. 026 (Feb. 4, 1986); Cai Shui Zi,
No. 009 (Jan. 27, 1987); Cai Shui Zeng Zi, No. 013 (March 26, 1987).
36. See Certain Regulations on Perfecting the Rules on Value Added Tax Administration, issued by the Ministry of Finance (March 20, 1987); Cai Shui Zi, No. 042. For an
English translation of the taxable items and applicable rates, see Li, supra note 30 at 22.
See also Ministry of Finance Notice, Cai Shui Zi, No. 242 (October 13, 1987).
37. For further comments on the Chinese VAT, see Li Shengjun, Our Country's VAT
Needs to be Further Perfected, Zhongguo Shuiwu, 1987, No. 2, 16; Wang Pingwu, To Actively and Steadily Implement VAT, Zhongguo Shuiwu, 1987, No. 4, 6; Yan, supra note 33
at 33; Chen Jijiang and Lou Jiwei, An Inquiry on the Question of Fully Implementing VAT
System, CAIMAO JINGJI (FINANCE, TRADE AND ECONOMY), 1987, No. 11, 17 (Chinese versions).
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Industrial and Commercial Tax in 1958, and subsequently the Industrial
and Commercial Tax in 1972. It became a separate tax in 1984 and was
imposed upon individuals and entities which were engaged in commerce,
the supply and sale of commodities, transportation, construction and installation, financial and insurance services, post and communications,
public utilities, publishing, entertaining, processing and other service industries.3 8 Unlike the Product Tax and VAT, the tax rates of Business
Tax are applied in accordance with the type of activity, and not with the
type of product or service. Enterprises providing services closely related
to people's everyday life, such as retailing, postal services, telecommunications, public transportation, publishing and entertaining are taxed at
lower rates; whereas those activities which are normally highly profitable
are subject to higher rates, the highest of which being petrol pipe transportation and railway cargo transportation. 9
The Business Tax is levied when a taxpayer receives business income
and is payable on the gross amount of revenue. Wholesale businesses are
40
taxed at 10 percent on the difference between purchase and sale prices.
Since industrial enterprises do not pay this tax, sales income realized by
these enterprises is not taxable under the Business Tax Law, but sales
revenue realized by wholesalers and retailers is taxable and service industries will be taxed on income derived from using these products. As a
result, double or multiple taxation still exists in the system.
Exemptions are granted to entities selling grains and edible oil at
state-planned prices. Incomes from export sales, agricultural insurance,
medicare, and childcare, are also exempted.'
4.

Salt Tax (Yan Shui)

Salt tax in China is almost as old as the country itself. References to
the first salt tax in China are recorded during the Warring Period (710221 BC). 2' The salt tax was retained as one of the fourteen taxes introduced in 1950 and regulations on the tax were promulgated in 1984 during the second stage of 1i gai shui.4 3 However, the revenue importance of

38. Art. 1 of the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Business Tax
(Draft), issued by the State Council on September 18, 1984 [hereinafter Business Tax Law].
The Implementing Rules for the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Business
Tax (Draft), promulgated by the Ministry of Finance on September 28, 1984.
39. Business Tax Law, supra note 38, art. 2; Schedule of Taxable Items and Tax Rates
of the Business Tax annexed to the Business Tax Law.
40. Business Tax Law, supra note 38, art. 3(2). The purchase price includes Product
Tax paid on the product.
41. Business Tax Law, supra note 38, art. 6.
42.

WANG,

supra note 1 at 138. See also SHAO-KWAN

CHEN, THE SYSTEN

OF TAXATION IN

1644-1911 (1914), reprinted in (1970).
43. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Salt Tax (Draft), issued by State
Council on Sept. 18, 1984 [hereinafter Salt Tax Law]; Implementing Rules for the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Salt Tax (Draft), adopted by the Ministry of
Finance on Sept. 28, 1984.
CHINA IN THE TSING DYNASTY,

1989

CHINA'S TAX SYSTEM

the tax has decreased from 5 percent of total tax revenue in 1950 to 1.2
percent in 1983."
The tax is levied upon salt producers, which are mainly state or collective enterprises, and upon salt importers and marketing agencies, on a
per quantum basis.' The tax rates rage from 40 yuan to 160.80 yuan per
ton depending on the area of production and the quality of salt. It is
exempted on salt for export and reduced for salt used for leather manufacturing, soap and animal feed industries, farming, fishing and animal
husbandry."6
5. Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax (Gongshang Tongyi
7
Shui)4
When the Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax (CICT) Law
was promulgated in 1958, it was made to apply to all enterprises and individuals, Chinese and foreign alike, which were engaged in the production
of industrial products, the purchasers of agricultural products, the importation of foreign goods, commercial retailing, communication and transportation, and all other service trades.4 s The 1972 tax reform consolidated
the CICT and three local taxes into the Industrial and Commercial Tax.
Since the Industrial and Commercial Tax was applicable only to domestic
enterprises and individuals, foreign businesses in China continued to be
subject to the CICT Law. The further reform which took place in 1984
likewise did not affect the application of CICT to foreigners." This tax
may, however, be repealed in the near future, so that foreign enterprises
will be subject to the turnover taxes applicable to domestic businesses."0
Altogether, CICT applies to over 100 categories of goods or transactions and prescribes some 42 different rates, ranging from 69 percent on
top-quality cigarettes to 1.5 percent on certain basic necessities. Retail
sales are taxed generally at 3 percent and the provision of services at

44. DING, supra note 18 at 70.
45. Salt Tax Law, supra note 43, art. 1.
46. Salt Tax Law, supra note 43, art. 6.
47. See A.J. Easson and Li Jinyan, Taxation of Foreign Business and Investment in
the People's Republic of China, 7 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 666, 668-9 (Fall-Winter, 1986);
GONGSHANG TONGYI SHUI JIANGHUA (A TALK ON THE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIAL AND COM-

(First Department of the General Tax Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, ed.,
Beijing, 1964 Chinese version).
48. Art. 1, Regulations of the Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax of the People's Republic of China (Draft), adopted in principle Sept. 11, 1958 by the 101st Meeting of
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress [hereinafter CICT Law]. The
Detailed Rules and Regulations for the CICT Law were adopted by the Ministry of Finance
on Sept. 13, 1958 [hereinafter CICT Rules].
49. It was decided by the Chinese government that to avoid the de-stability of taxation
applying to foreign investors and businesses, the current tax reform should only affect Chinese enterprises. See Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
Authorizing the State Council to Promulgate Tax Reform Regulations issued on Sept. 18,
1984.
50. Renmin Ribao (Haiwai Ban), July 7, 1988 at 3.
MERCIAL TAX)
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rates between 3 and 7 percent. It is this tax on services which is of primary interest and concern to foreign businesses.
Exemptions and reductions are specifically granted to enterprises
with foreign investment on the exportation of taxable goods (with the exception of crude oil, petroleum products and products covered separately
by state regulations) and on importation of raw materials, machinery and
equipment used in the business." Further exemptions and reductions are
available to those enterprises operating in the Special Economic Zones
(SEZs), Hainan Province and the Economic and Technological Development Zones (EDTZs) established in the 14 Coastal Cities, where special
policies are adopted to offer preferential treatment to foreign
52
enterprises.
6. Urban Maintenance and Construction Tax (Chengshi Weihu Jianshe Shui)
The Urban Maintenance and Construction Tax is a new local tax levied on taxpayers of Product Tax, VAT and Business Tax for the purposes
of urban maintenance and construction." Though the tax is not strictly
perceived as a turnover tax, the rate is expressed as a percentage of the
amount of tax payable by enterprises under the Product Tax, VAT or
Business Tax. This is normally 7 percent in cities, 5 percent in county
towns and 1 percent in other areas. The tax is payable at the same time
as the three turnover taxes are paid though revenue from the tax is required to be used specifically to maintain or construct urban utilities.
This tax has been criticized by some commentators as not equitable

51. See Regulations on the Supervision and Control of and Levying of or Exemption
from Duties and Taxation on Goods Imported or Exported by Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint
Ventures, jointly promulgated by the General Administration of Customs, the Ministry of
Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade on April 30, 1984; Regulations concerning the Levy and Exemption of Customs Duties and Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax on Imports and Exports of Goods for Chinese-foreign Cooperative
Petroleum Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum, promulgated on April 1, 1982 by the General
Administration of Customs and the Ministry of Finance; State Council Regulations Concerning Encouragement of Foreign Investment, promulgated on Oct. 11, 1986.
52. The four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou (in
Guangdong Province) and Xiamen (in Fujian Province); and the 14 coastal cities are Dalian,
Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo,
Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhangjiang, and Beihai. The tax incentives in these areas are
granted under the Provisional Regulations on Reduction and Exemption of Enterprise Income Tax and the Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax for the Special Economic
Zones and the 14 Coastal Cities, promulgated by the State Council on Nov. 15, 1984; Regulations on Encouraging Investment and Development on Hainan Island, adopted by the
State Council on May 4, 1988 [hereinafter Hainan Regs.]; Interim Provisions of the Ministry
of Finance Concerning the Reduction of and Exemption from Enterprise Income Tax and
Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment
in the Open Coastal Economic Zones, issued on June 15, 1988.
53. Art. 1 of the Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Urban
Maintenance and Construction Tax, promulgated on Feb. 8, 1985 by the State Council.
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because enterprises which are exempted from the Product Tax, VAT or
Business Tax benefit from urban public utilities without contributing to
the fund and enterprises manufacturing heavily taxed products have to
pay more tax than taxpayers paying lower rates of tax even if they do not
benefit from the public utilities at all."4
B. Income Tax
Historically, income taxes have played a relatively insignificant role
in the public finances of China. At various times over the past fifty years
attempts have been made to levy taxes on income, generally with little
success. 5 In 1950, when the new tax system was established, income tax
on business activities formed a part of the industrial and commercial
taxes, although a wages and salaries income tax was also proposed. The
only independent income tax was the Interest Income Tax,"6 chiefly payable by former capitalists whose businesses had been transferred to public
ownership in return for bonds. This tax was paid until 1959 when it was
discontinued and interest rates were correspondingly reduced. 7
The present income tax system dates from 1980, with the introduction of the Joint Venture Income Tax Law and the Individual Income
Tax Law. In 1981, the promulgation of the Foreign Enterprise Income
Tax Law completed the income tax system regarding foreign individuals
and enterprises doing business in China. Between 1983 and June 1988,
four more business income taxes were promulgated which applyied to
state enterprises, collective enterprises, individual households and private
businesses. Another two personal income tax laws were passed in September 1986 and June 1988 which were applicable only to Chinese citizens.
As a consequence, the revenue importance of income taxes has greatly
increased and now constitutes about 40 percent of total tax revenue.
Before discussing the various income taxes, some initial comments
should be made regarding income tax in China. First, the law distinguishes between the urban and rural sectors. Income from agriculture is
not treated in the same way as income from other forms of business activ-

54. Guo Hongde, Suggestions on Improving the Principles on Levying the Urban
Maintenance and Construction Tax, Zhongguo Shuiwu, 1986, No. 6, 15 (Chinese version).
55. Although a short-lived progressive personal income tax was imposed as early as 10
A.D., the first income tax in the modern sense was introduced, (without ever being enforced), in 1913. In 1936, an income tax law was formally promulgated by the Guomindang
Government. This law was based on the British schedular system and divided income into
three categories: business income, employment income and income from securities and deposits. In 1938 and 1943, the Government introduced "excessive income tax during the AntiJapanese War Period" to collect revenue for waging the war. See Yang Zukun, Wang Mang
First Introduced Income Tax, Zhongguo Shuiwu, 1988, No. 6, 64; WANG, supra note 1 at
184-5 (Chinese versions).
56. Interim Regulations on Interest Income Tax, issued on Dec. 29, 1950 by the Administrative Council.
57. See Xu Zenghong, Major Developments of Our Country's Income Tax System,
Zhongguo Shuiwu, 1987, No. 3, 22 (Chinese version).
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ity. Second, the tax system is essentially a schedular one. Although some
of the taxes are progressive, most income is taxed at a flat rate. There is
no general system of aggregation whereby the eventual tax burden of an
individual is computed by reference to his or her total income. In particular, a basic distinction is drawn between income from business and income from other sources. Third, different types of business organizations
are subject to different rules based on the ownership of the enterprises.
Finally, an obvious feature of the system is that it is divided into two
parts. Taxes on foreign individuals and businesses are distinct from taxes
on citizens and domestic enterprises. Foreigners and foreign businesses
are generally taxed more favorably when compared to Chinese nationals
and enterprises.
1. Personal Income Taxes
When it was introduced in 1980, the Individual Income Tax Law"
applied to both foreigners and Chinese citizens, although the main target
was the growing community of foreigners working in China. 9 Another
tax, the Individual Income Regulatory Tax"' was introduced in 1986, and
from the beginning of 1987 has applied to Chinese citizens resident in
China. In June 1988 a separate regulatory tax on private investors' income from private enterprises61 was adopted to adjust the income level
between these investors and ordinary wage earners.
(a) Individual Income Tax (Geren Suode Shui)
As a general rule, residents of China are taxed on world income while
non-residents are taxed only on income from sources within China. There
is no precise definition of "residence," but taxpayers are subject to different tax treatment based upon the period of time spent in China. Individuals who stay in China for more than five years are liable for Individual
Income Tax ("IIT") on their world income with a foreign tax credit avail-

58. Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the 3rd
Session of the 5th National People's Congress on Sept. 10, 1980 [hereinafter IIT Law]; Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Individual Income Tax Law of
the People's Republic of China, approved by State Council on Dec. 10, 1980, promulgated
by Ministry of Finance on Dec. 14, 1980 [hereinafter IIT Regs.].
59. It was estimated at the time that no more than 20 Chinese citizens would initially
have to pay the tax. N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1980, at 1. By 1985, it was reported that there were
1,318 in Shanghai alone paying the tax. Wang Xiaochun, Why the Shanghai Tax Bureau's
1985 Personal Income Tax Receipts Increased Rapidly, Zhongguo Shuiwu, 1985, No. 6 at
15.
60. Provisional Regulations of the Individual Income Regulatory Tax of the People's
Republic of China, adopted by the State Council on Sept. 25, 1986 [hereinafter IIRT Law];
Detailed Rules and Regulations for Implementing the Provisional Regulations of the Individual Income Regulatory Tax of the People's Republic of China, adopted by Ministry of
Finance on Dec. 10, 1986 [hereinafter IIRT Regs.].
61. The State Council Regulations Concerning the Levy of Individual Income Regulatory Tax on Private Investors' Income from Private Enterprises, adopted by State Council
on June 3, 1988, promulgated on June 25, 1988 [hereinafter Private Investors IIRT Law].
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able for taxes paid in other countries. Individuals who reside in China for
a year or more, but less than five years, are taxable on foreign-source income only to the extent that it is remitted to China. In practice, however,
foreigners working in China for non-Chinese enterprises who do not intend to become permanent residents in China are not taxed on foreign
source income at all. 2 Individuals residing in China for less than a year
are taxed only on income gained within China.63 The regulations further
provide that remuneration paid by employers outside China for individuals whose continuous or cumulative residence in China does not exceed 90
days in a calendar year is exempted."4 Individuals not resident in China
at all are taxed on the total amount of their income obtained from personal services, royalties, rental income, and upon interest and dividends
received from Chinese sources.
Taxable income under the IIT is divided into six categories: wages
and salaries; compensation for personal services; royalties; interest, dividends and extra dividends; income from the lease of property; and other
kinds of income specified as taxable by the Ministry of Finance.
(i) Employment Income
Only income from wages and salaries is taxed at progressive rates. A
monthly deduction of 800 yuan is allowed with the excess taxed at rates
rising from five percent to forty-five percent, the top rate being payable
on earnings in excess of 12,000 yuan per month. From August 1, 1987, the
tax on wages and salaries of foreign personnel working for non-Chinese
enterprises in China was reduced by half."5
(ii) Compensation for Personal Services
This type of income includes compensation received for providing
personal services, such as designing, installation, drafting, medical practice, law practice, accounting, consulting, lecturing, news reporting,
broadcasting and entertaining. 6 It is taxed at a fiat rate of 20 percent. A
deduction is allowed for expenses of 800 yuan if the amount received in a
single payment for a piece of work is less than 4,000 yuan For payments
of 4,000 yuan or more, a deduction of twenty percent is allowed. 7 The
remainder is taxed at twenty percent. Rents and royalties received by a
62. Notice of the General Tax Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, Cai Shui Zi, No. 62
(March 7, 1983).
63. This includes income from work and personal services performed in China and dividends, royalties and interest from Chinese sources, whether or not the place of payment is
in China. IIT Regs., supra note 58, art. 5.
64. Art. 5 of IIT Regs. as amended by Ministry of Finance (Feb. 13, 1988).
65. Interim Provisions of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Reduction of Individual Income Tax on the Income from Wages and Salaries Derived by Foreign Personnel Working in China, issued on Aug. 8,1987.
66. IIT Regs., supra note 58, art. 4(2).
67. IIT Law, supra note 58, art. 5(2).
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non-resident are taxable in full without any deduction.
(iii) Interest and Dividends
Income from interest, dividends and extra dividends is taxed at a flat
rate of twenty percent without deduction."8
(iv) Exemptions and Reliefs
Certain categories of income are exempted from tax, notably: prizes
and awards for scientific, technological or cultural achieverments, interest
from deposits in state banks, welfare benefits, certain pensions or severance pay, and salaries of foreign diplomatic and consular officials."9
(b) Individual Income Regulatory Tax (Geren Shouru Tiaojie Shui)
When the IIT Law was introduced in 1980, it was intended primarily
to satisfy the needs of the "open" policy and was designed mainly to tax
foreigners living and working in China. Within a few years of the economic reform it became apparent, however, that an appreciable number
of Chinese citizens were receiving substantial incomes without paying tax.
Basic exemption limits, which appeared to be quite reasonable for foreign
executives having to live in scarce and expensive apartments or in hotels,
were nevertheless many times higher than the average Chinese wage or
salary. The large difference between average incomes and the incomes of
this newly emerging wealthy class necessitated regulation, and a new personal tax was thus introduced in September 1986.70
The Individual Income Regulatory Tax (IIRT) applies to Chinese cit-

izens who have a residence in China 71 and obtain personal income.7 2 It

differs from the IIT Law in two important respects: tax rates are more
steeply progressive and there is some aggregation of the different categories of income.

68. IT Law, supra note 58, art. 3(2).
69. Id. at art. 4. For further discussion, see O.E. Bell, People's Republic of China PersonalIncome Tax, 11 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 373 (1981); Easson and Li, supra note 47,
at 683-92; M.H. Byres and A. Shum, Individual Income Tax in the PRC, TAX PLAN. INT'L
REV., 16 (March 1986); R.D. Pomp, T.A. Gelatt and S.S. Surrey, The Evolving Tax System
of the PRC, 16 TEx INT'L L.J. 11 (1981); and Wang Desheng, A General Talk on Our Country's Individual Income Tax System, FAZHI JIANSHI (LEGAL CONSTRUCTION), No. 3, at 54
(1987) (Chinese version).
70. See Li Jinyan, People'sRepublic of China: The New Regulatory Tax on Individual
Income, 41 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 167, 168 (1987); Editorial Notes in
Zhongguo Fazhi Bao (Chinese Jurisprudence Newspaper), Dec. 12, 1986 (Chinese version).
71. "Chinese citizens who have a residence in China" is defined as a Chinese citizen
who has Chinese nationality, a household registration and actually stays in China. See IIRT
Regs., supra note 60, art. 2.
72. IIRT Law, supra note 60, art. 2.
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(i) Taxable Income
The IIRT adds a new category of taxable income, namely "income
from contractual and sub-contractual fees."' "7These fees are earned by
individuals who contract with a state enterprise, a collective enterprise or
a joint enterprise to manage the business, or some part of the business,
and to be responsible for the profit or loss thereof7 4 Additionally, the
IIRT has two categories of "royalty" income; income from transferring
patent rights and providing non-patented technology, and income from
writing and translating."5
(ii) Tax Rates
Unlike the IIT Law, the IIRT Law provides for a measure of aggregation of the various types of income. The two types of royalty income are
taxed at a flat rate of 20 percent, after an expense deduction similar to
that under the IIT Law.70 Dividend and interest income is taxed at
twenty percent on the gross amount received. However, employment income, income from contractual fees, remuneration for personal services
and rental income are aggregated monthly and are taxed under an elaborate progressive rate schedule.77 Tax becomes payable, at a rate of twenty
percent, when the individual's monthly income exceeds four times the
"basic regional taxable amount" ' and increases to a rate of sixty percent
on the excess above eight times that amount. Consequently, the effective
rate varies from region to region. 79 The overall effect is that a Chinese
citizen living in Beijing will pay the highest rate of sixty percent, on income in excess of 800 yuan per month, whereas this amount is the same
as that at which a foreigner begins to pay the lowest, 2.5 percent, rate
under the IIT Law. As with the IIT Law, a number of categories of income are exempted.
The introduction of the IIRT Law has led to a considerable increase
in the number of Chinese citizens, particularly artists, athletes, writers,
business managers, and scientists, who are liable to pay personal income
tax and to a great increase in the tax burden upon those who already
were paying IIT. In Shanghai, for instance, there were 300,000 individuals

73. Id. at, art. 3(ii).
74. IIRT Regs., supra note 60, art. 4(ii).
75. IIRT Law, supra note 60, art. 3(v) and (vi).
76. Id. at, art. 7(i).
77. Id. at, art. 5.
78. The "basic regional taxable amount" ("BRTA") ranges from 100 to 115 yuan. The
starting point for tax is consequently 400 yuan, or 460 yuan in regions with the highest
BRTA.
79. The BRTA is determined by reference to wages and price levels in the different
regions. It appears to have a built-in incentive to encourage workers to go to the remote
regions. The BRTA tax is heaviest in the capital, Beijing, and least heavy in areas such as
Tibet and Xinjiang. See Li, supra note 70, at 169.
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who paid IIRT in the 1987 taxation year."0
(c) Private Investors Individual Income Regulatory Tax (Siying
Qiye Touzizhe Geren Shouru Tiaojie Shui)
This tax was introduced in June 1988 together with the Private Enterprise Income Tax."1 Individual investors in private enterprises are liable to IIRT on their wages or salaries paid by the enterprises. If the private enterprise distributes income to its investors out of its after-tax
profits, the investors are taxed under the Private Investors IIRT Law.
The enterprise is required, however, to put aside not less than 50 percent
of its retained earnings in a production development fund. The investor is
exempted from tax on his reinvestment in the production development
fund. He must, however, pay the tax at 40 on the amount distributed to
him for personal consumption. Where the investor takes funds out of the
production development fund, or gets funds by disposing of enterprise
business assets for personal consumption purposes, he will also be liable
for the regulatory tax at 40 percent of the amount.8 2
2.

Business Income Taxes

In contrast to personal income taxes, there are six or seven separate
taxes imposed upon business income, depending on the type of business
entity being taxed. Two of these taxes are levied on enterprises with foreign investment, and the rest are imposed on domestic enterprises.
(a) Income Taxes on Enterprises with Foreign Investment
(i) Joint Venture Income Tax (Heying Qiye Suode Shui)
A foreign company intending to do business in China must choose
between establishing a "branch"83 operation, or forming a subsidiary by
setting up a joint venture with one or more Chinese co-venturers or incorporating a wholly foreign-owned enterprise." A distinction is commonly
drawn between equity joint ventures 5 and cooperative joint ventures.

80. Renmin Ribao, Jan. 15, 1988, at 1 (Chinese version).
81. Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Private Enterprise
Income Tax, adopted June 3, 1988 and promulgated June 25, 1988 by the State Council
[hereinafter PEIT Law].
82. Private Investors IIRT Law, supra note 61, art. 3. See Li Jinyan, People's Republic
of China: Taxation of Private Business and Private Investors, 42 BULL. FOR INT'L FIscAL
DOCUMENTATION, 415, 417-8 (1988).
83. Generally, it is not possible for a foreign enterprise to establish a branch plant operation. But it may open a representative office which is permitted to transact business in a
limited way. In addition, a contractual joint venture is treated in a manner similar to that of
a branch.
84. Under the Law on Enterprises Operated Exclusively with Foreign Capital, adopted
April 12, 1986.
85. An equity joint venture can be established in accordance with the Law on Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, adopted by the 2nd Session of the 5th
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Prior to 1988, a cooperative joint venture created no separate legal entity
and the relationship of the parties resembled that of a partnership. All
this has been changed since the promulgation of the Cooperative Joint
Venture Law in April, 1988.88 Under this law, a cooperative joint venture
can choose whether to take the form of a partnership or that of a Chinese
legal person. Under the existing tax system, a cooperative joint venture is
normally not regarded as a taxable person, the profit of the venture is
divided among the participants in accordance with the contractual stipulation and is taxed in the hands of the participants. Thus, the Chinese
party may pay the State Enterprise Income Tax or Collective Enterprise
Income Tax while the foreign party pays the Foreign Enterprise Income

Tax. 7
By contrast, an equity joint venture is a separate legal person, incorporated under Chinese law and taxed under a separate tax statute. 8 The
Joint Venture Income Tax (JVIT) is levied on income of Chinese-foreign
joint ventures from production, business and other sources, including the
income from branches inside and outside China. 9 Taxable income is defined as "the excess of gross income in a tax year over its deductible costs,
expenses and losses". 0 Tax is charged at a flat rate of 30 percent, in addiNational People's Congress on July 8, 1979 [hereinafter JV Law]; and the Detailed Rules
and Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and
Foreign Investment, adopted by the State Council on September 21, 1983.
86. Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures, adopted at the 1st Session of the 7th National People's Congress on April 13, 1988,
promulgated and effective on the same date [hereinafter Cooperative Joint Venture Law].
87. At present it is unclear how a cooperative joint venture which chooses to be constituted as a legal person, under the Cooperative Joint Venture Law, will be treated. It seems
that the party can agree to share after-tax profits, rather than before-tax profits, and it may
be that in such a case the venture will be taxed in the same way as are equity joint ventures.
88. Income Tax Law concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment,
adopted by the 3rd Session of the 5th National People's Congress on September 10, 1980
[hereinafter JVIT Law]; Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment, promulgated by the Ministry of Finance on December 14, 1980 [hereinafter JVIT Regs.]. For further discussion of the law, see EASSON and Li, supra note 47, at 672-76; D.R. Simon,
Taxation of Joint Ventures in China: A Legal Analysis in the Context of Current Chinese
Economic and Political Conditions, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 513 (1982); T.A. Gelatt and

R.D. Pomp, Tax Aspects of Doing Business with the People's Republic of China, 22 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 21 (1984); H.J.F. Bloomfield, Legal Aspects of Joint Ventures in China,
14 INT'L Bus. LAW. 327 (1986).

89. JVIT Law, supra note 88, art. 1. "production" and "business" are defined as "operations in industry, mining, communications and transportation, agriculture, forestry, animal
husbandry, fishing, poultry-farming, commerce, tourism, catering, service trades and other
lines of business." "Other income" is defined as "income from dividends, extra dividends
and interest income, and income from the lease or transfer of tangible property, patent
rights, proprietary technology, trademark rights, copyrights and other property": JVIT
Regs., supra note 88, art. 2. Note that capital gains are also taxed as "other income": see
Ministry of Finance Ruling, (87) Cai Shui Wai Zi, No. 033 (Feb. 22, 1987).
90. JVIT Law, supra note 88, art. 2. Profits of joint ventures must be computed and
accounts drawn up, in accordance with the Accounting Regulations for Joint Ventures Using
Chinese and Foreign Investment, promulgated March 3, 1985 by the Ministry of Finance.
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tion to which a local income tax of 10 percent of the assessed tax is payable, bringing the effective rate to 33 percent. 1 For joint ventures established in the Special Economic Zones, or other special development areas,
the rate is commonly reduced to 15 percent, with no additional local income tax. A special dividend withholding tax of 10 percent is also payable
on profits remitted outside China.s' By contrast, when a participant in a
joint venture reinvests its share of the profits in China for a period of not
less than five years, the participant is eligible for a refund of 40 percent of
the central tax paid by the joint venture in respect of the reinvested
amount. 93 A participant who withdraws reinvested funds within the five
year period must repay the amount refunded.' A joint venture to which
the JVIT Law applies is taxed on its world income, but foreign tax paid
on income from non-Chinese sources may be credited against tax due
under the JVIT Law."
Certain tax holidays are provided in legislation to encourage foreign
investment in joint ventures. For instance, newly established ventures
scheduled to operate for ten years or more may be exempted from the
JVIT in the first two profit-making years and are allowed a 50 percent
reduction in the following three years. Joint ventures engaged in certain
low-profit operations, in particular farming and forestry, or located in remote or under-developed regions, may be allowed a further reduction for
up to ten years."s Joint ventures which are "export-oriented enterprises"'9
or "technologically advanced enterprises"" will continue to enjoy the 50
percent reduction after the expiry of the normal tax holiday period, in the
case of a technologically advanced enterprises for an additional three
years, and in the case of an export-oriented enterprise for as long as it
continues to qualify as such."

Art. 9 of the JVIT Regs. expressly prohibits certain deductions in the computation of profits, notably interest on capital, losses covered by insurance, donations other than those for
public welfare in excess of 1% of gross business income. Capital expenditures are not deductible, but depreciation or amortization is permitted normally on a straight line basis over
prescribed periods corresponding to the estimated useful life of the asset in question: arts.
10-17 of the JVIT Regs., supra note 88.
91. JVIT Law, supra note 88, art. 3.
92. Id. at, art. 4. This tax is commonly exempted in Special Economic Zones, Economic
and Technological Development Zones and other open coastal areas.
93. JVIT Law, supra note 88, art. 6.
94. Id.

95. Id. at art. 15.
96. Id. at art. 5.
97. These are enterprises whose output value of exported products amounts to more
than 70 percent of the total output. See art. 8 of the Provisions of the State Council for the
Encouragement of Foreign Investment, adopted and promulgated on October 11, 1986
[hereinafter Foreign Investment Provisions].
98. Id. at art. 9. The certification procedures, for both "export enterprises" and "technologically advanced enterprises", are set out in the Implementing Measures of the Ministry
of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade on the Confirmation and Examination of ExportOriented Enterprises with Foreign Investment, promulgated on Jan. 27, 1987.
99. Qualifying enterprises located in the SEZs, where the normal tax rate is reduced to
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(ii) Foreign Enterprise Income Tax (Waiguo Qiye Suode Shui)
A foreign enterprise that carries on business in China in any form
except that of an equity joint venture is liable to the Foreign Enterprise
Income Tax (FEIT) on income earned in China by that enterprise."'0 The
FEIT consequently applies to wholly foreign-owned enterprises incorporated in China, to the foreign participant in a cooperative joint venture,
and to foreign enterprises doing business in China through a representative office, branch or other establishment. For the purposes of the legislation, "foreign enterprise" means a foreign company, enterprise or other
economic organization having an establishment in China engaged in independent business operations or cooperative production or joint business
operations with Chinese enterprises. 1° ' Foreign enterprises which do not
have establishments in China are subject to a flat-rate withholding tax of
20 percent on income from dividends, interest, rentals, royalties and other
sources in China, which tax must be withheld by the paying unit.102
A foreign enterprise having an establishment in China is taxed on
income earned there at progressive rates ranging from 20 percent on the
first 250,000 yuan of taxable income for the year to 40 percent on income
in excess of one million yuan.103 A local income tax of an additional 10
percent is also levied, bringing the total rate to a maximum of 50 per-

15 percent, pay a reduced rate of 10 percent rather than receiving a 50 percent reduction:
see the Implementing Measures for the Preferential Taxation Provisions of the State Council Provisions for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, adopted by the Ministry of
Finance on January 31, 1987. In most of China's tax treaties, these tax holidays are accorded
"tax sparing" treatment. See EASSON and Li, supra note 47, at 693-4.
100. Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China concerning Foreign Enterprises, adopted by the 4th Session of the 5th National People's Congress and promulgated
on Dec. 13, 1981 [hereinafter FEIT Law]; Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China concerning Foreign Enterprises, promulgated by the Ministry of Finance on February 21, 1982 [hereinafter FEIT
Regs.]. For further discussion of the tax, see Li Jinyan and A.J. Easson, Taxation of Foreign
Investment in China, GuoJi MAoYI WFzNTI (INTERNATIONAL TRADE JOURNAL), 1987, No. 1, 27
(Chinese version), P.D. Reynolds, Doing Business with the People's Republic of China: Tax
Considerations,14 INT'L LAW. 49 (1980); J.Horsley, Comments on Laws and Legal Developments Affecting Foreign Investment in China, 3 CHINA LAW REP. 175 (1986); T.A. Gelatt
and E. Theroux, Tax Treatment in China, CHINA Bus. REV. 22 (Jan.-Feb. 1984); and A.
Ness and S.J. Mitchell, Taxing US Offices in China, CHINA Bus. REV. 36 (Sept.-Oct. 1986).
101. FEIT Law, supra note 100, art. 1. A foreign individual who carries on business in
China may be regarded as an "enterprise" for the purposes of the FEIT Law: see Ministry
of Finance Ruling (82) Cai Shui Wai Zi, No. 99, Aug. 2, 1982.
102. FEIT Law, supra note 100, art. 11. Certain types of interest and royalty income
are exempted or taxed at reduced rates. Interest on loans to the Chinese government, to the
state banks or to the National Offshore Oil Corporation are entirely exempted and a reduced rate of 10 percent is charged on interest on loans made between 1983 and 1990 and
on income from leasing equipment to Chinese concerns: see rulings from the Ministry of
Finance, (82) Cai Shui Zi, No. 326, Dec. 13, 1982; (83) Cai Shui Zi, No. 348, Jan. 7,1983;
and (86) Cai Shui Zi, No. 1, Jan. 6, 1986.
103. FEIT Law, supra note 100, art. 3.
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cent.104 Consequently, except in the case of small operations, an equity
joint venture will pay less tax on its profits than will a branch operation
or cooperative joint venture, though there will be an additional tax of 10
percent on profits remitted outside the country by the joint venturers.
Foreign enterprises operating in SEZs or other special areas and enterprises which are "export-oriented" or "technologically advanced" are
taxed at the same preferential rate as equity joint ventures. 0 5
The term "establishment" is interpretated to mean "organizations,
places or business agents established in the Chinese territory by foreign
enterprises and engaged in production and business operations,"'0 6 which
mainly include "management offices, branches, representative offices, factories and places where natural resources are exploited and where contracted projects of building, installation, assembly and exploration are operated."'' 0 7 The definition is, on its face, fairly broad. Nonetheless, in
practice, the word seems to correspond to the notion of "permanent establishment" used in the tax treaties signed so far by China."0 8
As in the case of joint ventures, the Chinese authorities provide tax
holidays to attract foreign investment. Enterprises scheduled to operate
for a period of ten years or more in farming, forestry, animal husbandry
or other low-profit activities may be exempted from tax in the first profitmaking year and allowed a fifty percent reduction in the following two
years, with further reduction for an additional period of up to ten
years."
(iii) Draft Law on Income
Investment

Taxation

of Enterprises with Foreign

A draft version of the Income Tax Law of People's Republic of China
on Enterprises with Foreign Investment (Draft) (the "Draft Tax Law")
has been under review by the State Council and might become law sometime in 1989. The draft law consolidates the JVIT Law and FEIT Law,
lowers the general tax rates and offers more incentives to foreign investors. The Draft Tax Law will apply to all enterprises with foreign investment, including equity joint ventures, cooperative joint ventures, wholly
foreign-owned enterprises, as well as foreign enterprises which have an
establishment in China. The tax rate will be either 25 percent with an
additional 5 percent local tax, or 30 percent with a 3 percent local tax.

104. Id. at art. 4. It should be noted that this local rate is not, unlike that under the
JVIT Law, expressed as a percentage of the tax otherwise payable. The local tax authorities
may reduce or waive this tax.
105. Foreign Investment Provisions, supra note 97, art. 8.
106. FEIT Regs., supra note 100, art. 2.
107. Id.
108. See EASSON and Li, supra note 47, at 677-9; and Li Jinyan, A Discussion of Tax
Agreements, JINGJI Yu FALu (EcoNoMICS AND LAW), 1987, No. 4, 7 (Chinese version).
109. FEIT Law, supra note 100, art. 5. These concessions are also accorded "tax sparing" treatment in China's tax treaties, except that with the U.S.
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Enterprises established in the Special Economic Zones and Economic and
Technological Development Zones will be taxed at 15 percent and productive enterprises established in the open coastal areas will be taxed at
20 percent. The tax reductions and exemptions provided under the JVIT
Law and FEIT Law will be maintained. Business losses will be allowed to
be carried forward forever. The Draft Tax Law also includes a new provision which authorizes the tax authorities to reasonably adjust the amount
of income where a taxpayer does not deal at arm's length with its affiliated companies.
(b) Income Taxation of Domestic Enterprises
(i) State Enterprise Income Tax (Guoying Qiye Suode Shui)
Despite the recent impressive growth in the number of foreign enterprises, joint ventures, collective and private enterprises, the Chinese economy remains dominated by state enterprises."' The growth in the importance of tax revenue, from less than half of the total budget revenue a few
years ago to the present over 90 percent, is due to the substitution of tax
payments for profit delivery by state enterprises. The main purposes of 1i
gai shui are to maintain a proper balance between state interest and that
of enterprises. The 1i gai shui establishing a system whereby enterprises
are responsible for profits and losses after tax, and enables them, under
the guidance of state macroeconomic planning, to have motivation and
become more vital, so that they will be able to perform their roles as relatively independent commodity producers."'
State Enterprise Income Tax (SEIT) is charged in accordance with
the State Enterprise Income Tax Law and Regulations." 2 The tax is imposed upon the profits of state enterprises engaged in industry, commerce, transportation and communications, construction and installation,
finance and insurance, catering and services, culture, education, public
health, supply and marketing of goods, urban utilities and other work.

110. By the end of 1985, there were approximately 833,000 state enterprises, 3,347,000
collective enterprises, and around 17 million people engaged in individually-owned businesses, the number of which is variously estimated at from 5.8 to 11 million. The key industries and sectors of the economy are in the hands of state enterprises. See China Daily, Jan.
27, 1986 and Oct. 23, 1986.
111. For further comments, see the Tianjin Investigation Team on Substituting Taxes
for Delivery of Profits, The First Stage in Substituting Taxes for the Delivery of Profits,
Jingji Guanli (Economic Management), 1984, No. 1, 20; Xu Riqing and Li Liangru, A Brief
Discussion on the Question of the Role of SubstitutingTax Payment for Profit Delivery for
State Enterprises,Jingji Wenti (Economic Issues), 1984, No. 1, 38; and Tian Jiyun, Several
Questions on Improving the System of Substituting Tax Payment for Profit Delivery,
Jingji Ribao (Economic Daily), Jan. 12, 1984 (Chinese versions).
112. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on State Enterprise Income Tax,
promulgated by the State Council on Sept. 18, 1984 [herineafter SEIT Law]; and the Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on State
Enterprise Income Tax, issued by the Ministry of Finance on Oct. 18, 1984 [hereinafter
SEIT Regs.].
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Not all state enterprises, however, are taxed under the SEIT Law. Those
enterprises which are not the subject of 1i gai shui, such as some military
enterprises, enterprises engaged in postal and telecommunications, civil
aviation enterprises, foreign trade corporations and agriculture, etc., are
not subject to the SEIT Law. They still deliver all their profits to the
state."'3
Under the SEIT Law, only those enterprises which keep independent
economic accounts are considered to be taxpayers. Therefore, joint corporations which are formed by several enterprises in order to enjoy economies of scale are not necessarily taxpayers of the SEIT as such. If a separate legal and accounting entity is established, the joint corporation pays
the tax as an independent taxpayer. If no such entity is formed, especially
those established among state enterprises and collective or private enterprises, each participating enterprise remains liable for tax on its share of
profits."1 For certain nation-wide corporations formed by enterprises in
the same industry, the joint corporation may pay the income tax as an
independent 5 taxpayer and receive a credit for taxes paid by its
11
subsidiaries.

The taxable income of a state enterprise includes net income from
production, transportation, commerce, services and other income. "Other
income" is interpreted as dividend income received from a joint corporation or other enterprise, interest income on bonds (except state bonds)
and other non-business income."" In calculating taxable income, the following deductions are specifically permitted: profits and dividends distributed to its shareholders by a joint corporation before paying the
SEIT; certain interest payments on loans approved by the Ministry of
Finance; losses incurred in previous years; and some prescribed deductions, such as net profits from utilizing waste liquid, gas or materials,
profits from processing for a foreign enterprises, etc. 7 The following
items are not deductible: wages, bonuses or subsidies paid out of a aftertax fund (such as wage-increase fund, bonus fund); payments of bonus
tax, construction tax and purchasing state bonds. 8
A state enterprise is taxed on its world income. Income from a foreign-source must be computed separately from domestic income and a
reduced rate of 20 percent is applicable to the foreign income. 1 9 Taxes
113. Ding, supra note 18, at 229-30.
114. Arts. 2 and 9 of the SEIT Law, supra note 112 and art. 4 of the SEIT Regs., supra
note 112, and arts. 24-27 of the Decision of the State Council on Questions Regarding Further Improving the Horizontal Economic Cooperation of Enterprises, March 23, 1986 by the
State Council.
115. See DING, supra note 18, at 230-1; and Zhang Lianshun, A Brief Discussion of the
Question of Levying Income Tax on Joint Enterprises, Zhongguo Shuiwu, 1985, No. 8, 26

(Chinese
116.
117.
118.
119.

version).
SEIT Regs., supra note 112, art. 9.
Id. at art. 10.
Id. at art. 11.
Arts. 1 and 4 of the Interim Regulations on the Levy of State Enterprise Income
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paid in foreign countries are deductible in calculating taxable income.12
A company incorporated for the purposes of carrying out contracting
businesses in foreign countries is exempted from income tax for the first
five years from its incorporation, and further reductions in tax may be
available subject to approval by the tax authorities. 2'
State enterprises are divided into two categories for tax purposes.
Large and medium-sized enterprises pay a flat rate of 55 percent on their
profits. Small enterprises, 22 food servicing enterprises and enterprises in
the hotel business pay an eight-grade progressive tax, which rises from 7
percent to 55 percent. Certain industries are subject to the 55 percent
rate regardless of the size of the enterprise. These include enterprises engaged in publishing, construction and installation, finance and insurance,
wholesaling, trading centres, friendship hotels,'
petroleum stores (in2 4
cluding gas stations), overseas shipping companies.
The distinction also applies to the treatment of after-tax profits.
Small enterprises and enterprises paying the progressive rates assume
sole responsibility for profits and losses and, after payment of taxes, the
state generally makes no further appropriation. Only those which have a
large amount of "extra" profits are required to pay a contractual or leasing fee to the state. 2 5 As for the large and medium-sized enterprises a
number of experimental systems have been tried. Initially, a further part
of the profit was turned over to the state under specially negotiated contractual arrangements. However, for many enterprises this system has
been superseded by a separate regulatory tax which seeks to address the
wide disparities in the profitability of different enterprises which may reflect circumstances other than the efficiency of management, such as geo-

Tax on State Enterprises Engaging in Contractual Projects in Foreign Countries, adopted
by the Ministry of Finance on March 11, 1985: (85) Cai Shui Zi, No. 058.
120. It should be noted that it is a deduction method instead of credit method which is
adopted here.
121. (85) Cai Shui Zi, No. 058, supra note 120. See Zhang Lianshun and Sun Wushan,
Comments on Levying Income Tax on State Enterprises' Income from Contracting
Projects in Foreign Countries, Zhongguo Shuiwu, 1985, No. 5, 32 (Chinese version).
122. "Small enterprises" are defined as those whose fixed assets, profits and workers do
not exceed a certain level which varies from region to region. In Beijing, Shanghai and
Tianjin, the three largest cities in China, a small industrial and transportation enterprise is
one whose fixed assets do not exceed 4 million yuan, annual profits do not exceed 0.4 million. In other regions, a small enterprise is one whose fixed assets do not exceed 3 million
yuan and annual profits do not exceed 0.3 million yuan. Small enterprises in commerce in
Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin are defined as those whose number of workers does not exceed 60 and annual profits do not exceed 0.2 million. See art. 15 of the SEIT Regs., supra
note 112.
123. In China, special stores are designated as "friendship stores" to serve the needs of
foreigners and overseas Chinese. Generally, local currency is not accepted in these stores
and the goods are normally not easily available in local shops.
124. SEIT Regs., supra note 112, art. 15.
125. The amount of the leasing fee is determined by local government. See Tao
Shengyu, The Contents of Policies in the Second Phase of Li Gai Shui, Qiye Guanli (Enterprise Management), No.10 and 16, at 17 (1984) (Chinese version).
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graphical location, availability of natural resources, level of previous capital investment, the condition and age of the plant and machinery and the
state pricing policy. A resource tax is also levied as a form of excess profits tax on large and medium-sized enterprises, aimed at eliminating disparities between enterprises brought about by different physical
conditions.
(ii) State Enterprise Income Regulatory Tax (Guoying Qiye Tiaojie Shui)
This tax is imposed on large and medium-sized state enterprises
whose after-tax profits exceed a "reasonable" amount of retained profits.
This amount is equated to the reasonable amount of retained profits of
an enterprise in 1983, after paying the SEIT and the State Enterprise
Income Regulatory Tax (SEIRT).
Unlike other income taxes, there are no tax rates provided in the
SEIRT Measures. 26 The SEIRT Measures do, nonetheless, provide that
the appropriate rate is determined according to the following formula:
Tax rate-= Base Year Profit X (1-55%) - 1983 Retained Profit X 100%
Base Year Profit
The "base year profit" refers to the amount of profits realized by an
enterprise after deducting payments of Product Tax, VAT, Business Tax
and Resource Tax." 7 Once the tax rate is determined, it is valid for seven
years, commencing from 1985, to ensure that subsequent increases in
profitability in response to the new incentives are not nullified by the tax.
Enterprises whose current year profits exceed that of the base year can
enjoy a 70 percent reduction in the regulatory tax on the excess amount.
Although declared temporary, the regulatory tax is criticized from
Chinese writers. They claim that it retains vestiges of the former profit
delivery system and, by penalizing success, is like "beating the fast running cow." 2 8 Due to the existence of those factors causing disparities of
profitability among enterprises, the SEIRT is likely to remain in order to
allow the state to appropriate the amount of profits realized by enterprises which benefit from advantageous factors and to encourage enterprises to improve their technology by reducing the SEIRT payable.' 2 9

126. State Enterprises Income Regulatory Tax Collecting Measures, promulgated by
the State Council on Sept. 19, 1984 [hereinafter the SEIRT Measures].
127. Id. at art. 6.
128. See Chen Lanying, Should Not Undervalue the Historical Function of the Regulatory Tax, Zhongguo Shuiwu, No. 6 at 30 (1986); and Tang Sheng, Is the Regulatory Tax
Beating the Fast Running Cow?, Zhongguo Shuiwu, No. 3 at 18 (1987) (Chinese versions).
129. See Tao Shengyu and Lu Bing, To Actively Create Conditions for Enliven Large
and Medium-Sized Enterprises by Doing a Good Job in Reducing Regulatory Tax, Cai
Zheng (Finance), No. 5 at 15 (1986). As a matter of fact, many state enterprises enter into
contracts with the state to "promise" to hand in a certain amount of taxes, including SEIT
and SEIRT, to the state for a number of years in accordance with the Interim Provisions
concerning the Financial Affairs of Large and Medium-Sized State Enterprises which Implement Contractual Responsibility System, issued by the Ministry of Finance on August 21,
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(iii) Collective Enterprise Income Tax (Jiti Giye Suode Shui)
Collective enterprises had been subject to the Industrial and Commercial Income Tax until 1985 when a separate tax law - the Collective
Enterprise Income Tax Law ("CEIT Law")' was promulgated. The tax
applies to all collective enterprises engaged in industry, commerce, service
trades, construction, installation, communications, transportation and
other fields of work, which have independent accounting systems. Collective enterprises in China take a variety of forms, ranging from small partnerships to relatively large concerns which are incorporated and, in some
cases, have made public offerings of stock.' The essence of a collective is
that it is collectively-owned, rather than state-owned, and is "non-governmental." The collective's production plan is not incorporated directly as
part of the State Economic Plan and it does not account to the state for
its profits. Due to the rapid development of collective enterprises in urban and rural areas, the percentage of national industrial revenue contributed by the collective sector increased from 6.8 percent in 1978 to 15
percent in 1984 and collectives also generate 43.7 percent of national revenue from light industry. 2 The number of collective enterprises far exceeds that of state enterprises.' 33
Collective Enterprise Income Tax ("CEIT") is levied upon total income after deduction of expenses, according to an eight grade progressive

1987, (87) Cai Gong Zi, No. 407. This saves the problem of calculating the SEIRT for each
year but it may cause confusion of profit delivery and tax payment. For further discussions,
see Xu Jingan and Zhou Shaohua, Remodel the State Economic Management Pattern,
Shijie Jingji Daobao (World Economic Herald), Nov. 31, 1987, at 15; Wang Shaofei, ContractualResponsibility System and Tax Reform May Promote Each Other, Renmin Ribao,
Feb. 5, 1988, at 5; Xia Yang, The Defects of Signing a Contract with Guaranteed Tax
Payments, Guangming Ribao, Dec. 5, 1987, at 3; and Renmin Ribao, March 14, 1988, at 1
(Chinese versions).
130. The Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Collective Enterprise Income Tax, promulgated by the State Council (April 11, 1985) [hereinafter CEIT
Law], and the Detailed Rules for the Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China
on Collective Enterprise Income Tax, adopted by the Ministry of Finance (July 22, 1985)
[hereinafter CEIT Regs.].
131. At present, collective enterprises are the only type of domestic enterprises which
are officially permitted by the government to issue stocks: see Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, April 4,
1987 (Chinese version). See further Chen Huiren, The Practice of Stock System of Zhongxingcun and Inspiration therefrom, Jingji Gaige (Economic Reform), No. 1, at 43 (1987)
(Chinese version); Zhang Hong, Certain Questions on the Shareholding System of Collective Enterprises, Jingji Gaige, No.1, at 47 (1987)(Chinese version); and China Tries out
Shareholding System written by the Investigation and Research Group of the State Commission for Economic Restructuring, BEIJING REV. 22, Oct. 5, 1987.
132. Wang Chuhong, Collective Economy Shall be The Basis of our Country's Ownership System, Guangming Ribao (Guangming Daily), Feb. 7, 1987, at 3 (Chinese version).
133. By the end of 1985, there were 833,400 state enterprises, and 3,347,000 collective
enterprises. See Renmin Ribao (Haiwai Ban), July 11, 1986. Rural township collectives have
been developing rapidly since the late 1970s and the gross revenue therefrom exceeded the
gross revenue from agriculture in 1986 for the first time: Renmin Ribao (Haiwai Ban), Nov.
14, 1986.
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scale, as is the case with small state enterprises. However, income from
agriculture is not taxed under this tax."' Profits and dividends received
from other enterprises are deductible in computing taxable income.
Nonetheless, the deduction of the following items are specifically prohibited: losses from previous years; payments of wages and bonuses paid to
workers;' 35 penalties; Construction Tax; government bonds; and dividends
to shareholders.
The tax is levied annually, and must be prepaid monthly or quarterly."3 7 Special reductions or exemptions are given for certain types of
enterprises, especially those enterprises ancillary to agriculture, village
and township collectives established in minority-inhabited areas or re13
mote and border areas.
As in the case of small state enterprises, collective enterprises are
free to dispose of retained profits after payment of the income tax subject
to the following conditions: not less than 55 percent of the retained profits must be allocated to the production development fund, and not more
than 20 percent to the workers' welfare fund, not more than 10 percent to
the workers' bonus fund and not more than 15 percent to the dividend
account.' 39
(iv) Individual Industrial and Commercial Household Tax (Geti Gongshangyehu Suode Shui)
Since the introduction of the economic reforms and the open policy
in 1979, private businesses have been revived and have become an inseparable part of the national economy.'"" By the end of 1987, there were
more than 13 million individually owned businesses employing more than
20 million people conducting industrial, commercial and service activities. 4' Like collectives, individual households were until recently liable to
pay the Industrial and Commercial Income Tax. A new tax, introduced in
"
1986,142
now applies to all industrial and commercial households engaged

134. CEIT Regs., supra note 130, art.9.
135. Payment of wages and bonuses to workers by collectives in accordance with the
specified standard are treated as a cost of production and therefore deductible. Payments
beyond the standard must be paid from retained earnings: art. 28(1) of the Financial Administrating Measures on Urban and Township Industrial Collective Enterprises, adopted
by the Ministry of Finance (Dec. 31, 1986) [hereinafter Collective Enterprise Financial
Measures].
136. CEIT Regs. supra note 130, art.12.
137. Id. at art.6.
138. Id. at art. 4.
139. Collective Enterprise Financial Measures, supra note 135, art. 4(3). The exact percentage is for the enterprise to decide.
140. See Gao Jikang, A Summary of Discussions on Legal Questions Regarding Private
Economy, Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, Oct. 28, 1986, at 3 (Chinese version).
141. Renmin Ribao (Haiwai Ban), Dec. 30, 1987; and Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, Sept. 5, 1986
(Chinese versions).
142. Interim Regulations on Income Tax concerning Urban and Rural Individually-operated Industrial and Commercial Households, promulgated by the State Council (Jan. 7,
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in industry, commerce, service trades, construction and installation

trades.
The Households Income Tax is levied on profits after deducting
costs, expenses, salaries and losses. 4 ' The deductible amount of salaries
payable to employees, the number of which may not exceed seven, shall
be in line with the amount payable to workers in state enterprises in the
same industry and the same region. 4" The net profits are taxed according
to a ten-grade progressive scale which rises from 7 percent to 60 percent.
In addition, a surtax of from 10 to 40 percent is imposed on taxable income in excess of 50,000 yuan a year. Since most individual households
operate on a small scale, 45 the surtax is only applicable to a few households to effectively regulate the profit level of those enterprises.
Special reductions in the tax are accorded to the childless elderly,
handicapped and those providing badly needed services requiring high labour intensity. 46 Individual doctors, dentists and veterinarians are exempted from the tax on income earned through private practice if the
fees charged are reasonable. 4 7 Households engaged in farming activities
or water transportation are also exempted.""
(v) Private Enterprise Income Tax (Siying Qiye Suode Shui)
As of July 1, 1988, individuals are officially allowed not only to conduct business in the form of individual households but also through private enterprises registered under the Private Enterprise Law" 9 in the
form of a sole proprietorship, a partnership or a corporation with limited
liability.
Private enterprises established under the Private Enterprise Law are
currently taxed under the Private Enterprise Income Tax Law (PEIT
1986) [hereinafter Households Income Tax Law]. Unlike other tax laws, the implementing
rules will not be promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, but by local governments: art. 16
of the Households Income Tax Law.
143. It should be noted here that, in contrast, losses in previous years are not deductible for collective enterprises. See art. 12 of the CEIT Regs., supra note 130.
144. Art. 4 of Certain Policy Regulations concerning the Urban and Rural Individuallyoperated Industrial and Commercial Households Income Tax, adopted by the Ministry of
Finance, (86) Cai Shui Zi, No. 091 (April 18, 1986)[hereinafter Households Tax Policies].
145. Households are restricted to hire more than seven employees. See Renmin Ribao
(Haiwai Ban), March 12, 1988, at 1; Meng Qingyaun, Several Questions on Private Economy, Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, Aug. 27, 1984, at 3; State Council Interim Regulations on Individually-operated Industrial and Commercial Households in the Countryside, issued on Feb.
27, 1984: (1984) Guo Fa, No. 26; and the Provisional Regulations on the Management of
Individual Industrial and Commercial Households in Urban and Rural Areas, issued by the
State Council (Aug. 5, 1987) (Chinese versions).
146. Households Income Tax Law, supra note 142, art. 5.
147. Households Tax Policies, supra note 144, arts. 6 and 9.
148. Id. at art. 7.
149. The Provisional Regulations on Private Enterprise of the People's Republic of
China, adopted by the State Council (June 3, 1988), promulgated on June 25 and effective
as of July 1, 1988 [hereinafter Private Enterprise Law].
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Law) on their profits derived from engaging in industry, construction,
transportation, commerce, catering or other service industries. The tax is
imposed on profits after deducting costs, expenses, turnover taxes and
non-business expenses allowed by the State. 5 ' Unlike the Households Income Tax, a fiat rate of tax of 35 percent is charged on the taxable
amount and no surtax is levied. 1 Moreover, business losses incurred by a
private enterprise can be carried forward for three years.15
Exemptions and reductions are granted if a private enterprise manufactures goods by using waste water, gas or materials, or where the taxdue to storm, fire, flood, earthquake or
payer is in financial 1difficulty
53
other natural disaster.
As previously explained, profits distributed by a private enterprise
are taxed again, in the hands of the investor, at a fiat rate of forty percent.'" Consequently this provides a measure of integration of the taxation of enterprises and investors and creates a system not unlike the
"classical" system of corporation tax employed in the United States and
some other Western countries.
C.

Agriculture Tax

Agriculture taxes existed in China, in one form or another, for at
least four thousand years. This is not surprising considering that China
always has been mainly an agricultural country. Whether to classify these
taxes as taxes on income is questionable. At some times - for instance
with the "nine-square" system - the tax resembled the medieval European "tithe" and could be considered to be a tax on production or on
income. 55 At other times, the assessment was based upon the value or
area of the land itself, approximating a property, or annual wealth, tax.
The system, in force since 1949, is based upon the estimated yield of the
average harvest for the land in question, and might therefore be described as a sort of hybrid property and income tax.
The agriculture tax is of major importance not only because of its
antiquity but also because it affects some eighty percent of the population of the People's Republic. However, its budgetary importance gradually diminished over the past three decades as the degree of industrialization increased. Even in the predominantly agricultural areas, it has
ceased to be a major source of tax revenue.' 56 That does not mean that

150. PEIT Law, supra note 81, art. 2. For a discussion of the tax, see Li, supra note 82,

at 417.
151. Id. at art. 3.
152. Id. at art. 6.

153. Id. at art.4.
154. Under the Private Investors IIRT Law, supra note 81.
155. See Easson and Li, supra note 1, at 429.
156. According to one study in a primarily agricultural county, the agriculture tax had
accounted for thirty-two percent of the total tax revenue in 1957, but for only nine percent
in 1983. See Zheng Jiaju and Ye Shaokun, Thoughts on Reforming Agriculture Taxes,
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the contribution by peasants to the national revenue has decreased, since
the state also secures its share of agricultural income through a "concealed tax" - compulsory procurement.
The first agriculture tax law in the People's Republic was promulgated in 1950.87 The tax was assessed on the basis of the average annual
harvest for land of the particular type and levied on a progressive scale
according to the total production of the household owning the land. By
1958, with the formation of mutual-assistance groups and then the communes, there was no longer a need for a progressive tax system and a new
flat-rate system was introduced. " This is the system which, with some
modifications, remains in force today.
As under the previous system, tax is charged on all units and individuals deriving agricultural income from the production of grain, varieties
of potatoes, cotton, hemp, tobacco, sugar and oil-bearing crops, as well as
income from horticultural crops and cash crops.1 50 The tax is assessed on
the basis of the estimated average annual yield of the land. The assessment usually remains in force for five years. This has the advantage of
providing an incentive to increase production as the taxpayer has a complete tax holiday on the increment in output over the normal level until
the date of the next assessment of normal output.6 0 The tax rates vary
from thirteen to nineteen percent in different regions, with a national average of 15.5 percent.' Local governments may impose an additional local surcharge of up to fifteen percent (in the case of grains) or thirty percent (in the case of cash crops) of the basic tax.1 2 A ten to fifty percent
surtax may also be levied upon income derived by individual farmers."6 8
The amount of tax is calculated in monetary terms based on the price
paid by the state for medium-quality grains when it buys from the production unit. However, until recently the tax was normally paid in kind
and was collected twice a year following the summer and autumn
harvests.
The Agriculture Tax has failed to keep pace with crop yield and with
rising rural incomes. Since Liberation (1949), despite some setbacks, agricultural production has risen steadily. By 1978, total output value stood
at 3.63 times that of 1949, and the vital grain output had risen by 270

NONGYE JINGJI WENTI (AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC ISSUES) April 23, 1985, at 36-8 (Chinese

version).
157. Interim Regulations on Agriculture Tax in Newly Liberated Regions, promulgated
by the 9th Session of the Central People's Governmental Committee (Sept. 5, 1950).
158. Regulations on Agriculture Tax of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (June 3, 1958) [hereinafter Agriculture Tax Law].
159. Id. at arts. 3 and 4.
160. See A.R. Khan, Taxation, Procurement and Collective Incentives in Chinese Agriculture, 6 WORLD DEv. 827, 829 (1978).
161. Agriculture Tax Law, supra note 158, art. 10.
162. Id. at art. 14.
163. Id. art. 13.
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percent."" Production rose still more sharply following the introduction
of the "responsibility system" in 1978.6' In contrast, tax assessments rose
barely, with the result that an average nominal tax rate of fifteen percent
amounted in reality to a real rate of three percent or less."" Consequently, in the past few years, pressure has been mounting for a major
reform of the Agriculture Tax in line with the tremendous changes which
have taken place in rural China. The "responsibility system" has meant
that the state has considerably relaxed its control over agriculture. Until
1985, the state almost totally monopolized grain supplies; taxes were
mostly paid in grain and the remainder of the state needs were met by
quota deliveries at state-fixed prices. 167 This policy has been changed.
The state now obtains most of its grain requirements on a contract basis.
In more backward areas, tax continues to be paid in kind, but elsewhere
the current policy is cash payment.1" Peasants, in turn, have greater freedom to determine what shall be grown on the land leased to them. Many
have switched from grain production to cash crops which yield higher incomes; 6 9 stories abound of a new generation of 10,000 yuan-a-year peasants. To reduce the difference between growing grains and cash crops,
new regulations were adopted in 1983 170 to levy a five to fifteen percent
tax on income from producing fruits, natural rubber, silkworm and other
7
cash products.' 1
The agricultural tax system designed for conditions existing thirty
years ago is no longer suitable for modern conditions, and is under attack

164. Zhang Yulin, Readjustment and Reform in Agriculture, in CHINA'S ECONOMIC RE124 (eds. Lin Wei and A.Chao 1985).
165. See, R.Delfs, Growing Troublesome: China's Rural Reforms Have Produced Some
Unexpected Results, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REvIEW, Feb. 18, 1988, at 66. For a general
discussion of the rural economic reform, see also, Keith Griffin and Kimberley Griffin, Institutional Change and Income Distribution,and A.K. Ghose, The New Development Strategy and Rural Reform in Post-Mao China in INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHINESE COUNTRYSIDE, (K. Griffin, ed., 1984), 20 and 253 respectively.
166. Ministry of Finance, Great Achievements in Finance Adminstration in the Past
35 Years, CAI ZHENG, (FINANCE) 1984, No. 10, at 1.
167. See, Cai Nong, Several Questions on the Collection and Accounting of Agriculture Tax, CAI ZHENG, 1987, No. 11, at 36 (Chinese version).
168. The method of calculating the tax has also been changed to reflect the new procurement policy. It is now set in the "reverse ratio of 3:7," that is to say, 30% of the price
component is the price formerly set for the state monopoly purchase of grain while the
remaining 70% is based on the purchase price for grain surplus to the production quota: see,
Guo Fa, No. 71; and Cai Nong, To Pay in Cash rather than in Kind is a Major Reform in
Agriculture Tax Collection, CAI ZHENG (Finance), 1985, No. 6, at 19 (Chinese versions).
169. For example, citrus crops yield three-and-a-half times as much income as a double
crop of rice due to the lowly state-fixed purchasing price for grains. See, Zhang and Ye,
supra note 156.
170. Measures concerning the Collection of Agriculture Tax on Income Derived from
the Specialized Products of Rural Households, adopted by the State Council (Nov. 12,
1983).
171. Id. at arts. 2 and 4. For further comments, see Collection of Taxes on Rural Specialized Products, CAI ZHENG, No. 1, at 11 (1984); and Cai Nong, Agriculture Tax Rates, CAI
ZHENG, No. 4, at 45 (1985) (Chinese version).
FORMS

1989

CHINA'S TAX SYSTEM

by many writers in China. 172 It is likely that, before long, a whole new
system, an income
tax with progressive rates, will replace the present Ag73
riculture Tax.
1. The Concealed Agriculture Tax
Direct agricultural tax is not the only contribution made by the agriculture sector to the state revenue. It also makes a contribution through
sales to the state if prices are below those which might otherwise have
been obtained. After the founding of the People's Republic, the Government commenced an industrialization program to catch up with developed countries. Due to the nature of an agricultural state, capital was
hard to obtain internally and more difficult externally because of the
trade embargo imposed by the United States and its western allies. The
only source available for China to raise capital was from the contributions
of the peasants. There were two possible means of acquiring revenue from
the agricultural sector by the state: direct taxation and compulsory
purchase by the state at artificially low prices. By using the latter
method, the state was able to procure raw materials from the agricultural
sector at low prices and allocate them to industry, or sell them to urban
workers at low prices, to keep down the cost of production of industrial
enterprises and then to collect profits and taxes from these enterprises.
As the basis of the economy, the agricultural sector has made a tremendous contribution to the nation's industrialization process by contributing
600 billion yuan in the form of "concealed tax""' and 96.5 billion yuan in
the form of Agriculture Tax between 1953 and 1983.1"
Before 1985, there were two types of procurement of agricultural
products. " 6 A lower price was paid on a basic quota which had to be
fulfilled by all collective units; this was called gongliang (public grains).
Over and above the compulsory quota, all production units were free to
sell additional quantities to the state; this was commonly referred to as
yuliang (additional grains). On such voluntary sales the units received a
price which was approximately 30 percent higher than the price received
from compulsory sale.'7 7 The units sold yuliang voluntarily to the state
because it was an honorable obligation of each citizen or unit to contrib-

172. Su Ting and Huang Zhengang, Discussions on Reforming the Agriculture Tax
System, CAIJING YANJIU, No. 1, 13 (1985); Zhao Yong, An Attempt to Discuss the Agriculture Tax Reform, CAI ZHENG, No. 7, 26 (1984); and Zhao Ganqi and Cai Jianhua, To Readjust the Agriculture Tax Burden and Implement Rural Economic Policies, CAI ZHENG, No.
11, 37 (1987) (Chinese version).
173. China Daily, Oct. 22, 1986, at 2; and Yan Chu, A Summary of Discussions at the
1986 Seminar on Tax Theories, ZHONGGUO SHUIWu, No. 4, 22, at 23 (1987) (Chinese
version).
174. Zhou Qiren, Dai Shaojing, Peasants, Market and Bringing Forth New Ideas,
JINGJ GUANLI, No. 1, 3, at 5 (1987) (Chinese version).
175. Id.; Ding, supra note 18, at 971.
176. See, R. ALLEY AND W. BURCHETT, CHINA: THE QuALrTY oF LIFE 26 (1976).
177. A.R. Khan, supra note 160, at 829.
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ute to the national development, and also because there were hardly any
buyers except the state during that period.
Under the new purchase system inaugurated in 1985, peasants sign
quasi-voluntary contracts with the state to supply grain to the state-marketing system. The state pays the base-procurement price for twenty to
thirty percent of the contracted amount and a higher, above-quota price
for the remaining seventy to eighty percent. The exact proportions vary
in different areas and for different grains. ' 8 The state purchases about 50
million tons of grains, and sells it to urban residents at low, fixed, retail
prices. Peasants sell another 50 million tons in further negotiated sales to
the state and in free markets. The latter are mainly in rural areas, though
some premium quality grain is sold in cities. The rest of the crop is retained by the peasants for their own consumption, reserves and seed. As a
result of this procurement system, the state controls eighteen to twenty
percent of total grain production, three-quarters of the market supply
and nearly all urban grain trade."7 9
D.

Additional Taxation of After-Tax Profits 80

In addition to income taxes levied on state and collective enterprises,
taxes are also imposed upon certain retained profits to allow the state to
participate in the allocation of funds, guide and supervise the use of those
profits, control the overall investment level and prevent excessive increase
in consumer consumption. This type of tax is not uncommon in other
state-planned economies. 8
1.

Construction Tax (Jianzhu Shui)

The Construction Tax' 82 was introduced to curb the country's increasing capital construction expenditure, to readjust the investment
structure, and to direct its limited capital to key projects. The tax is imposed on state enterprises, collective enterprises, private enterprises, and
other organizations, which undertake investment in: (1) capital construction, (2) investment in construction as part of a technology renovation
project; or (3) investment in construction not listed in the State's Fixed
Assets Investment Plan by using the following funds; (a) capital funds
outside the state budget, (b) local reserve funds and bank loans (including foreign exchange loans) and (c) various private funds of an enterprise

178. R. Delfs, How the System Works, FAR E. ECON. REV. 68 (Feb. 18, 1988).
179. Id.
180. This title may seem self-contradictory but the taxes covered in this part are levies
payable by enterprises with their retained earnings.
181. DING, supra note 18, at 257.
182. The tax is levied under the Provisional Rules of the People's Republic of China on
Construction Tax, (June 25, 1987) by the State Council [hereinafter Construction Tax Law].
The Construction Tax Law replaced the Interim Measures on Collecting Construction Tax
and their detailed implementing rules, promulgated by the State Council on Sept. 20, and
Nov. 18, 1983, respectively.
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or public institution; or other self-raised funds."'3
This tax is charged at 10 percent on investment made by state enterprises or public institutions in a capital construction project or investment in construction as part of a technology renovation project which is a
project listed in the state plan;"8 ' and on an investment in a construction
project in urban areas by collective or private enterprises.8 3 The tax rate
is twenty percent on an investment in a project not listed in the state
plan, and 30 percent on constructing a hotel, guest house, convalescent
hospital, theatre, auditorium, conference hall, office building or exhibition
centre which is not listed in the state plan.18 6
The Construction Tax is exempted on investment in constructing facilities for the development of energy resources, communication facilities,
educational facilities for a school, hospital or scientific and research facilities. The tax is also exempted on investment in a project financed with a
loan provided by an international financial institution or a foreign government, or donations from abroad, as well as investment in a social welfare project or a pollution control and environment protection project.187
To make the Construction Tax more effective, the tax must be paid
with self-raised funds and is not deductible in calculating taxable income.188 Taxpayers are not permitted to pay the tax with funds allocated
to them by the state or from bank loans. The tax payments cannot be
counted as part of the cost of the fixed assets and therefore cannot be
amortized.
2. State Enterprise Wages Regulatory Tax (Guoying Qiye Gongzi
Tiaojie Shui)
This tax is only imposed upon those state enterprises which have
adopted a floating-wage system whereby the level of wages floats with the
economic efficiency of the enterprise. 8 9 It is levied on the portion of
183. Construction Tax Law, supra note 182, at art. 2. Individuals constructing houses
for commercial use in urban areas are also liable for the tax. See ZHONGGUO SHUxwu, No. 10,
at 41 (1985) (Chinese version).
184. A "project listed in the state plan" refers to construction investment which is organized by a provincial, autonomous region, directly-administered municipal planning commission, economic commission or one of the various State Council departments in charge, in
accordance with the annual plan of the State Planning Commission on self-raised investment in capital construction or investment in construction as part of a technology renovation project, and relevant regulations. See art. 4 of the Construction Tax Law, supra note
182.
185. Construction Tax Law, supra note 182, arts. 3(i), 3(iii).

186. Id. arts. 3(), 3(iv).
187. Id. art. 5; Ministry of Finance Notice (87) Cai Shui Zi, No. 234 (Oct. 6,1987).
188. See SEIT Regs., supra note 112, art. 11(3); CEIT Regs., supra note 131, art. 12(4).
189. The "economic efficiency of an enterprise" refers to the amount of taxes and profits paid to the state, which includes SEIT, Product Tax, VAT, Business Tax, Resource Tax,
SEIRT and Urban Maintenance and Construction Tax. See art. 3 of the Detailed Rules for
the Implementation of the Provisional Regulations on State Enterprise Wages Regulatory
Tax, promulgated September 18, 1985 by the Ministry of Finance (hereinafter SE Wages
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wages exceeding the specified amount.
Prior to the current economic reform, wage levels were generally set
by the state and enterprises had no power to increase the amount of
wages to their workers. Honorary awards or awards in kind were normally
granted to "model workers." As part of the urban economic reform, the
wage system is undergoing reform, and various methods are being implemented which are aimed at giving workers more incentives and to breaking the system of "everybody eating from the same pot." For certain large
and medium-sized state enterprises, wages float with the economic
achievement of the enterprise. As a result, the more profitable an enterprise, the more after-tax profits can be retained and the more money is
available for the "wage increase funds."' 90 For other state enterprises and
public institutions, the basic wage level was maintained, but they could
increase the renumeration to workers and staff by granting bonuses. Consequently, enterprises tended to use up all their funds to increase wages
or bonuses to their employees and certain enterprises operating at a loss
were unable to do so. In order to limit the wage increase to a reasonable
level, to regulate the wage difference between enterprises and to ensure
that wages increase at an appropriate speed to avoid a "demand-pull"
inflation, the Wages Regulatory Tax and Bonus Tax (explained in next
section) were introduced in 1985.
The State Enterprise Wages Regulatory Tax is charged only on the
amount of wages that exceeds the amount of wages specified by the state
for the previous year by seven percent. 91 The amount of wages includes
various forms of wages, salaries, bonuses, subsidies, allowances and
awards in kinds.1"2 Where the increase is not more than seven percent, no
tax is payable. The rate ranges from thirty percent to 300 percent for the
1985 tax year 9 3 and 20 to 200 percent for the 1987 tax year.'94 The
amount of tax payable in the previous year is not included in the speci-

Regulatory Tax Regs.].
190. A steel manufacturing enterprise in Hubei Province adopted this system upon approval by the provincial government in 1981. Under the system, the enterprise "promised"
to increase its profitability by not less than seven percent based on the 1983 level and wages
were to increase by 0.75 percent for every one percent extra increase in profits. See Wuhan
Iron and Steel Corporation, To Link Wages with Profits and Taxes, the Enterprise In-

creases its Vitality by Times, Qiye Guanli, 1987, No. 1, at 17 (Chinese version).
191. Art. 4 of the Provisional Regulations on State Enterprise Wages Regulatory Tax,
promulgated by State Council on July 3, 1985 [hereinafter SE Wages Regulatory Tax Law].
192. SE Wages Regulatory Tax Regs., supra note 189, art. 6.
193. 193 For 1985, the tax was levied at thirty percent for an increase between seven
percent and twelve percent; one hundred percent for an increase between thirteen percent
and twenty percent; and three hundred percent for an increase of more than twenty percent.
See Appendix to the SE Wages Regulatory Tax Law, supra note 191.
194. The tax rate was cut in 1987 to twenty percent for an increase between seven and
twelve percent; fifty percent for an increase between thirteen and twenty percent; one hundred percent for an increase between twenty one and twenty seven percent; and two hundred percent for an increase of more than twenty seven percent. See Jingji Ribao (Economic
Daily), Feb. 24, 1987 (Chinese version).
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fled amount of that year and thus does not form part of the basis for the
following year.
3.

State Enterprise Bonus Tax (Guoying Qiye Jiangjin Shui)

Those state enterprises which have not implemented the floatingwage system are subject to the State Enterprise Bonus Tax on bonuses
paid to workers. 195 It should be noted that this tax, as well as the State
Enterprise Wages Regulatory Tax, is levied on the enterprise rather than
on the workers. Workers are taxed according to the Individual Income
Regulatory Tax on their monthly income received that exceeds four hundred yuan.
The tax rates vary in accordance with the amount of the bonus that
exceeds the amount of four month's standard wages."' The standard
monthly wage amount is sixty-seven-and-one- half yuan or more, depending upon the skill and experience of the worker and the regional wage. 97
If the total yearly bonus exceeds four months wages but is not more than
six months, the tax rate is 30 percent. The top rate under this tax is three
hundred percent where the yearly bonus amount exceeds the standard
wage amount by six month's wages."9 "
The tax is exempted on bonuses paid to employees as invention
awards, awards for rational proposals on technical transformation, awards
for speed unloading of foreign freighters, and bonuses issued to workers
working in mining, transportation, construction, or oil and gas
exploitation.""
4.

Collective Enterprise Bonus Tax (Jiti Qiye Jiangjin Shui)

All collective enterprises are liable for the Collective Enterprise Bonus Tax on bonus payments to their employees in accordance with the
rules provided in the State Enterprise Bonus Tax Law. 00 The taxable
bonus includes all payments made from the workers's award reserves and
bonus reserves, as well as wages, subsidies, labour dividends and stock

195. Art. 2 of the Provisional Regulations on State Enterprise Bonus Tax, adopted by
the State Council on June 28, 1984 and amended and promulgated on July 3, 1985 [hereinafter SE Bonus Tax Law]. This tax was imposed on all state enterprises in 1984 before the
SE Wages Regulatory Tax Law was introduced.
196. SE Bonus Tax Law, supra note 195, at art. 3.
197. Ministry of Finance Notice, (86) Cai Shui Zi, No. 082 (April 2, 1986).
198. Id. In 1987, the rates were reduced to 20% and 200%. See Ministry of Finance
Notice, (87) Cai Shui Zi, No. 010 (Feb. 17, 1987).
199. SE Bonus Tax Law, supra note 195, at art. 6. For further discussion of the tax, see
Yan Zhiping & Yu Leigui, Certain Questions on Taxing Bonuses, Gongren Ribao (Workers
Daily), May 5, 1984 (Chinese version).
200. Arts. 1 and 2 of the Provisional Regulations on Collective Enterprise Bonus Tax,
promulgated by the State Council on Aug. 24, 1985 [hereinafter CE Bonus Tax Law]; and
arts. 2 and 3 of the Detailed Rules for Implementing the Provisional Regulations on State
Enterprise Bonus Tax, promulgated by the Ministry of Finance on Nov. 2, 1985 [hereinafter
CE Bonus Tax Regs.].
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dividends that exceed the standard amount.' 1 "Labour dividend" is a
form of renumeration made by a collective to its workers at the end of the
year to allow them to share in the profits of the enterprise. This payment
is taxable only if the amount of the labour dividend is more than one
month's standard salary. 02 "Stock dividends" are dividends declared and
paid by a collective which has issued stock to its employees. These stock
dividends are taxable if the amount paid is more than fifteen percent of
the paid-in capital.20 3 Food subsidies and price subsidies granted to workers by collective enterprises by referring to those given by state enterprises 2o0 are not taxable. If a collective enterprise pays wages under the
standards set by the state for state enterprises, the taxable bonus is computed in the same way as for a state enterprise. If wages are paid according to other standards,
the monthly wage is calculated based on sixty
20 5
yuan per worker.

Tax rates and exemptions are similar to those applicable to state enterprises except that collectives engaged in agricultural activities are exempted from the tax.'06
E. Resource Taxes
1. Resource Tax (Ziyuan Shui)
The Resource Tax, introduced in 1984,207 was aimed at eliminating

profit disparities brought about by favorable physical conditions and encouraging an efficient use of the natural resources of the country. This tax
is now being levied on units and individuals engaged in exploiting crude
201. CE Bonus Tax Law, supra note 200, at art. 5.
202. Id. at art. 7.
203. Id. at art. 8.
204. In China, wages are only a part of the workers' actual income received from state
enterprises. A greater part of their renumeration is in the form of labour insurance and price
subsidies. Labour insurance and welfare payments are about 37% of the basic wage bill in
state enterprises. All employees in state and collective enterprises enjoy free medical care.
Because of the price policy on agricultural and sideline products, the government has to
purchase cereals, oil crops, eggs, pork and coal, etc., and sell them to city residents at a loss
in order to keep the wage level down. State enterprises may also give certain food subsidies
to their employees in various forms. From early 1988, the "hidden" food subsidy became
apparent in Beijing by paying a 10 yuan food subsidy to each qualified person (such as
workers and university students) per month in return for allowing the market to decide the
price of vegetables, eggs, sugar and pork. In addition, houses in cities are built and distributed by government departments and enterprises according to an overall plan, and rents are
artificially low. The total cost of these subsidies makes up 85% of the renumeration in state
enterprises of which 70% consists of subsidies for housing. See Yu Haitao, Difference in
Wage Systems, BEIJING REV., Jan. 18-24, 1988, at 25-26.
205. CE Bonus Tax Law, supra note 199, at art. 10. There have been some complaints
about this standard monthly wage amount being too low. See Shijie Jingji Daobao (World
Economic Herald), Dec. 28, 1987, at 2.
206. CE Bonus Tax Law, supra note 200, at art. 13.
207. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Resource Tax (Draft), promulgated Sept. 18, 1984 by the State Council [hereinafter Resource Tax Law].
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oil, natural gas, coal, metal and non-metal products.2"' The progressive
tax rates are calculated according to the sale profit rate of the taxable
products. 0 9 The higher the sale profit rate, the higher the Resource Tax
rate. The basic sale-profit rate is 12 percent, and the tax is only imposed
if the profit rate is higher than the basic rate. For each 1 percent increase
in the sale-profit rate, the rate is .5 percent of the sales income of the
product if the profit rate is between 12 to 20 percent. The tax rate is .7
percent for each 1 percent increase on the excess portion where the salesprofit rate exceeds 25 percent.2 10 Products consumed by the taxpayer are
2
deemed to be sold at the stipulated prices for the purpose of the tax. '
Small-scale mining businesses can be granted a 50 percent reduction in
tax. Other taxpayers may also be entitled to an exemption from or reduction in the tax if special encouragement is deemed appropriate by the
government.2 2 The payment of this tax is deductible when computing the
taxable income of the taxpayer.
2.

Special Tax on Burning Oil (Shaoyou Debie Shui)

This tax was introduced in 1982213 to restrict domestic oil consumption in order to encourage the domestic use of coal, thereby increasing the
export of petroleum abroad.
Enterprises which burn crude
kilns and furnaces are subject to
burned.2" The tax is levied at the
oil and 70 yuan per ton on heavy

oil or heavy oil for boilers, industrial
this tax based on the amount of oil
rate of 40 to 70 yuan per ton on crude
oil.21 '

F. Local Taxes
Considering China's size, both in terms of geography and population,
its tax system and legal system are highly centralized. Local government

208. Id. at art. 1. Foreign enterprises and Chinese-foreign joint ventures are not currently subject to this tax. Tax on metal and non-metal products has been postponed. See
art. 1(1) of the Provisions on Several Questions of Resource Tax, in Ministry of Finance
Notice, (84) Cai Shui Zi, No. 296.
209. The "sales-profit rate of a taxable product" calculation is:
Sale profit of the product
Sale income of the product
Resource tax = sale income of the product X tax rate
210. Resource Tax Law, supra note 207, at art. 2.
211. Id. at art. 4.
212. Id. at art. 7. For a discussion of the tax, see Guo Hongde and Yang Yimin, The
Status of Implementing the Resource Tax and Ideas for Perfection of the Tax, Zhongguo

Shuiwu, 1986, No. 4 (part 1), 13-5. and No. 5 (part 2), 11-2; and Hong Chu, The Deep
Meaning of Start Levying Resource Tax, Zhongguo Shuiwu, 1985, No. 1, at 18 (Chinese

versions).
213. Trial Regulations on Levying of Special Tax on Oil Burning, promulgated by the
State Council on April 22, 1982 [hereinafter Oil Burning Tax Regs.].
214. Id. at art. 1.
215. Id. at art. 3.
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authorities derive their taxing powers from the central government so
that the taxes that they are empowered to levy, and the maximum rates
of such taxes, are prescribed by the central government."' 6 However, local
governments have extensive powers to promulgate implementing rules
with respect to the local tax laws promulgated by the central government.
The local government also may have powers to grant reductions or exemptions from local taxes.
Taxes designated as local taxes by the central government include
Real Estate, Urban Land Use, Farmland Use, Vehicle and Vessel Use,
Slaughter, Stamp and Banquet.2 1
1.

Real Estate Tax (Fangdichan Shui) s1

s

An Urban Real Estate Tax was imposed in China in 1951 on both
buildings and land. 219 It was replaced in 1986 by the Real Estate Tax,22
but the 1951 version still applies to foreign individuals and enterprises
with foreign investment. The Real Estate Tax is levied in cities, counties
and townships. This tax is payable in respect of houses or buildings
owned by units or individuals. It is charged at 1.2 percent of the residual
value of a property if the taxpayer is also the property owner. The
"residual value" is usually between 70 and 90 percent of the original cost
of the property, the exact percentage being determined by the local government."' If the property is leased, the tax is imposed at 12 percent of
the rental income from the property.22 2 Properties owned by government
agencies, armed forces, and individuals for non-business purposes are exempt from the tax. Temples, parks and historical places are also
225
exempt.
2.

Urban Land Use Tax (Chengzhen Tudi Shiyong Shui)

The Urban Land Use Tax was introduced in July 1988 and became

216. The Principal Rules of 1950 provided that tax legislation which is within the jurisdiction of a county, municipality or province must be submitted to the central authorities
for approval. In practice, most local tax legislation is promulgated by the central government in the first place. They are referred to as local taxes because the revenue accrues to
the local governments and the local governments have the right to promulgate implementing
rules.
217. See Regulations concerning the Implementation of a Fiscal Administration System
of Delineating Taxes, Checking and Ratifying Revenue and Holding Different Levels of
Government Responsible, issued by the State Council on March 21, 1985.
218. The term "real estate" does not include land as all land in China remains the
property of the state under the CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 10
(adopted on Dec. 4, 1982, by the 5th Session of the 5th National People's Congress).
219. See Provisional Regulations Governing the Urban Real Estate Tax, promulgated
Aug. 8, 1951 by the Administrative Council.
220. Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Real Estate Tax,
issued by the State Council on Sept. 15, 1986 [hereinafter Real Estate Tax Law].
221. Id. at art. 3.
222. Id. at art. 4.
223. Id. at art. 5.
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effective as of November 1, 1988. All units and individuals who use land
located in cities and towns are subject to the tax.2 " The tax rates vary
from 0.5 to .10 yuan in large cities to between 0.3 and 0.6 yuan in county
towns and mining areas, the exact rate of which is determined by the
local government.2 2 The tax is not imposed on land used by the government agencies, armed forces, temples or parks, or used for the purposes of
constructing energy, transportation and water facilities.22
3. Farmland Use Tax (Gengdi Zhanyong Shui)
The Farmland Use Tax was introduced in 1987.22' It was aimed at
encouraging citizens and businesses to make better use of land resources,
strengthen land control, and protect farmland. 2 "
Any unit or individual that occupies farmland to build a house or
engage in other non-farm business is a taxpayer and is liable for the tax
at rates ranging from one to 10 yuan per square meter, depending on the
location of the land. The exact rate of the tax is determined by the people's government of the province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government. 229 These rates may be raised by not
more than 50 percent in the Special Economic Zones and other areas
open to foreign investment. 30 Land is also exempt from tax if it is used
for such things as military purposes, railways and airports, schools, kindergartens and hospitals."'
4.

22
Vehicle and Vessel Use Tax (Che Chuan Shiyong Shui)

This tax was levied on units and individuals using motor vehicles and
motor boats of most types, plus some types of non-motored transport. It
is within the jurisdiction of the province, autonomous region or municipality directly under the Central Government, and is normally paid
yearly as a form of license fee.

224. Art. 2 of the Interim Provisions of the People's Republic of China on Urban Land
Use Tax, adopted by the State Council on July 12 and effective as of Nov. 1, 1988 [hereinafter Urban Land Use Tax Law].
225. Id. at arts. 4 and 5.
226. Id. at art. 6.
227. Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Farmland Occupation and Use Tax, promulgated by the State Council on April 2, 1987 [hereinafter Farmland
Use Tax Law].
228. "Farmland" is defined to be land used for growing crops. See id. at art. 2.
229. Id. at art. 5.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. This tax was previously called Vehicle and Vessel License Plate Tax under the
Provisional Regulations Governing the Vehicle and Vessel License Plate Tax, promulgated
Sept. 13, 1951 by the Administrative Council of the Central People's Government. On Sept.
15, 1986, a new law was issued by the State Council based on the 1951 law - the Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Vehicle and Vessel Use Tax. The
1951 law still applies to foreigners and foreign businesses in China.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
5.

VOL. 17:3

Slaughter Tax (Tuzai Shui)

The Slaughter Tax is charged when pigs, sheep and cattle are slaughtered. The tax is imposed at a rate fixed by the local government in accordance with the Slaughter Tax Regulations.23
6.

Stamp Tax (Yinhua Shui)

A stamp tax was levied from 1950 until 1958 when it was incorporated into the Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax. A new
Stamp Tax Law was passed in June, 1988, and became effective October
1, 1988.234 Under the Stamp Tax Law, all individuals and entities who
write or obtain a specified document are liable for the tax. The "specified
documents" include: (1) contracts for; (a) purchases and sales, (b) undertaking of processing work, (c) construction projects, (d) leasing property,
(e) transportation of goods, (f) storage and custody, (g) lending funds, (h)
insuring property and technology; (2) conveyances; (3) business accounts
books; (4) registration certificates for rights and licenses; and (5) other
documents determined taxable by the Ministry of Finance.2 Tax rates
vary in accordance with the nature of the documents. For example,
purchase and sales contracts are taxed at 0.003 percent of the sale price,
while construction and installation contracts are taxed at 0.003 percent of
the fee charged; contracts for the undertaking of processing work and
transportation of goods are taxed at 0.005 percent.2 6 Taxpayers are required to pay the tax at the applicable rate by purchasing and affixing tax
stamps which must be pasted on the taxable document. 3 7 The tax is not
levied on duplicates or manuscript copies of documents on which the
stamp tax has already been paid, nor on instruments written by the
owner of property when such property is donated to the government, a
social welfare entity, or a school."3 '
7.

Banquet Tax (Yanxi Shui)

A Banquet Tax was introduced in September 1988, to guide reasonable consumption and discourage waste.239 Entities and individuals who
hold banquets in restaurants, hotels and other catering places are subject

233. Provisional Regulations on Slaughter Tax, issued by the Administrative Council
on Dec. 19, 1950.
234. Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Stamp Tax, adopted
by the State Council on June 24, 1988, and effective as of Oct. 1, 1988 [hereinafter Stamp
Tax Law].
235. Id. at art. 2.
236. See Table of Tax Rates for Stamp Tax Items annexed to the Stamp Tax Law.
237. Stamp Tax Law, supra note 234, arts. 5 and 6.
238. Id. at art. 4.
239. Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Banquet Tax, adopted
by the State Council on Sept. 9, 1988, and promulgated Sept. 22, 1988 [hereinafter Banquet
Tax Law].
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to this tax.2 40 The tax is charged at fifteen to twenty percent of the banquet price exceeding 200 to 500 yuan, the exact amount of which is subject to determination by the local government.2 4 The owner or manager
the banquet are required to withof restaurants and hotels which provide
24 2
hold the tax from the price charged.
8.

243
Market Transaction Tax (Jishi Jiaoyi Shui)

This is a tax imposed on individuals or entities (mainly farmers) selling domestic animals, meat, fruits, local products and home-made handicrafts. The rate is generally 10 percent of the sale price and local governments are empowered to impose the tax at lower or higher rates.
9.

Livestock Transaction Tax (Shengchu Jiaoyi Shui)1"

Entities or individuals purchasing cattle, horses, donkeys, mules and
camels are liable to this tax. The tax rate is 5 percent of the purchase
price. The tax is payable to the local tax office and accrues to the province, autonomous region or municipality directly under central control.
Enterprises with foreign investment may also be liable to this tax if they
purchase taxable livestock for business purposes.2 4
III.

AN OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE CHINESE TAX SYSTEM

Despite its long historical antecedents, China's present tax system is
the creation of the past eight or nine years and is the result of the new
economic policy. Although further major changes and reforms can certainly be expected, the basic structure of the system now seems to be
complete. Because China is both a developing and a socialist country, the
criteria which would commonly be applied in assessing a Western capitalist economy may be inappropriate in evaluating China's recent
achievements.
A.

Functions of Taxation in China

Taxation in China performs not only the function of raising revenue
for the government, but also acts as an economic regulator to implement
the state economic plans and various state policies. Since 1980, when the
Joint Venture Income Tax Law was promulgated, taxation also has
played an important role in attracting foreign investment.

240. Id. at art. 2.
241. Id. at art. 3.
242. Id. at art. 5.
243. The tax is charged under the Interim Regulations on Market Transaction Tax,
adopted on April 16, 1962 by the State Council.
244. It is levied under the Interim Regulations on Livestock Transaction Tax, issued on
Dec. 13, 1982 by the State Council.
245. Cai Shui Wai Zi, July 19, 1984, No. 130 (Ruling by the General Tax Bureau of the
Ministry of Finance).
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Raising Revenue

As in any other system, taxation in China performs the function of
raising revenue and reallocating income. Taxes are levied on the "principle of using what is taken from the people in the interest of the people." 2" Since the establishment of the People's Republic, more than 800
billion yuan has been collected in the form of taxation, and this has
played an important role in promoting socialist construction. Prior to the
recent tax reform, tax revenue accounted for only 40 to 55 percent of
state revenue while the rest came from profits delivered by state enter248
prises.24 In 1986, this figure had been increased to over 90 percent.
This function of raising revenue is considered to be the primary function
of taxation in China.24 9
2.

Regulating the Economy

Another function of taxation is to regulate the economy. In China,
numerous "economic levers" are used to implement the state economic
plans, including controls on prices, credit, interest rates, wages and profits, as well as taxation. The most important of these at present are pricing
and taxation. The state uses taxation to guide and control the production
and consumption of products and to fulfill various planned targets by
stipulating different tax rates, tax base and exemptions to suit various
requirements.2 0 Frequently, however, taxation is used in combination
with price controls to regulate the economy.
Taxation is also used as means of readjusting differences in income
among enterprises caused by various "objective factors," such as fixed
prices, quality of existing equipment, availability of resources and the locality of the enterprise. By levying taxes on profits earned from taking
advantage of favorable conditions, the state can make enterprises compete on a equal basis.2 '

246. Commentator's article, Fundamental Ways to Increase Tax Revenue, Renmin
Ribao, April 14, 1984, at 1 (Chinese version).
247. Wang Kun, supra note 1, at 20.
248. See Jin Xin, The Principles and Practice of Constructing China' Tax System,
ZHONGGUO SHUIWU, No. 12, at 4 (1987).
249. See Liu Zuo, The First Function of Socialist Taxation Is Organizing Fiscal Revenue, ZHONGGUO SHUIWu, No. 6, at 23 (1986); and Xu Jianguo, Functions of Socialist Taxation, ZHONGGUO SHuIwu, No. 12, at 17 (1986). Agriculture Tax is not very important in
providing revenue, but it does secure the supply of grains to the state. See Cai Nong, Characteristics,Functions and Policy of Our Country's Agriculture Tax, CAI ZHENG, No. 2, at 37
(1985) (Chinese version).
250. See further Wang Ruichang, A Brief Discussion of the Characteristicsof the Economic Lever Function of Taxation, ZHONGGUO SHUIWU, No. 1, at 16 (1986); Deng Ziji, A
Brief Discussion of Taxation Lever, ZHONGGUO SHUIWU, No. 4, at 24 (1986); and Lu Renzhi,
The Comparison and Choice of Public Debt Lever and Taxation Lever, CAJMAO YANJIU, No.
11, at 60 (1986) (Chinese version).
251. Yuan Zhenyu, Functions of Socialist Taxation, ZHONGGUO SHUIWu, No. 4, at 33
(1985); and Tang Tengxiang, From Economy to Finance, ZHONGGUO SHUIWU, No. 11, at 42
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(a) Prices Versus Taxes
China used to have a highly centralized, planned economic system.
The overwhelming majority of commodities and services were controlled
by the state pricing management organs, and principal aim of pricing policy had been to maintain the stability of market prices. 52 Since the late
1970s, when new economic policies were adopted, China has been experimenting with a combination of market forces and state planning in order
to regulate the economy. By the end of 1987, the degree of central planning of the economy reduced from 100 percent to about 55 percent.2 "6
Two new pricing systems also were adopted in addition to the previous
system. Under these systems the state stipulated a single price known as
state stipulated prices." These two systems are "state guided prices" and
"market adjusted prices." The term "state stipulated prices" refers to
prices of products and rates of service fees determined by the Commodity
Price Department and the competent departments of local governments.
"State guided prices" are commodity prices and service fee rates determined by enterprises within the guidelines prescribed by the Commodity
Price Departments and the competent departments of local government
by setting a basic price fluctuation range, a2rate
differential, a profit rate,
54
a ceiling price or a minimum reserve price.

State stipulated prices are determined as not only the same as the
value of the commodity, reflecting supply and demand conditions, but
also to meet state policy requirements. 5 5 Prior to 1979, most goods and
services were subject to state price control. State policy required that agricultural products, raw materials and necessities be priced artificially low
in order to reduce the cost of industrialization; by contrast, luxury goods
and some industrial products were priced very high. 56 Consequently, enterprises producing highly-priced goods, such as watches and bicycles,
were profitable whereas those producing lowly-priced products suffered
257
losses or made little profit no matter how well they were managed.
Since price reform commenced in 1979, goods subject to state stipulated prices decreased from more than three hundred categories to
twenty-six by the end of 1987. However, basic production materials listed
(1986) (Chinese version).
252. HE JINMING, JINGJi GONGZUO SHOUCE (ECONOMIC WORKING HANDBOOK) 455 (1984)
(Chinese version).
253. Renmin Ribao (Overseas Edition), Nov. 9, 1987, at 1 (Chinese version).
254. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Price Control, art. 8, promulgated Sept. 11, 1981 by the State Council [hereinafter Price Control Regs.].
255. Id. art. 7.
256. It is argued by some writers that whenever prices are set above marginal costs, the
part of price over the marginal costs can be deemed as an indirect tax on the product payable by the purchasers. See R.H. Floyd, Equivalence of Product Tax Changes and Public
EnterprisePrice Changes, 28 IMF Staff Paper 338 (1981).
257. For a discussion of the disparities caused by the previous price policy, see Wang
Zhenzhi and Wang Yongzhi, Epilogue: Prices in China, CHINA'S ECONOMIC RF'ORMs 220
(1982).
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in the state plan, such as petroleum, natural gas, electricity, acid and coal,
are still uniformly priced by the state. The majority of industrial products
are, however, subject to the state guided prices and some goods are totally
priced by market forces. Certain products may be subject to three different prices, depending upon whether they are inside or outside the state
plan. In most cases, the stipulated price is lower than the guided price,
which is lower than the market price. 5 8 Enterprises used to be indifferent
to their profits, since they accounted for all their profit and loss to the
state and everyone ate from the "same big pot." The current economic
reform requires these enterprises to be economically independent and responsible for their own profits and losses. Although the price reform has
rationalized the pricing system, the reform cannot be completed within a
short period of time due to various existing problems. Further, inflation is
too high to allow further readjustments.25 9
To balance the "bitter and the sweet" among enterprises manufacturing different products, Product Tax and Value Added Tax (VAT) were
introduced in 1984.260 The tax rates of these two taxes were designed on
the assumption that price levels would be relatively unchanged."' Where
prices are higher than the value of products,2"' profits made by enterprises from the price over the actual value should be handed over to the
state in the form of tax, whereas enterprises that suffer losses due to the
price being set below the value should be granted financial subsidies in
the form of lower tax rates or special tax exemptions. Therefore, tax rates
are high for products which are sold at high prices and where the govern-

258. For example, rice is subject to three type of prices. When state purchases rice
pursuant to a contract signed with peasants, the price is state stipulated. Where peasants
sell extra amounts to the state, they can sell it at the state- guided price. If the rice is sold
on the market directly, peasants can get whatever price they can determined by supply and
demand. See Bao Xiansen, A Discussion of the Effect of Li Gai Shui on Price Factors,
CAIMAO YANJIU, No. 3, at 27 (1985) (Chinese version).
259. An obvious difficulty of rationalizing the price system is how to increase prices for
previously lowly priced goods, (mainly raw materials, agricultural products and necessities)
without causing a cost-push inflation. The inflation rate in 1987 was 7.3 percent, in general,
but around 20 percent for non-staple foods in cities. See Ge Wu, Prices and Economic Situations, Beijing Review, March 7-13, 1988, at 4; and Song Yangyan, Wang Haidong and Du
Duanhua, Reflections on and Designs of Price Reform, JINGJI LILUN YU JINGJI GUANLI (EcoNOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT), No. 3, at 21 (1987) (Chinese version).
260. The ICT performed similar functions as these two taxes but on a smaller scale.
261. See Liu Deming, A Brief Discussion of the Relationship between Price Lever and
Tax Lever, ZHONGGUO SHUIWU, No. 3, at 8 (1985) (Chinese version).
262. The value of a product equals the cost of production plus wages and average social
profit which is the average profit made by all enterprises manufacturing the same products.
See CHEN GONG, Hou MENGHUA AND YUAN ZHENYU, CAIZHENG JIAOCHENG (TEACHING MATERIALS ON FINANCE) 155 (1985) (Chinese version). The price of a product theoretically equals
the value of the product plus Product Tax or VAT. The amount of the Product Tax or VAT
is not shown on price tags and consumers do not know how much tax they pay when they
purchase goods. Normally, when taxes are increased, prices are not increased at all, or are
increased by a smaller amount, depending upon whether the state intends to maintain the
price level of the product or not. Thus, increased taxes are borne by producers.
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ment does not intend to encourage over-production of these products.
Lower tax rates or exemptions are applied to products which are lower
priced, and the production of which is necessary and needs to be encouraged. To influence consumption of taxable goods, higher rates are applied to those the consumption of which needs to be limited due to limited supply or social policy. Conversely, lower rates are set for products of
which the government encourages the consumption and for products receiving financial subsidies, such as foods and other necessities.26 This explains why the Product Tax has as many as 26 tax rates applicable to 270
taxable products.
It should be noted that, as long as the state controls prices, taxes will
be used to regulate supply and demand. However, it has been recommended that when prices are rationalized, i.e., prices equal the true value
26 4
of products, taxes should be "neutral".
3.

Attracting Foreign Investment

The Chinese government believes that lower tax rates will attract foreign investment to China and that taxing foreign investment in a
favorable way will do no harm to the creation of a suitable environment
for foreign investors. Therefore, tax incentives are offered to foreign enterprises and Chinese-foreign joint venture enterprises. These enterprises
are taxed at very low rates - 10 percent in Special Economic Zones for
export-oriented enterprises, whereas state enterprises are taxed at 55 percent and individual households are taxed at 60 percent or more. Foreign
individuals working in China are also taxed at nominal rates compared to
those applicable to Chinese citizens.
B. Equity
Before discussing the equitability of China's tax system, it should be
mentioned that the equity dimension of tax policy, highly important in
capitalist countries, is less important in China. Despite the fact that a
rich class of citizens is emerging in China due to the flexible economic
policies, large disparities of income are unlikely to appear in the near future because of the public ownership of land and means of production
and state control over wage increases. The communist party and the government maintain a host of instruments other than income taxation to
influence the distribution of incomes in the society. The government
maintains these controls because of the communist philosophy and tradi263. See Dai Yuanchen, A Discussion of the Relationship between Price and Public
Finance, Taxation, Credit, Wages and other Economic Levers, CAiMAO YANJIU, No. 1, at 9
(1986); He Zhaoqi and Tang Shunlu, To Properly Use the Price and Taxation Levers to

Promote and Speed up a Commodity Economy, ZHONGGUO SHUIWU, No. 9, at 8 (1986); and
Xu Riqing and Qian Wei, A Study on Several Questions relating to the Socialist Tax
Lever, CAIMAO YANJIU, No. 1, at 14 (1986).
264. Xu Jianguo, Relationship between Prices and Taxes, ZHONGGUO SHUIWu, No. 5, at
19 (1987).

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 17:3

tional Chinese values which emphasize equal levels of income and wealth.
1.

Vertical Equity

Marx and Lenin both called for a heavily progressive income tax in
socialist states in order "to ensure that the incidence of taxation falls on
those individuals best able to pay.""" Although China's Individual Income Tax (IIRT) is not heavily progressive, the recent Individual Income
Regulatory Tax and the Private Investors Individual Income Regulatory
Tax make it more so for Chinese citizens. Passive investment income is
taxed at a flat rate of 20 percent. With the basic deductions permitted,
the effective top marginal rate on royalties is a mere 16 percent for Chinese citizens. At first sight, China's system of taxing earned income more
heavily than unearned, and taxing workers more heavily than the selfemployed, seems contrary to socialist principles. Such an evaluation, however, is superficial. Employees do not begin to pay tax until their wages or
salaries are several times greater than average Chinese monthly earnings.
Even under the IIRT, tax becomes payable only when income exceeds
approximately four times average monthly earnings. Employment income
would have to exceed seven times the average before the total tax burden
equals that of the flat-rate tax on interest and dividends.
For Chinese citizens, the IIRT aggregates income from employment,
professional services and rents, with the two latter items now being taxed
at progressive rates. In addition, business income of individuals, whether
operating through private enterprises or individual households, is taxed
at progressive rates, though technically it is the enterprise which pays the
tax. In any event, it could be argued that a progressive income tax is not
needed in China for purposes of redistributing income, since redistribution has already been achieved by other means. The relatively even distribution of income and wealth in China, and the absence (as yet) of any
substantial class of "rich" individuals, reduces the need for a steeply progressive income tax.
A further possible cause of vertical inequity is the fact that personal
income tax plays, at least for the present, an insignificant role in public
finance. Heavy reliance is placed upon taxes on goods and services, which
are generally considered to be regressive in nature. Taxes on essential
items, such as the Salt Tax, clearly are regressive. In general, however,
the structure of indirect taxes seems to be mildly progressive, with low
rates applying to basic necessities and higher rates to luxuries, tobacco
and alcohol. Further, in an economy where the prices of many commodities are controlled, the conventional view that indirect taxes are necessarily shifted to the consumer is no longer valid. Currently, Chinese officials
feel that these taxes operate as taxes on enterprise profits, since they cannot be passed on in the form of higher prices. In the case of state enterprises this may make little difference, but as competition among different

265. M.

NEwciTY, TAXATION IN THE SOVIET UNION

361 (1986).
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types of enterprises increases in China, it may be legitimate to regard
indirect taxes, at least in part, as being imposed upon the profits of private and collective businesses.
2.

Horizontal Equity

In terms of horizontal equity, the present system stands up to scrutiny less well. A major reason for this is the essentially schedular nature
of income taxation in China due to the state policy of taxing earned and
unearned income differently, though the IIRT may be viewed as a step
towards the eventual introduction of a comprehensive income tax since it
introduces a measure of aggregation of the various sources of income. At
present, however, there is a mixture of flat-rate and progressive taxation:
an individual with a large salary may pay more tax than another individual with the same total income where that income is derived from dividends or interest, or from a combination of salary and investments. Since
different types of income are taxed differently - rents and royalties on
the one hand and dividends and interest on the other - distortions are
inevitable and opportunities for tax planning and avoidance arise.26 Another potential cause of inequity is the taxing of certain types of income,
notably rents, royalties and professional income, on the basis of gross receipts less a standard deduction, rather than upon actual profit.
C. Neutrality
Inequities will arise in the taxation of business income as well. Seven
different taxes - eight if one includes the Agriculture Tax - are imposed on profits, depending upon whether the business is foreign-owned,
a joint venture, a state enterprise, collectively owned, individually or privately operated. Each type of business pays tax according to its own rules
and schedule of rates. Since these different types of business are in competition with each other, there is a risk that differences in tax burdens
may cause distortions.21 7 Unfortunately, this situation may stay until a
complete reform of the business income tax system has taken place. In
any event, in a socialist state, the difference in ownership predetermines
the difference in fiscal liability of enterprises towards the state. The difference will remain if the government adopts different policies towards

266. Little is known about the Chinese attitude toward tax avoidance. Tax evasion, by
contrast, appears to be widespread and a serious problem. See, e.g., Renmin Ribao, May 13,
1985 (Chinese version); China Daily, Oct. 8, 1986. Nor is it a new problem. Ecklund records
a massive campaign against tax evasion in 1955, and notes that of 2,071 firms audited in
Wuhan, 1,760 were found to have evaded tax. G. Ecklund, supra note 19, at 41.
267. Different tax treatment, of course, may be designed to promote competition and to
compensate for other factors which cause distortions. Nevertheless, some consequences may
be unintended; for example, a large collective enterprises (in terms of profit) pays more tax
than a small one, although, when profits are shared among the individual members each
receives the same. Similarly, there are significant differences in the rates of tax applicable to
contractual fees earned by an individual under the IIRT, and by a private business under
the CEIT or Household Tax.
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each type of enterprise.
Distortions also exist in the indirect tax system, due to the partially
cumulative effect of the 'roduct Tax and Business Tax. This leads one to
wonder whether the value-added tax might eventually be expanded to replace those taxes. It should be noted, however, that some of the distortions are intended by the state to encourage or discourage the production
and consumption of certain products or to use taxation as an economic
lever to control the economy. Neutrality of the tax system is not yet one
of the main criteria to evaluate the Chinese tax system.
D.

Complexity

At first glance the Chinese tax system appears to be excessively complex. Where, in many Western countries, there is a single comprehensive
income tax, or two taxes (one on individuals and one for corporations),
China has nine or ten. Similarly, where other countries manage with two
indirect taxes - a sales tax or value-added tax and an excise duty China has four or five. Nevertheless, these differences are more apparent
than real. Frequently, a country will have a single income tax code, commonly of considerable length, which treats various types of activity and
income differently. Western tax codes are, at least, as complex as the
multiplicity of separate tax laws in China. The number of separate taxes,
therefore, is not important unless they are administered separately. Nevertheless, the existence of so many categories and rate schedules, both of
direct and indirect taxes, inevitably gives rise to "grey" areas and to uncertainty, which in turn may give rise to disputes between taxpayers and
authorities.
Simplification of China's tax system seems a distinct possibility.
There has already been a substantial move towards VAT in the turnover
tax system, but simplification cannot really take place until the pricing
system is totally reformed. Taxes on enterprises may be, at least in part,
integrated. A single income tax law on all enterprises with foreign investment has been drafted.2 8 The State Enterprise Income Regulatory Tax
may be repealed due to the pressure from both academics and enterprises
and we may eventually see a single enterprise income tax system in China
in the future.2 9 The Individual Income Regulatory Tax has moved a step
further in aggregating personal incomes.
IV.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As the current tax system is mainly a product of the new economic
polices adopted in the late 1970s, it is bound to be reformed along with
the further development of the economic and political reform in China.

268. Renmin Ribao (Haiwai
269. Cao Ruitian and Zhou
Economy - a talk by Jin Xin,
Finance, Renmin Ribao (Haiwai

Ban), July 7, 1988, at 3 (Chinese version).
Caifeng, To Organize Tax Revenue and to Regulate the
Director of the General Tax Bureau of the Ministry of
Ban), June 21, 1988, at 3 (Chinese version).
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To a certain extent, in fact, the tax system has already lagged behind the
development of the economic reform. For instance, the replacing of Product Tax with VAT has been very slow and has not taken into account the
results of the pricing reform by amending and simplifying the rate structure when the price of more and more commodities are subject to market
determination; the income taxation of domestic enterprises cannot completely meet the requirements of urban economic reform, which generates
some new forms of business entities, such as corporate groups, formed by
mergers among state enterprises, collectives or private enterprises, which
are not at present clearly subject to any tax laws; and there have been tax
laws providing for the taxation of enterprises and individuals where state
enterprises are contracted, leased or sold to collectives or individuals. The
existing tax system, also has many deficiencies in itself. The income taxes
levied on business income cause unfair competition among different types
of enterprises. Large and medium-sized state enterprises, which are the
backbone industrial enterprises of the Chinese economy, are subject to
heavy taxation and are short of funds for investment. 7 0 The multiplerate structure of the turnover tax system and the separate tax on each
type of enterprise cause confusion among taxpayers and difficulty in administration. Tax evasion has already become a big problem and concern
of the government." 1 Annual national tax inspections have been called to
investigate serious tax evasion cases and penalize tax evaders.
To accommodate the economic reform and create an equitable and
simple tax structure which fits in the socialist economy, the existing tax
system needs to be reformed and perfected. It is anticipated that the future reform may be conducted in the following manner. The turnover
taxes and income taxes will remain the two important components of the
system, and neither of which can become the leading tax. In the turnover
tax system, VAT will gradually replace product tax and, probably, business tax and an excise tax will be levied on some specific products. In the
income tax system, income regulatory taxes may be abolished, various tax
laws may be integrated, and progressive tax rates adopted. An agricultural tax may stay and be reformed to regulate the rural sector of the

270. See Zhou Shaoyun and Liu Jin, The Problems Existed in the Current Income Tax
System and Thoughts on Further Reform, CAMJNG YANJIU, No. 2, at 40 (1988) (Chinese
version).
271. It has been reported that, in certain areas of the country, about 50 percent of state
enterprises avoid tax and about 90 percent of individual households try to pay no tax at all.
Tax evasion is becoming a commonplace. See Renmin Ribao (Haiwai Ban), May 4, 1986, at
1; Han Shaochu, To Administrate Law with Law Is the Material Requirement of Taxation,
ZHONGGUO SHUIWU, No. 12, at 20 (1985); and To Implement National Tax Law and to
Guarantee State Tax Revenue, ZHONGGUO SHUIWU, No. 1, at 17 (1988) (Chinese version).
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economy. Local taxes may be further defined
to make sure that the cen2 72
tral government receives adequate revenue.

272. See Jin Xin, Principlesand Practicefor the Development of China's Tax System,
ZHONGGUO SHUIWU, No. 12, at 3 (1987); Xu Jianguo, Principlesfor the Establishment of our
Country's Tax System, ZHONGGUO SHuiwu, No. 4, at 21 (1987); Ji Kan, A Brief Discussion
of the Reform of our Country's FiscalSystem, JINGJI GAIGE, No. 2, at 25 (1987); Xu Riqing,
Du Yanshuang and Zhao Kaitai, An Inquiry on the further Reform of our Country's Socialist Tax System, CAIJING YANJIU, No. 5, at 8 (1985); Liu Liqun and Shi Xiaomin, Reflections
on and Choices of Tax Reform, CAIMAO JINGJI, No. 6, at 26 (1987); Shen Liren, Comments
on "to eat from separate kitchens" and to Delineate Central and Local Taxes, CAIMAO
JINGJI, No. 11, at 24 (1987); Cai Xiuguo, Several Ideas on the Third Stage of Li Gai Shui,
CAIJING YANJIU, No. 7, at 62 (1986); Sui Zongyan, Theoretical Basis and Guiding Principles
for Reforming and Perfecting our Country's Tax System, ZHONGGUO SHUIWu, No. 5, at 20
(1986); Gao Wancong, A Summary of Views of Discussions at a Seminar on Perfecting the
Tax System and Tax Models, ZHONGGUO SHUIWU, No. 2, at 27 (1987); and Xu Riqing,
Thoughts on the Develop Strategy of Our Country's Tax System, ZHONGGUO SHUxwu, No. 6,
at 21 (1988) (Chinese version).
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INTRODUCTION

In May of 1985 more than 400 American businesspeople attended
meetings in Moscow with Soviet trade officials as part of a conference
sponsored by the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission. The Soviets
hoped to accomplish a double purpose by hosting these meetings: demonstrate to Western nations that it was willing to do business, and encourage Western governments to reciprocate by relaxing trade barriers.'
One year later, Soviet trade officials met in New York with U.S. trade
leaders to explore what forms would best facilitate Soviet-American business relationships. After expressions of interest by Monsanto, Occidental
Petroleum, Singer Sewing Machine, and other companies,2 Soviet officials
announced a new Soviet Joint Venture Law in January of 1987.' Within
* The Leonard v.B. Sutton Award is presented each year in recognition of excellence in
international legal writing. The award is endowed by the Honorable Leonard v.B. Sutton.

Judge Sutton is a former Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, the former Chairman of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States, and an internationally renowned scholar and attorney.
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1. Rogers, Glasnost and Perestroika:An Evaluation of the Gorbachev Revolution and
Its Opportunitiesfor the West, 16 DEN. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 209, 211 (1988). The Soviet
description of the Commission's goals is: to search for ways of improving cooperation between the Soviet Union and United States' economies through seminars, symposiums, marketing, joint scientific research, joint ventures and technology transfers. USSR TRADE SupPLEMENr, J. of Comm., Dec. 8, 1986, at 10.
2. Aronson, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law: Analysis, Issues, and Approaches for
the American Investor, 19 LAW & POL'Y. INT'L Bus. 851 (1987). Among other interested
companies which have recently entered into negotiations with the Soviets are: RJR Nabisco,
Mercator Corp., Chevron, Eastman Kodak and Johnson & Johnson. See Breakthrough: a
Journalist'sReport From Moscow, THE NEW YORKER, April 17, 1989, at 30.
3. ON THE PROCEDURE FOR THE CREATION ON THE TERRITORY OF THE
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months the Soviets received over 200 proposals from interested Western
businesspeople.
Although there havc been joint venture laws in the Eastern Bloc for
some time, 5 this Western access to the Soviet economy is new and reflects
a changing Soviet Union, in terms of perestroika and glasnost as well as
the desire to integrate its economy with the more prosperous West. This
change of attitude has spread throughout Soviet society and politics, and
is confirmed by other recent events such as the relaxation of controls on
information, the historic agreement between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to
eliminate intermediate range nuclear missiles,6 and a number of domestic
and foreign reforms.
Some observers and experts on Soviet affairs have remained skeptical
of Soviet attempts to become involved with the free market, while holding reservations about Soviet intentions in the joint venture realm.7 However, the new joint venture law conforms to the realities of perestroika
and glasnost, and reveals remarkable flexibility by conforming to Western
investors' needs.
The joint venture law can bring about more than the establishment
of many small ties for profit. Partnerships based on common economic
goals will allow communist and capitalist enterprises to encounter and
assimilate each other. This interdependence will require the creation
within a given venture of structures for developing shared interests and
resolving conflicts, as well as harmonizing what may be considered a new
communist - capitalist economic culture.
Because the joint venture law does not operate in a void, these many
small ties will implicate numerous social, economic, and political realities.
The venture's resolution of inevitable conflicts arising under the law due
to differing ideologies, will be paramount to the partnership's viability. It
is through this mutual resolution of problems that larger processes for
conflict resolution are created: a process for resolving conflicts in the
U.S.S.R. AND THE ACTIVITIES OF JOINT ENTERPRISES WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS AND FIRMS OF THE CAPITALIST AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 26 I.L.M. 750 (1987)[hereinafter JOINT VENTURE LAW].
4. Wall St. J., April 6, 1987 at 20 (the 200 proposals were counted as of April 1987).
5. There exist East-West joint ventures in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
and Yugoslavia. See Scriven, Co-operationin East-West Trade: the Equity Joint Venture,

10

Bus. LAW. 105, 109 (1982).
6. Agreement was signed Dec. 9, 1987.
7. It is no secret that the Soviet Union desires to attain the same advantages given
member states of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Consequently, it
has been hinted that the Soviets believe their democratization of certain government powers
through Glasnost may lead to admission to GATT. Rogers, supra note 1, at 227. Speculation
operates in the idea that the new joint venture law stems from the Soviet desire to gain
admission to GATT. One means of broadening the base of Soviet export earnings and a
prominent role in world trade can be linked to joint ventures as the proving ground for more
of the open free trade principles found in GATT. See Aronson, supra note 2, at 856-867.
Arguably, the Soviet joint venture law may be a stepping stone for Soviet inclusion to
GATT.
INT'L
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larger context of East-West relations.

II. BACKGROUND
It is apparent that the Soviet Union no longer represents a compelling ideal to the third world, or even to its own society. As one commentator recently observed, "[S]ince Communism is becoming an evident failure at home, it is increasingly difficult for the Soviets to sell it as the
wave of the future to third world and other countries." In an attempt to
stabilize and modernize the Soviet economy, the U.S.S.R. has found it
necessary to expand its role in the world market by implementing what
looks remarkably similar to capitalist reform. If so, this would not be the
first time the Soviets have found certain Western reform advantageous,
since as far back as the 1920's Lenin implemented many free-market reforms in times of crisis.' In fact there is an economic crises in the
U.S.S.R. today and, as one author has determined, the programs the Soviets are implementing to correct its problems "[a]rise from the new Soviet
consciousness that its economic system is not working and that if it
wishes to keep pace economically and culturally with the rest of the
world, [it] must make 'significant changes.' "10
Before the enactment of one such change - the joint venture law foreign investment in the Soviet Union was limited to Industrial Cooperation Agreements (ICA's),"' which required a Western investor to furnish
the Soviets with the capital, equipment, and technical expertise essential
to make the Soviet run operation function. Without any real say in the
operation of the ICA or in managing the operations, Western investors
were left only with the hope they could recoup the cost of their original
investment.1 2 This conformed to the reality of the U.S.S.R.'s centrally
planned economy, controlled and administered entirely by a rigid and entrenched bureaucracy bent solely on state ownership of all means of production, prohibiting the private use of hired labor, and private management: a virtual ban on private business for profit.
The joint venture law is a stark contradiction to past Soviet policies
on foreign investment. Joint ventures are a creative form of business relationship, existing in many forms, and managed by their respective partners. A joint venture is simply, "[A]n economic entity comprised of two or
more partners which combine their assets, and expertise, and agree to
share the profits and losses resulting from their jointly managed
enterprise.""
The desire to implement a joint venture law in the Soviet Union

8. Rogers, supra note 1, at 211.
9. Id. at 239.
10. Id.
11. Dunn, The New Soviet Joint Venture Regulations, 12 N.C. J. OF INT'L & COMM.
REGS. 171, 174 (1987).

12. Id. at 175.
13. Aronson, supra note 2, at 855.
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came partly from the knowledge that joint ventures provide their host
country with great opportunities in research and development. These
benefits were made obvious by China's success with its joint venture
law." ' The Chinese experience, and the fact that joint ventures between
capitalist countries have also been successful, 5 has improved the Soviets'
receptivity to joint ventures.
III.
A.

THE JOINT VENTURE LAW - GENERAL PROVISIONS

The Venture Proposal

The first step for parties interested in creating a joint enterprise is to
submit a proposal to the Soviet partner's local ministry. The proposal is
to reflect an interested investor's tentative plans for a business activity
with a Soviet partner. After being processed through the Soviet bureaucracy, the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers decides whether to accept or
deny the proposal."8 The Council has wide discretion in making its decision. This discretion is limited only by such considerations as the Soviet
Union's need for raw materials, foodstuffs, new technology and management techniques, a desire to enhance the value of the ruble, increase imports of foreign exchange, and expand the export base of the U.S.S.R.."
B.

Structure of the Joint Venture

The structure of the joint venture is determined by a number of
mandatory and permissive provisions in the joint venture law. In the original 1987 law, a Soviet partner was to own not less than fifty-one percent
interest in the joint venture; however, the law has since been changed
permitting Western partners more than fifty percent ownership.' 8 The
venture is to be considered an individual entity, self-financing and with
its own balance sheet. That is, the enterprise must "sink or swim" on its
9

own.1

14. China has permitted an "open door policy" to Sino-Foreign partnerships in the
form of joint ventures for 10 years. These have brought China over 6 billion dollars in foreign investment from over 7,000 foreign investors. See Yuquing, Like Bamboo Shoots After
a Rain: Exploiting the Chinese Law and New Regulations on Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures,
8 N. W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 59, 118 (1987).
15. Since 1978 a number of industrial nations focused on joint ventures as a progressive
business. Most of those countries were high profit residence states such as the United Kingdom, United States, Japan, France, and West Germany. KAREN J. HLADIK, INTERNATIONAL
JOINT VENTURES 6 (1985).

16. 16 JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 750, secs. 1 & 2.
17. Id. at 750-751, sec. 3.
18. Telephone interview with Harold E. Rogers, Jr., International Attorney and Author
on U.S. - Soviet business transactions (April 10, 1989). For a view of the old forty-nine
percent rule see id. at 751, sec. 5.
19. With a view of the past, this provision is startling to most observers because it
allows soviet business to run itself for the first time, and allows joint ventures to set production limits and goals free from government control. See Dunn, supra note 11, at 174. What
M.S. Gorbachev has stated as the key to the new Soviet economic and social reform is, "[t]o
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The venture will conclude contracts on its own, acquire property, and
have the right to sue and be sued.2 0 Each venture is to have a board with
Soviet citizens as the Chairman and General Director. Participants of the
venture have the right, by mutual consent, to transfer their share of ownership to third persons. However, the Soviet partner has a first right of
purchase and any transfer must be approved by the Council of
Ministers.2
The joint venture must employ a labor force that is made up primarily of Soviet citizens,22 thus the venture may enter into contracts with
Soviet labor organizations. The venture must pay its workers wages, social security and pensions at a rate determined by Soviet law. All disputes
between the partners, and between the venture and other businesses, may
be settled either in the Soviet courts or by a Soviet arbitration tribunal.2"
Finally, the joint venture must create a charter and file it with the Council of Ministers. The contents of the Charter must include the purposes of
the venture, its location, composition of ownership, the stated amount of
each partner's capital contributions, and a statement of the Charter fund
composition.
The composition of the charter fund includes a statement of the
amount of foreign currency, as opposed to the rubles brought into the
venture. The value of each partner's property (capital contribution) is to
be determined by its conversion into rubles.2 This valuation is the determining factor of ownership interest and profit allocation between the
partners.
The duration of the venture may be perpetual; it is limited solely by
the Charter.2" The Charter may also include any other provisions which
allow the partners to further define their duties and relationship to one
another. Thus, having a Soviet Chairman and General Director does not
necessarily eviscerate a foreign partner's voting and decisionmaking
rights. Structures and rules for inter-venture decision making may be defined by agreement between the partners and incorporated into the ven-

carefully prepare, within the year 1987, and to implement in the U.S.S.R. law on State Enterprises. To extend its action to all enterprises in 1988 and 1989, and make them completely self accounting and self financing." Pravda, June 27, 1987, col. 1.
20. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 751, sec. 6.
21. Id. at 752, sec. 16.
22. Soviet Council of Ministers Decision on Joint Ventures with Western Firms, 4
INT'L TRADE REP. 358, 361 (BNA) (Mar. 11, 1987).
23. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 753, sec. 20.
24. Id. at 752, secs. 11-12.
25. Id. at 751, sec. 8. This is a very positive provision because many communist nations
limit their ventures' duration. Both Poland and Bulgaria place a 15-year maximum on the
length of the venture. Other socialist countries have similar principles. One problem associated with limitations on joint venture duration is that foreign partners must accept the
exploitation of their capital and technology by sacrificing their capital to the government
when exiting the partnership. See Scriven, supra note 5, at 109.
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ture charter.2" In many respects the charter operates in a manner similar
7
to partnership agreements in the Western legal world.1
C.

Venture Operations

For its operations the joint venture may create branch offices within
the Soviet Union.2 It may purchase raw materials from the Soviet
Union; 29 however, all the venture's purchases and sales in the Soviet domestic markets must be transacted in rubles. ° The venture's cash assets
must be deposited in a Soviet State Bank, with foreign currency to be
immediately converted at an exchange rate determined either by world
money market rates or a procedure established by the State Bank.3 '
The venture may import and export goods as necessary, but it must
do so through a Soviet Foreign Trade Organization (FTO). 3 2 Any foreign
currency expenditures flowing from the venture must be transacted with
the actual foreign currency brought in by the venture's export sales. The
foreign partner's repatriation of profits is similarly limited
to the cur3
rency brought in by the venture's net export receipts. 1

IV.

THE LAW'S INHERENT PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The new joint venture law presents ample opportunities for profit,
expanded trade, and improved foreign relations. Yet, because the law
does not operate in a void, it also presents problems that must be resolved. Major difficulties exist in regard to the law's provisions on foreign
exchange. There are, as well, the existing trade regulations promulgated
by the Soviet Union and Western nations: these alone present significant
obstacles. Finally, the absence of Soviet legal precedent in partnership
and contract law may well be the most daunting problem for joint

26. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 753, sec. 21. Without a foreign partner
having the ability to make major management and production decisions, the entire purpose
of the Joint Venture law would be destroyed. The Soviets desire to learn Western decision
processes and without flexibility in the charter agreements the Soviet partners could dominate the venture.
27. Id. at 751, sec. 7. This provision allows the partners to make specific contractual
obligations between themselves, thus minimizing disputes in the future.
28. Id. at 753, sec. 19.
29. There exist a number of incentives making it less likely that the venture will contract for raw materials outside the country. Large tax breaks are given to ventures that
purchase their materials within the country. Extra taxes can be levied on raw materials that
are imported, even while available within the Soviet Union. For a more in depth review of
the tax consequences to the Joint Venture, see UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: EDICT CONCERNING TAXATION OF JOINT ENTERPRISES IN THE SOVIET
UNION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 13, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 759
(1987)[hereinafter DISPUTE RES. LAW].
30. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 754, secs. 25 & 26.
31. Id. at 754-755, sec. 29.
32. Id. at 754, sec. 24. This seems necessary because the Soviet's wish to prevent the
importation of undesirable commodities.
33. Id. at 755, secs. 30-32.
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venturers.
These problems can be solved and, in many cases, aspects of the law
which appear to be obstacles are in fact opportunities in disguise. The
process of problem solving is as important as the solutions to individual
problems. The joint venture law provides the Soviet Union and Western
nations with an opportunity to develop common approaches to problems
in circumstances where shared goals are clearly defined.
A.

Foreign Exchange and Currency Problems

Foreign currency reserves are critical both to nations and joint ventures. Using the foreign currency it has acquired, a nation can invest in
activities and products from abroad and enhance the state's ability to
compete in the world market. Not surprisingly, states are quite restrictive
in controlling the foreign currency that enters and leaves their economies.
International law also reflects this attitude: there is no bilateral treaty
anywhere in the international business world that allows a venture to import or export domestic or foreign exchange freely." ' A state's regulation
of foreign exchange is explicitly recognized as an act of sovereignty."
Some countries are less concerned with the acquisition of foreign currency than others. Its importance depends on a country's relative economic status in the world. Thus, "While the acquisition of foreign exchange may be a high priority of the investment policy of the Sudan, it is
certainly not as important for Saudi Arabia, which seeks particularly to
acquire new technology.""8 Without question, the Soviet Union wishes to
acquire both foreign currency and new technology. In fact, the Soviet
need for foreign currency reserves is as great as that of Sudan; Soviet
currency has very little practical worth in the Western market.3 7 In its
trade with Western countries, the U.S.S.R. must use the currency of its
trading partners. Foreign currency is so important to a joint venture's
successful operation that it has been described as "the mother's milk of
joint venturing abroad.""
The new Soviet joint venture law's foreign exchange provisions also
present major difficulties for joint ventures. The law inhibits a joint venture's ability to obtain needed currency simply because the law is geared
toward increasing the Soviet acquisition of foreign exchange. The Soviets
have organized their joint venture law in a manner that makes joint ventures a conduit for bringing in foreign currency. The law inhibits the venture from sending foreign currency out of the country once it has received

34. Salacuse, Host Country Regulation of Joint Ventures, in JoiNT
103 (1985).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 106.
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37. Aronson, supra note 2, at 863. Of course, the Soviets need foreign currency to trade
with other countries and foreign businesses.
38. Salacuse, supra note 34, at 118.
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it." Provision 25 of the joint venture law limits the joint venture's use of
foreign exchange to the currency it earns through its own exports.4 0 The
venture is also precluded from obtaining currency subsidies and from borrowing currency outside the U.S.S.R."1 This forces joint ventures to concentrate their activities more in the area of exporting goods rather than
selling in the Soviet domestic market where payment would be in
rubles.4
The biggest risk a venture faces when dealing with these restrictions
is that its exports might fail or fall short. It would then be unable to pay
its foreign creditors and repatriate the profits for its foreign partner." "In
substance, the new law's express 'guarantee' of the right to take of profits
in foreign exchange . . . will apparently apply only when the necessary
foreign exchange has been earned."" Under Soviet law, if the venture's
foreign currency runs out, it must make all its expenditures in rubles."'
Many capitalists will be discouraged from entering joint ventures if the
pot of gold they seek exists only in rubles.
B. Foreign Exchange Rate - The Ruble
The essential problem of foreign exchange is the valuation process of
the ruble: all foreign currency and capital originally contributed or
brought in through exports must be deposited in a Soviet State Bank and
then converted to rubles. 4 6 The State Bank of the U.S.S.R. determines for
itself the official exchange rate.4 7 Such a one-sided determination of ex-

39. Although seeming harsh, such is not unusual in Eastern Bloc states, nor in China.
Yuquing, supra note 14, at 100.
40. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 754, sec. 25.
41. Id. at 860-861.
42. As long as a joint venture decides to concentrate on selling its products exclusively
within the Soviet domestic market there would be little concern over foreign exchange since
the entire process can be accomplished in rubles. However, because foreign currency is required for making outside purchases and repatriating profits, a foreign partner benefits
more by using its Soviet facilities to manufacture its products for export to its previously
established Western markets. As witnesses in China's international joint venture law, foreign investors have geared toward primarily export oriented ventures, Yuquing, supra note
14, at 100. See also, Salacuse, supra note 34, at 106 (Soviet law has forced many to accept
export as the quid pro quo). It may indeed be more beneficial to Western partners if they
set up primarily export oriented joint ventures since it is likely the Soviets will go along
with proposals which give the Soviets some competitive advantage in the manufacture or
sale of a product. This is expecially true when the foreign partner lacks a great foreign
marketing operation and could benefit from such activity. If a foreign partner does have an
extensive marketing operation throughout the world, he receives little incentive to enter a
Soviet joint venture because start-up costs override the low wages found in the U.S.S.R.
43. Aronson, supra note 2, at 863.
44. Smith, U.S. - Soviet Joint Ventures: A New Opening in the East, 43 INT'L Bus.
LAW.

79, 84 (1987).

45. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at secs. 25-29.
46. Section 20 of the joint venture law dictates that the foreign currency acquired by
the venture must be deposited in a Soviet Bank for conversion into rubles.
47. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at sec. 29.
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change rates can result in an inflated valuation of the Soviet partner's
initial contribution and, eventually, the share of profit that partner receives.4 8 Thus, a partner's profits could vary at the whim of state
49
policymakers.
Whi2 this discussion may lead one to believe that the future for joint
ventures is doubtful, it is still quite possible under the present law for
ventures to resolve the foreign exchange problems and reap sufficient
profits." The establishment of a fair exchange rate is more likely than it
seems. The Soviet Union has strong incentive to build up the international integrity of its currency:
Gorbachev may represent the last chance of better integrating the Soviet Union into the world economy. There it would come under pressure to behave like a Western Country, competing for capital... lowering the barriers to foreign investment and even making its currency
convertible.5'
It is in the strong mutual interest of both Soviets and joint venture's to
establish a fair exchange rate for the ruble. 2 Moreover, the joint venture
can protect itself from unreasonable exchange rates by agreement within
the venture charter. Both partners can agree as to the value of their respective contributions and ownership interests."
The Soviets have recently reacted to this dilemma of poor ruble marketability by considering a new type of "special ruble" for international
trade purposes. This limited edition ruble, if approved, will be available
to Western partners, and backed by gold and hard currency reserves.5 4
This type of consideration enforces the idea that the Soviets view the new
law as both flexible and accommodating to Western needs. 5
C. Import Substitution
Another way of relieving a venture's foreign exchange problems is
through import substitution. If a venture is producing certain products
which the Soviets need to import from abroad, it is much more economi-

48. Aronson, supra note 2, at 864.
49. Id. at 866.
50. Smith, supra note 44, at 84.
51. TIME, July 27, 1987, at 11.
52. There exist a number of obvious and not so obvious reasons for enhancing the value
of the ruble: 1) Since unfair rates will discourage foreign investors, the Soviets will be apt to
set a rate which encourages entrance into joint ventures; 2) The more joint ventures that
exist in the Soviet Union, the more the ruble is spread around the world community, and it
follows that this alone may enhance the integrity of the ruble in the free market; 3) The
more inflated the ruble becomes, the less likely it will ever be respected in the international
market.
53. Smith, supra note 44, at 89.
54. Soviet Union ConsideringSpecial Ruble to Lift Trade, Wall St. J., April 4, 1989, at
A17, col. 4.
55. Thus, we might consider this type of flexibility as a precursor to even greater Soviet
receptability to Western investors' needs.
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cal for the Soviets to trade with the venture and avoid the costs associated with importation, shipping, and excise taxes. If the Soviets pay the
venture for its products in rubles, they need not touch their foreign exchange reserves; however, the venture will be left with an excessive surplus of unconvertible rubles.
Import substitution allows the venture to utilize a greater amount of
foreign currency than it could if limited solely to the currency it acquired
through its exports.5 The amount of rubles the venture receives from the
Soviets is valued at its worth in foreign currency, and the venture then
receives the right to borrow or withdraw foreign currency from abroad or even within the Soviet Union - up to the amount of the valuation.
This allows a joint venture to utilize needed foreign currency above and
beyond the limits of its export income, as well as repatriate profits and
pay foreign creditors.
The benefits of import substitution are reciprocal. The venture receives a higher limit on its foreign currency transfers, and the Soviets
reduce their foreign currency expenditures on goods from abroad. 7 The
use of import substitution is only one example of how the Soviets and
joint ventures can meet their needs by resolving problems in respect to
their shared interests.
D. Countertrade
Countertrade offers further solutions to the joint venture law's limitations on foreign exchange. Countertrade is trade with an eye on avoiding the exchange of money. One form of countertrade especially useful to
joint ventures is barter. Barter is the direct exchange of goods or commodities of equal or near equal value without the use of currency.58
Although barter encompasses only 4% of all countertrade transactions worldwide,59 its practicality presents an obvious advantage for joint
ventures and the Soviets. A joint venture can trade the goods it produces
for the products of a foreign company. The goods received by the venture
may be divided up among the venture's partners according to their percentage of ownership. A foreign partner can avoid the harshness of the
Soviet controls on foreign exchange by having its share of the booty sent
to an FTO outside the Soviet Union. Thus, the FTO can sell the Western
partner's share of goods in exchange for convertible currency. The profits
from such can be deposited into a foreign account, thus allowing the partner to repatriate its profits. Of course, the Soviet Union also profits in
this transaction - it acquires the goods received by the Soviet partner,
new trading partners in the free market, and increases exports of Soviet
56.
57.
58.
(1985).
59.

Yuqing, supra note 14, at 102.
Aronson, supra note 2, at 861.
Rowberg, Countertrade as a Quid Pro Quo, in JOINT
Id. at 211.
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made goods.

Since it is often impossible to get immediate delivery of goods as
payment for outgoing goods, another more widely used form of countertrade (counterpurchase) may be utilized. Counterpurchase, or "buyback," is the exchange of goods for goods and is performed through reciprocal contracts. Each party pays for the other's goods in an escrow type
account upon receiving delivery of the goods, while guaranteeing by
promissory note that the other party will pay the same amount back into
the account upon receiving a reciprical delivery of goods." This avoids
foreign exchange problems because the currency never really leaves the
possession of the Joint Venture."
The Soviets should be very receptive to countertrade because of its
popularity and its benefits. Countertrade today encompasses over five
percent of all world trade, while some sources put it as high as thirty
percent. 2 At least 88 countries, including socialist, developing, and developed states, require some form of countertrade in certain transactions."
64
China has the same restrictions on foreign exchange as do the Soviets,
and for them countertrade has been a great success." Even greater benefits have been realized in the Slavic Communist nations. Western joint
venture partners in Yugoslavia have profited through countertrade, and
Yugoslavia has been able to afford the import of previously unattainable
goods from costly Western markets. Also, other Eastern Bloc countries
have also experienced a greater influx of needed consumer goods, a noticeable rise in their exports, and a growth in their domestic industries.6
The utility of countertrade strikes a balance between the needs of partners and the Soviet state. By recognizing the interests both desire from
trade, the joint venture and Soviet Union can develop a dialogue conducive to their separate and shared interests, therefore, shaping both Soviet
law and a future Soviet-Capitalist economic culture.
E.

Review by Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations

Although the joint venture law gives the Soviet venture the right to
import and sell goods in the domestic market,67 a Soviet Foreign Trade
Organization (FTO) must review and approve all transactions to deter-

60. Park, CountertradeRequirements in East - West Transactions, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW.
122, 123 (1982).

61. The venture can use the same lump sum of currency in a number of successive
transactions since only its presence in the account is important. For a more detailed description of countertrade transactions, see Atrisien & Buckley, Joint Ventures in Yugoslavia:
Comment, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 163 (1984). See also Rowberg, supra note 58, at 211.
62. BARTON & FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 80 (1986).
63. Rowberg, supra note 58, at 214.
64. Yuquing, supra note 14, at 100.
65. Id. at 96.
66. Atrisien & Buckley, supra note 61, at 166.

67. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 754, sec. 24.
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mine if the goods are appropriate for Soviet domestic consumption. The
venture is not free to deal directly with Soviet citizens until approval is
granted. Therefore, if the Soviet FTO is motivated to promote exports
over domestic sales, or to protect Soviet industry from competition, a
joint venture oriented toward sales in the U.S.S.R. will seldom succeed. 9
One of the most problematic aspects of the Soviet Union's desire to
regenerate its ailing economy is the introduction of unplanned goods into
their planned economy."0 Because the Soviets fear an introduction of
goods that are "too new too soon," they require a FTO to approve all
joint venture goods designed for domestic sale. 7 1 Another potential problem exists. It is not entirely clear whether the Soviets will require foreign
partners to bring the newest and most modern machinery and tools into
the joint venture. Some Eastern Bloc countries and less developed countries require a foreign investor to supply its venture with the most up-to72
date technology available.
The potential for resolving conflicts associated with FTO's is promising. We must not forget the benefits host countries seek through their
joint ventures: increased foreign exchange, increased employment, public
revenue, the development of local resources, management experience,
technology, and improved quality in domestic goods.7 These benefits are
not always realized by a host country, and there is a danger that a venture can backfire, causing greater harm than good.74 Nonetheless, the Soviet desire for obtaining the resulting benefits from joint ventures may be
motivation enough for allowing many previously unacceptable goods to be
sold domestically. 8 It is important to note that although FTO's are legal
entities, they are integral parts of the Soviet Ministry of Trade and,
therefore, representative of Soviet policy.7 Without the newest skills and
technology, the Soviets could neither compete in the world market nor

68. Smith, supra note 44, at 82.
69. Id. at 85. This situation might never arise if the joint venture states at the outset
what types of goods it plans to bring into the country. If this plan is approved by the Council of Ministers, it seems unlikely an FTO could override Ministry approval.
70. Dunn, supra note 11, at 177.
71. Smith, supra note 44, at 85. There exists a possibility that if goods are designed
primarily for export or destined for other communist nations, the FTO might be more willing to approve the venture's sale within Russia. Thus, a foreign partner should always seek
ministry approval of domestic sales before manufacturing.
72. Salacuse, supra note 34, at 15. The requirement provides a host country numerous
benefits, including: the examination of the newest technology around, modern equipment
which is less likely to break down and, low cost replacement parts. Likewise, these contributions on the part of foreign investors demonstrate their intentions to remain and make a
venture work.
73. Id. at 106.
74. These risks include foreign domination (both political and economic), as well as the
destruction of local competition, negative impact on foreign exchange reserves and, in the
communist world, adverse social effects from the introduction of undesirable consumer
goods. Id. at 107.
75. This is another example of how ideology must often accommodate practical need.
76. Dunn, supra note 11, at 174.
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improve their local industries. 7 7 From the Soviet perspective, joint ventures are the way these benefits can be obtained.7 8 There are a number of
steps joint ventures can take to prevent struggles with Soviet FTO's.
FTO's have discretion in how they deal with parties. They do not necessarily have the same policies or negotiation techniques as their brother
organizations. 7s Thus, foreign partners should learn as much as possible
about the FTO they will work with. The investor should determine beforehand whether it wishes to sell its products in the Soviet domestic
market and whether permission to do so can be obtained from the FTO.
F.

Foreign Regulation of Technology Transfers

A determination as to what technology may be brought into the Soviet Union is not exclusive of the FTO's. Capitalist states have an even
greater say in what types of products and technological know-how may
enter the U.S.S.R. from the West. Technology transfers are heavily monitored and regulated by most of the industrialized nations through their
membership in the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM).80 COCOM is designed to prevent militarily useful technology from being transferred by capitalist businesses and governments
to Communist nations. COCOM has the ability to prevent transfers
through political and economic pressures, including threats, and embargoes."' COCOM often enforces its purpose by committing its member
states to use their domestic law to punish those who export military technology to the Eastern Bloc. The states themselves may determine if a
certain transfer fits the definition of "militarily useful." COCOM has effectively blocked a number of transfers, as well as applied sanctions
against violators.8 2
The COCOM vision is to enable all capitalist nations to exchange
important technology freely, without the fear of having important technological information fall into the wrong hands. Ironically, this vision is inherently self - defeating: this paranoia held by Capitalist nations blocks
the flow of technology between industrialized nations.

77. Aronson, supra note 2, at 856.
78. Id. at 856. The newest advancements from Japan and South Korea are also a necessity for Soviet competition. Asian countries may also enter Soviet joint ventures since the
law is open to all "Capitalist Countries." JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 750,
sec. 1.
79. Smith, supra note 44, at 86.
80. COCOM includes Japan and all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries,
with the exception of Iceland.
81. Aronson, supra note 2, at 888.
82. Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1988, at 17, col. 1. France arrested 4 people charged with selling
electronic measuring and communications equipment. This was done under the authority of
COCOM using French anti-espionage laws. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1988, at 32, col. 5. Pressure
was also exerted through sanctions against the Toshiba Corporation and Norway's Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk for selling equipment to the Soviets which they could use to develop
quiet submarine propeller systems. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1988, at 26, col. 4.
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Many Western businesspeople feel the inclusion of certain items on
the COCOM embargo list is unwarranted. They feel that such inclusions
not only inhibit trade, but harm political relations as well. 8 3 More Western businesses are entering the joint venture arena and the pressures they
alone can exert on their governments may result in a relaxation of export
controls.
Moreover, certain actions taken by states in the name of COCOM
have been assailed. One such challenge is reflected in an ongoing debate
within COCOM. On January 29, 1988, the European Committee (EC)
protested the United States' attempts at passing a Senate Trade Bill that
barred the importation of products from foreign corporations that the
U.S. determined had violated COCOM's Export Controls List. The EC
(which includes many COCOM members) complained that the legislation
interfered with the purposes of COCOM and was nothing less than an
"extraterritorial application of United States law." '8 4 These accusations,
as well as other pressures from COCOM members, may cause COCOM to
shorten the list of banned items.8 5
G.

Domestic Policies of the Capitalist States

Further restrictions on technology transfers are made by the individual nations. The United States, for example, has export control laws
which restrict transfers of high technology. The Jackson Vanick Amendment8" limits the extension of most favored nation status to countries
that have taken noticeable steps to improve human rights. The Soviet
Union has been excluded from this status because of its restrictions on
emigration." Strategically, the Soviets have taken a number of positive
steps in improving their emigration policies and the U.S. may soon act to
lift the Soviet's restricted status.8 8
The United States' Export Administration Act of 1979 also restricts
the export of goods and technology which could contribute to the military

83. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1988, at 26, col. 4.
84. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1988, at 18, col. 5. Such protest by Western members of many
international trade agreements and committees is pressure which enables export standards
to be re-evaluated, and modified to the benefit of business.
85. Id.
86. 19 U.S.C. sec. 2432 (1982).
87. If the Soviets believe a most favored nation status would help improve its trade
relations and economy, it may find it advantageous to change its domestic policies even
more.
88. Charles A. Vanik, the co-author of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment, recently
stated, "With the Soviet levels of immigration, and its dynamic effort to relax its regulations
on religion and culture, why should the U.S.S.R. be denied most-favored nation under a
Jackson Vanik waiver .. " quoted in T.L. Friedman, U.S. Gets Appeal for Freer Trade
With the Soviets, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1989, at A5, col. 3. The statement was made in a
speech before the American Committee on United States-Soviet relations. Secretary of State
James A. Baker was present and hinted that a waivor might soon be issued to the Soviets as
a method of testing the new thinking of the Soviets. Id.
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potential of countries viewed as a threat to U.S. national security. The
Act was invoked in 1982 after Western European governments and firms
began exporting American pipeline technology and equipment to the Soviet Union in exchange for natural gas. Fearing that Western Europe
might become overly dependent on the Soviet gas, President Reagan issued an executive order aimed at preventing further exports. The U.S.
used political pressure and the threat of embargoes to persuade its allies
that the venture was unacceptable. 9 To bolster its right to engage in
these activities, the U.S. cited a provision of the act:
No person in the United States or in a foreign country may export or
re-export to the U.S.S.R. foreign products directly derived from
United States technical data relating to machinery utilized for the exploration, [and] production . . . of natural gas .... 11
The European Community protested that the U.S. actions were in contravention of "territoriality principles" accepted by all nations, including the
U.S.9 1
As tensions mounted between Europe and the U.S., the incident was
resolved, though not completely in favor of East-West trade.92 The ultimate decision as to what actions will be taken under the act is within the
discretion of the President.
Laws such as these place a great burden on the Soviets and their
foreign partners: neither can be absolutely sure whether necessary capital
and technology will be available to them. However, businesses that are
interested in joint venturing, or that are already involved in a joint ventures, can exert pressure
on their governments to ameliorate especially
93
harsh restrictions.
V.

IRREGULARITIES IN SOVIET

LAW

- PECULIARITIES IN APPLICATION

An important aspect of joint venturing in the Soviet Union involves
the venture's use of the Soviet court system. 4
The joint venture law permits partners in the joint venture to con-

89. The embargo list included oil and gas equipment as well as a general ban on certain
licensing issuances. See 83 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 28 (1983).
90. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 6(b) as amended by § 379.8 (1982).
91. European Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade
with the U.S.S.R., 21 I.L.M. 891 (1982).
92. Through economic and political compromise, the U.S. agreed that all present contracts with the U.S.S.R. should be recognized. The Europeans agreed they would not continue the venture, and would instead seek alternate Western sources for their natural gas
needs. Resolution of the East-West Trade Regulations and the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions,
83 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 28 (1982).
93. For a much more detailed look at U.S. tranfers of technology to the Soviet Union,
see G. Armstrong Jr., Transferring U.S. Technology to the Soviets: Some PracticalLegal
Problems, 16 INT'L. LAW. 737 (1982).
94. DISPUTE RES. LAW, supra note 29, at 759 (allowing the venture access to the
Soviet courts).
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tract with each other and with outside entities.9 5 Yet the Soviets have
only now begun to deal significantly with joint ventures. There is very
little applicable contract and partnership law in the Soviet Union.96 Contract rights, until recently, were allocated to a small minority of government entities, even though the Soviet Constitution provides its citizens
with such rights97 Soviet legislation places some limitations on contractual freedom,9 8 but there has been very limited litigation of contract
rights in the Soviet Union."
Not only is there a lack of substantive law in the areas of partnership
and contracts, but the joint venture law itself is in its infancy. Most of its
provisions still await an interpretation of law. As one author has sug'10 0
gested, the law is written broadly and resembles a "moving target.'
Neither side can know exactly how the provisions will be applied in a
given set of circumstances.
This "naked" law could lead one to believe that resolution of a joint
venture's conflicts might be best achieved elsewhere. However, the dearth
of applicable law should not be regarded as an obstacle, but viewed as
providing a blank slate on which Western attorneys and Soviet lawmakers
can write laws that will enable the ventures to prosper.
Because a joint venture is the mutual assimilation of each partner
toward creation of a new entity, there will be a number of interests common to both partners as a unit. A venture strives to profit from its undertakings and both partners will want to test and change laws that inhibit
the venture's ability to grow and profit. Simply stated, "[lit is through
the recognition of these goals by each partner that the necessary mutuality of interests is created."'0 1
One area the joint venture will surely explore is the extent to which
partners may determine their respective duties and powers. For example,
the preliminary guidelines of the joint venture law do not specify how
much control a foreign partner may have in selecting management and
labor. 1 1 Thus, the venture's charter agreement is one means of testing,
95. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 751, sec. 6.
96. Salacuse, supra note 34, at 115. The Soviets use a wide range of legal entities which
encompass their joint venture law. Their past use of agencies and ministries to monitor and
determine the outcome of disputes in their domestic realm must give way to dispute resolution in their courts. It is this change of legal supervision which provides the West an opportunity to integrate necessary laws into the system.
97. Id. at 113.
98. Article 234 of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Code provides that
changes in the Soviet National Plan may lead to a cancellation of contracts. Dore, Plan and
Contract in the Domestic and Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R., 8 SYR. J. INT'L. L. & COM. 29,
32 (1980)
99. Smith, supra note 44, at 82. See also id.
100. Rogers, supra note 1, at 853.
101. Scriven, supra note 5, at 106.
102. The termination of employees under current Soviet law can be accomplished only
under the most extreme circumstances. Aronson, supra note 2, at 874. Yet because poor
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defining, and developing the limits of newly enacted Soviet law.
Of course, there still exists the problem of what law should apply in a
given conflict. That there is virtually no Soviet law to apply to joint ventures may well be the greatest benefit to the West. The U.S.S.R. has a
number of incentives for absorbing western style contract principles and
partnership law. First, the Soviets wish to acquire and integrate Western
technology and management techniques into their industrial sector. 0 3
Adopting established and workable Western contract and partnership law
will expedite this process. Second, the Soviets would benefit from adopting Western law simply because of the difficulty involved in adapting existing Soviet law to cover the disputes unique to joint ventures. Finally,
Soviet receptivity to Western law will encourage greater Western
investment.
Western attorneys will need to use creative legal argument to protect
both partners' investment and define the boundries of newly established
law. "This transitional period of reform provides an opportunity for U.S.
lawyers to help shape the new Soviet legal and economic structure in a
0
way which would make it most advantageous for Western investment.""'
This need for Western legal knowledge is already evident as one New
York law firm has established an office in Moscow."'
The greatest obstacle to Soviet assimilation of Western law is the
effect such developments might have on Soviet ideology and policy. After
all, Western law comes replete with such democratic principles as voting
rights, equality, and the right to profit. In theory, at least, the problems
with ideology can be solved, since these problems are the subject of recent
Soviet reforms. In fact, General Secretary Gorbachev has titled the reform process as "The Democratization of the Economy."'" Though the
Soviets will have to compromise some ideology to receive the benefits of
joint ventures, this compromise would be minimal. Simply enacting a
joint venture law was an enormous sacrifice of Marxist ideology: the Soviet Constitution has always prohibited the ownership of industrial enterprises by anyone but the government. 07 Before recent changes, the law
permited a foreign partner to own only forty-nine percent of the venture.
However, the Soviets have recently made a dramatic change in the law by
allowing foreigns partner an unprecedented fifty percent or more of the

labor performance will effect the quality of products and diminish a foreign partner's invesment interest in a venture, the Soviets might be persuaded to initiate change in the area of
labor law.
103. HLADIK, supra note 15, at 40.
104. Aronson, supra note 2, at 853.
105. This is an annex of the New York firm Coudert Brothers. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16,
1988, at 32, col. 6.

106. ON THE PARTY'S TASKS IN FUNDAMENTALLY

RESTRUCTURING

MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY, Report by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
at the June 25, 1987 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, reprinted in Moscow News (Supp.) No. 27, at 4 (1987)[hereinafter GORBACHEV ADDRESS].
107. KONST. SSSR art. II.
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venture's ownership. 08 Furthermore, and for the first time in history, Soviet business (including the joint venture) may run itself with very limited government control. 10 If the Soviet Union was willing to sacrifice
ideology in enacting the joint venture law, it might easily do the same to
ensure their joint ventures retain that viability and attractiveness to the
West. One author has remarked, "[h]aving identified the need to engage
in joint ventures in order to advance .... the Soviet government will not
be restrained by conflicting statutory provisions. Once again, ideology will
be forced to accommodate practical need."" 0 Thus, the Soviets may well
sacrifice more Marxist doctrine in order to incorporate existing Western
law. This ideological flexibility is a virtual precondition to Soviet attempts at reviving their domestic business sector with modern Western
practices."'
VI.

CONCLUSION

The benefits that flow from the new Soviet Joint Venture Law have
yet to be fully realized. As joint ventures proliferate and mature, all parties will be able to take full advantage of the law's provisions. Those provisions allow expanded trade between communist and capitalist states.
The Soviets will enjoy access to their Western partners' established business connections in the free market; likewise, Western
partners will gain
2
access to a vast Eastern Bloc market alliance."

108. Insiders originally acknowledged that the Soviet desire for knowledge, expertise,
and technology possessed exclusively by some firms might give the Soviets a reason to allow
these firms even equal or majority ownership of the venture. Aronson, supra note 2, at 872.
Obviously their hypothesis has been fulfilled in a manner most surprising to even them. See
Interview, supra note 18. It is the power of the Soviet Regime which allows it to do
whatever it wishes with its own Constitution, and as the past has shown us, the Soviet
Constitution is often compromised; for example, freedom of the press and freedom of speech
are guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution. The fact that foreigners, can now own Soviet
based businesses may be the Soviets' most capitalistic compromise.
109. Dunn, supra note 11, at 174. This is the first time that such has been permitted
without government control. Combined with the fact Westerners may receive majority control over Soviet based property, the right to run the business end of the venture seems
natural, yet incredible when realizing these rights are available to capitalists in the U.S.S.R.
110. Id. at 178.
111. Gorbachev has repeatedly emphasized the need to change existing management
philosophy in the Soviet business strata to engender the efficiency of the West. As
Gorbachev has stated: "The sum of the Nation's substance of the fundamental reshaping of
the Nation's economy control is the switch over . . . from an excessively centralized system
of management to democratic, promoting self-management." CONCLUDING SPEECH OF
M.S. GORBACHEV TO THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, June 25, 1987, reprinted
in Moscow News (Supp.) No. 3276, at 4 (1987). The Soviets have always believed in a production enterprise operating under one-man management, with all responsibility for administration held by a single director. In contrast, capitalism frequently operates with co-equal
decision making, done by a majority of ideas and votes. Aronson, supra note 2, at 874.
112. Section 24 of the Soviet Joint Venture law grants joint ventures the freedom to
trade and transact business in the markets of COMECON member countries. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at sec. 24. The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) was established on Jan. 30, 1949 and includes the nations of the Soviet Union,
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The joint venture law also presents other historic opportunities. Although there are problems that must be solved, the problems can be
solved. In fact, the chance to resolve difficulties together in an atmosphere of mutual interest may be the greatest benefit of all.
As these East-West trading relationships have evolved from simple
once - off sales and purchases into the complicated transactions existing today, the partners ... have had to pay more attention to the
mutuality of interest which is inherent in any long-term commercial
relationship.' Is
Resolving these problems will result in formal structures for problem
solving. Structures such as an evolving Soviet commercial law, will lead to
enhanced understanding and cooperation, as well as the establishment of
a new Communist-Capitalist economic culture. More importantly, the
structures will be a way of perpetuating this understanding and cooperation between nations. General Secretary Gorbachev recognized as much
when stating,
Comrades, not one state in the world of today can regard itself isolated from others in the economic respect. Our country is no exception. International commercial and financial relations of countries and
the latest technological ideas invariably have an impact on our own
economy ....
In other words, restructuring of the Soviet economy
will promote broad international cooperation and, hence, better world
relations.'

Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, North Korea, Vietnam, and
Cuba. Its goals include the exchange of economic experience, technical aid, material assistance in foodstuffs, raw materials, machines, and technology. Scriven, supra note 5, at 105.
COMECON began as an alliance between communist nations (under Soviet hegemony) to
help war-torn Marxist regimes re-establish growth in their own economic systems and to
encourage the sharing of modern technological information.
113. Id. at 106.
114. GORBACHEV ADDRESS, supra note 106, at 10.

BOOK REVIEWS

Association International De Droit Penal
Reviewed by Edward Kwakwa*
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF VICTIMS (M.C. Bassiouni,
ed.); Siracusa, Italy, 1988; pp. 470.
The concept of basic human dignity has gained increased contemporary significance in the conduct of inter- and intra-state relations. Despite
this welcome trend, however, the international community has probably
placed undue emphasis on penalizing the perpetrators of crime and abuse
of power. In the process, there has been a corresponding de-emphasis on
protecting or adequately compensating the victims of such crime and
abuse of power. The publication of InternationalProtection of Victims'
is a timely event to help reverse this trend of ignoring or not adequately
alleviating the severe physical, psychological and financial harm suffered
by victims of crime and abuse of power.
International Protection of Victims is essentially a combination of
studies, commentaries and documents pertaining to the United Nations
Resolution of Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of
Crime and Abuse of Power.2 Divided into four sections, the text initially
* Visiting Lecturer in Law, University of Denver College of Law; LL.B (Honors) 1984,
University of Ghana; LL.M., 1986, Queen's University, Canada; LL.M., 1987, Yale Law
School; J.S.D. Candidate, Yale Law School.
1. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF VICTIMS (C. Bassiouni ed. 1988) [hereinafter
BASSIOUNI].

2. In December 1985, in a landmark pronouncement by the United Nations on the
rights of victims of crime and abuse of power, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted Resolution 40/34 which included an annex on the "Declaration of Basic Principles
of Justice for Victims of Crime and the Abuse of Power."
The Declaration files the lacunae in the definition of "victims" by including not only
persons harmed by ordinary or conventional crimes, but also those harmed or injured by
abuse of power. Paragraphs 1-17 of the Declaration define "victims" of crime, provide standards for access to justice and fair treatment, restitution from the offender, as well as compensation from the state and assistance toward recovery. Paragraphs 18-21 define "victims"
of abuse of power and call upon states to incorporate into their national law proscriptions
on abuse of power provisions for remedies to victims of such abuses. For a text of the Declaration, see Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly- Declaration of Basic Principles of
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/34 (Dec. 11, 1985),
reprinted in BASSlOUNI, at 201-05.
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gives a brief historical conspectus of events leading to the establishment
of the Declaration. Part II contains the core of the study. It includes
studies and commentaries by distinguished experts, many of whose reports were presented at a World Society for Victimology meeting held in
Dubrovnic, Yugoslavia. The third part of the book is a collection of all
the relevant United Nations documents pertaining to the Declaration,
and the redundant final part discusses some regional and national approaches taken in pursuit of the rights of victims of crime and abuse of
power.
There is much to recommend to InternationalProtection of Victims.
It demonstrates an acute sensitivity to the plight of victims of crime and
abuse of power. As succinctly put by Bassiouni, victims of crime and
abuse of power are by the very fact of their victimization persons whose
basic human rights have been violated. A growing realization of the preeminence of individual and collective human rights should therefore serve
as an incentive for scholars and international legal practitioners to draw
attention to the problems faced by victims of crime and abuse of power.
The studies and commentaries in International Protection of Victims
serve as a useful guide in this respect.
All of the essays, without exception, are scholarly, instructive and
thought-provoking. Kerrigan provides a detailed paragraph-by-paragraph
analysis of the United Nations Declaration. 3 He rightly concludes that
victims of abuse of power may need greater attention. This follows from
the obvious defects in Part B of the Declaration dealing with victims of
abuse of power, which suffers from serious ambiguity in terminology.
The second essay by Professor Lamborn 4 suggests an "internally consistent and rational way" 5 of reconciling these ambiguities. In his view,
paragraph 19's reference to "norms proscribing abuses of power" should
be construed to mean "internationally recognized norms relating to
human rights." 6 Paragraph 21's "acts that constitute serious abuses of political or economic power," pace Lamborn, is also a reference to "those
[acts] in violation of internationally recognized norms relating to human
rights."7 In this reviewer's opinion, such a teleological interpretation of
the Declaration serves a useful purpose. To be sure, it is the only way in
which the inconsistent paragraphs of the Declaration can be reconciled. It
is also the most effective way of giving effect to the aims and purposes of
the Declaration. A reference to "internationally recognized dimensions
and effects of acts taking place within an otherwise domestic setting.

3. Kerrigan, Historical Development of the United Nations Declaration,in BASSIOUNI,
supra note 2, at 91.
4. Lamborn, The United Nations Declarationon Victims: The Scope of Coverage, in
BAssIouNI, supra note 2, at 105.
5. Id. at 112.
6. Id. at 113.
7. Id.
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Dr. Van Dijk's essay Prioritiesfor Policy Makers8 will be of genuine
interest to scholars of law and policy. More significantly, it should be of
great value to government officials and policy makers who are genuinely
concerned about improving the condition of crime victims. Dr. Van Dijk
reminds us that the criminal justice system does not treat victims of
crime with respect. He therefore makes an eloquent plea to police officers,
prosecutors and judges for better treatment of crime victims.
Professor Waller addresses implementation of the Declaration.' He
provides the reader with a comparative study of implementation measures adopted in various legal systems. No less important are his additional recommendations on adoption, application, review and dissemination of the Declaration.
Marco Sassoli's thesis on the victim-oriented approach of International Humanitarian Law10 is probably the most detailed as well as the
most important contribution. Armed conflicts undoubtedly produce the
greatest number of victims. The point bears emphasis; as lucidly put by
Sassoli, situations of armed conflict "represent the most intense form of
victimization in the contemporary world."" Sassoli rightly points out that
the United Nations Declaration covers only victims of violations of domestic criminal law and internationally recognized norms relating to
human rights." In effect, the Declaration treats violation of a norm as the
conditio sine qua non for the existence of a "victim." This is in contradistinction to the position of the "victim" in international humanitarian law.
The laws of armed conflict protect both combatants and non-combatants,
and not only those affected as a result of a violation of the laws of war.
Sassoli clearly and cogently demonstrates that International Humanitarian Law is victim-oriented. Indeed, he succeeds in establishing that
International Humanitarian Law is more victim-oriented than International Human Rights Law. 3 "The writer observes that the best way to
improve the situation of victims is to prevent their being victimized. This
leads him to the self-evident statement that "the best way to prevent victimization by armed conflicts is to prevent armed conflicts."' " Unfortunately, however, this is the one area in which International Humanitarian
Law is unable to play a direct role. Sassoli does not seem troubled by this;
in his opinion, there exist "other branches of international law, with their
own implementing procedures and bodies, intended to prevent armed

8. Van Dijk, The United Nations Declarationon Crime Victims: Prioritiesfor Policy

Makers, in BASSIOUNI supra, note 2, at 117.
9. Waller, Rights of Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power: From Rhetoric to Realiza-

tion, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 127.
10. Sassoli, The Victim-Oriented Approach of InternationalHumanitarianLaw and
of the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 147.
11. Id. at 148.
12. Id. at 150.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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conflicts."1 He might have added that the conclusion to be drawn from
this scenario is stark and plain - International Law in general, and International Human Rights Law in particular, are not as victim-oriented
as International Humanitarian Law would have them be.
The final commentary by Bassiouni is on the protection of "collective
victims" in international law.16 The "criminal conduct, goals, and outcome in the case of "collective victims" are predicated on the fact that
'
Bassiouni's
the victim belongs to an identifiable group or collectivity."17
essay provides the reader with a sophisticated overview of a complex subject. It gives a carefully reasoned distinction between individual and collective victims, discusses the sources of international law applicable to
collective victims, and delineates an extensive list of international crimes
as well as categories of collective victims protected under international
human rights instruments. Bassiouni's discussion leads him to four troubling conclusions: first, there are several categories of collective victims
who are victimized in spite of the protections granted them by national
and international law; second, there are very limited or ineffective means
to adequately prevent such victimization; third, the modalities for the
protection or compensation of collective victims are inadequate; and finally, objective scientific study of the problems of collective victims are
being hindered or stalled because of concerns about the politicization of
8
the issues involved.
InternationalProtection of Victims is not without blemish. A close
reader is likely to get bored and frustrated with the book - this is because a certain amount of material overlaps throughout the book. In fairness to the editor, this could be explained by the fact that the studies and
commentaries are all based on the same United Nations Declaration. The
fourth part of the book could however have benefited from a less Europocentric concentration and a more representative coverage of regional
and national approaches to the problems of victims of crime and abuse of
power. Out of the nine essays, there are five on Europe, and one each on
North America, South Australia, India and Nigeria. Above all, International Protection of Victims suffers from patently obvious typing errors
in some crucial areas. For example, Part II of the table of contents refers
to "The United Declaration of Victims" [sic], in an apparent reference to
the United Nations Declaration. An even more fundamental objection
could be made to page 148 of the book, which refers to "the four Geneva
Conventions of 1943" (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, these errors do not detract from the essence of International Protection of Victims. It is a very timely publication which will

15. Id. at 183.

16. Bassiouni, The Protection of "Collective Victims" in InternationalLaw, in BASsupra note 2, at 181.

SIOUNI,

17. Id. at 191-92.
18. Id.
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serve as a useful introduction to the intricate but often overlooked issues
pertaining to victims of crime and abuse of power.

International Criminal Law: A Guide to U.S.
Practice and Procedure
Reviewed by Edward Kwakwa
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Ved Nanda and Cherif Bassiouni, eds.)
New York: Practicing Law Institute, 1987. Pp xiv, 546.
What sources of law can a United States practitioner turn to when
faced with a case that has international criminal ramifications? What are
some of the procedural aspects of criminal law issues most likely to be
encountered by the international business transactions practitioner?
Which areas of international judicial assistance in criminal matters are of
interest to a United States attorney? Where does he find the relevant
laws on extradition, diplomatic and consular immunity? Above all, what
judicial remedies are available in United States courts for breaches of internationally protected human rights? These ubiquitous and important
questions are the focus of inquiry in Ved Nanda and Cherif Bassiouni's
InternationalCriminal Law: A Guide to U.S. Practice and Procedure.1
The book is a combination of essays by several distinguished practitioners and academicians. It is appropriately divided into six subject areas: jurisdiction, mutual assistance and judicial cooperation, extradition,
immunities, constitutional limitations and judicial remedies. It is not possible, within the confines of this review, to adequately summarize and appraise in sufficient detail the various and varied essays in International
Criminal Law. The variation in attention or length of review given to a
particular essay should therefore not be construed as a judgment on its
quality.
The first part of International Criminal Law is a very useful introduction by the editors. The introduction is essentially a discussion of the
reasons for, and scope of coverage of the book. Part II deals with the
subject of jurisdiction. Professor George gives a comprehensive discussion
of United States Federal anti-terrorist legislation, with particular emphasis on the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.2 His discussion has
been given greater relevance by the ongoing trial of several terrorists in
United States federal courts.
Theodore Banks also addresses the issue of international activities
and criminal considerations under United States antitrust laws. His principal concern is with the Sherman Act, a task for which he draws upon

1. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (V.

& C. Bassiouni, eds. 1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
2. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).

CRIMINAL LAW].
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his experience as corporate counsel. For the international business practitioner concerned with antitrust laws, the issue of which practices violate
the antitrust laws is inextricably tied to the question of jurisdiction under
the Sherman Act. Banks' discussion of such landmark cases as American
Banana,3 Timberlane,' and Mannington,5 as well as subsequent developments in the case law, will be of invaluable assistance to the interested
practitioner. Following up on the theme of jurisdiction, Professor Herman
addresses issues pertaining to the extraterritorial application of United
States securities laws. He presents a summary of criminal provisions in
United States securities laws, surveys some of the leading cases on extraterritorial application of the United States securities laws, and concludes
that the test of "reasonableness," rather than the "conduct and effects"
test, will more appropriately facilitate a determination of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities laws and any criminal prosecution brought
under those laws.
In his chapter on tax crimes and extraterritorial discovery, David
Pansius argues that if one accepts the need for broad powers possessed by
the government in the domestic setting, then one must a fortiori give
United States discovery powers the broadest construction in the international setting. Any contrary position, he insists, would permit foreignbased individuals or wealthy Americans to evade taxes through foreign
transactions in jurisdictions that have secrecy laws. The chapter also discusses conflict of laws problems that arise in two different situations those in which there is a tax treaty in force between the United States
and the foreign jurisdiction, and those in which there is no such treaty.
The section on jurisdiction ends with Reed Kathrein's essay on criminal
enforcement of the Export Administration Act, Francis Higgins' chapter
on procedural aspects of anti-boycott laws and regulations, and that of
Robert Gareis and Paul McCarthy on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and related statutes.
The third major section of InternationalCriminalLaw is on the subject of mutual assistance and judicial cooperation. Prominent among the
essays in this section is Cherif Bassiouni's examination of issues arising
from bilateral treaties that allow for the transfer of convicted criminal
offenders. Parts IV, V land VI of the book cover the areas of extradition,
immunities and constitutional limitations, respectively. The final chapter
of the book is on judicial remedies. Written by Professor Nanda, the
chapter is, as is to be expected, penetrating and incisive. Professor
Nanda's discussion provides a variation on the dominant theme by shifting attention from domestic law limitations to international law limitations. The focus of inquiry is on the remedies available to a plaintiff who
invokes norms of international human rights law in United States court.
Professor Nanda asserts that the international community has success-

3. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
4. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
5. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
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fully established norms of international human right law in the post-1945
era. Unfortunately, however, the achievements in prescribing norms
"have not been matched by availability of remedies to the victims of the
violations of those norms." 6 The chapter also discusses the interface between international criminal law and international human rights, and examines the treatment of treaties and customary norms of international
human rights law United States courts. Professor Nanda ends the book
on an optimistic note by predicting that conventional and customary international human rights law will eventually find their proper place in
United States courts.
International Criminal Law is a major contribution to international
scholarly literature. As far as this reviewer knows, it is the first of its kind
that has brought together so many essays by such distinguished experts
on international criminal law and how it impacts on United States practice and procedure. The book is extensive in scope - it covers some of
the most important and crucial aspects encountered on an everyday basis
by the international legal practitioner. The individual essays are all concisely written, lucid in style and very well documented. The book also
provides the reader with an extensive table of authorities, as well as an
index.
The editors state at the outset that the book is meant to provide an
international law practitioner with a useful set of materials; it is their
hope that the book proves to be useful for those practicing in the international criminal law area. Professors Nanda and Bassiouni skillfully succeed in performing the task they set out to do with the publication of
InternationalCriminalLaw. But they do more than that - the book will
be of invaluable assistance not only to international law practitioners, but
also to teachers, students and even government officials involved in substantive and procedural aspects of international criminal law in United
States practice. Professors Nanda and Bassiouni deserve congratulations
for adding International Criminal Law to their already extensive list of
publications.
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BOOK NOTES

SANDS, P., CHERNOBYL: LAW AND COMMUNICATION;

Grotious Publications

Limited, Cambridge, England (1988); $57.00; ISBN 0-949009-22-9;
312pp.; index, bibliography, map section.
This publication brings together in a single volume some of the more
significant materials needed to examine the legal issues and ramifications
arising out of the Chernobyl accident. Moreover, likely developments in
this area are also considered. Twenty four texts, each commencing with a
personal note by the author make up this publication which successfully
studies the legal issues relating to nuclear accidents which have international effects
G., SOUTH AFRICA AND THE RUKE OF LAW; Printer Publisher,
London and New York (1988); $37.50; ISBN 0-86167-919-8; 159pp.; index.
This report, conducted by four lawyers both from practical and academic backgrounds focuses on "legislation" in South Africa. The report
takes into account legislation regarding areas such as freedom of speech
and expression, education, children, the right of personal freedom and the
legal stuctures of Apartheid. It is premised upon the notion that the
South African government has undermined all human rights of the black
and colored people. Moreover, the report suggests that South African legislation has made a mockery out of it's legal system. This mission rejects
claims that human rights violations are justified by security reasons. Report takes into account developments up to the end of February 1988.
BINDMAN,

S.P., WORLD POPULATION AND THE UNITED NATIONS; Cambridge
University Press (1987); cloth $59.50, paper $22.95; ISBN 0-521-32207-3
hard cover, ISBN 0-521-31104-7 paper back; 357pp.; charts and index.
This book overviews four decades of United Nations involvement regarding the world's population dilemma. The author particularly emphasizes on the post 1969 period. The book primarily focuses on the creation
of the U.N.'s Fund for population activities (UNFPA), and deems it as
the major instrument for United Nations for resolving the problem. Actual accomplishments with regard to the population problem have been
studied. Furthermore, major sections of the book are devoted to the two
international conferences on population which have been held during the
periods under consideration.
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